3  Authoritarian under-labouring?

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On the occasion of Richard Sparks’s honorary doctorate, I paid tribute to the diverse domains where Richard makes nuanced contributions, and the humble humanitarian character of his manner in doing so. He cares about the environmental and corporate crime catastrophes discussed in this chapter, even though they are not Richard’s main thing. He wants to include space for them in his rendez-vous criminology. Even so, I sought to be provocative by suggesting that increasingly I think about being an authoritarian under-labourer, rather than the democratic under-labourer advocated by Richard. Richard, initially with David Garland (Garland & Sparks, 2000) and more fulsomely with Ian Loader (Loader & Sparks, 2010, 2011, 2016), retrieved John Locke’s democratic under-labourer to serve a better democratic politics of crime through generating useful knowledge. Like Michael Burawoy (2005), they aim for a social science that engages in dialogue with democracy’s publics that are already in dialogue. In pondering authoritarian under-labouring, this chapter also positions the discipline of criminology, critical criminology, preoccupation with national policy, and national intellectual communities as distractions when the planet is in peril.

One could advance a case for being an authoritarian under-labourer by contending that many Western ‘democracies,’ such as those ruled by Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and the ruling investment banks of financialized capitalism, constitute authoritarian societies where the tyranny of the democratic majority is an ugly tyranny to labour under. That is not the argument I run. I do not consider it a ridiculous argument that to be a democratic under-labourer in such authoritarian societies can be a bit phony. To apply for grants to work with their criminal justice systems or their corporate elites; to write letters for rankist, elitist, blackballing clubs like the British Academy, as I am currently doing, and to claim to be a democratic under-labourer, might be phony. Instead of working on a deconstruction site to pull apart democratic under-labouring under the authoritarian conditions of exclusionary Western societies, my advocacy will be for working on a construction site for more productive engagement with the geopolitical relationships among China, Russia, and the United States. It argues for a different kind of criminology of the commanding heights of great power institutions and organizations (such as NATO, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the Basle Committee, and...
environmental treaty secretariats). This transnational criminology differs from
democratic under-labouring as a national practice that can amount to shifting deck
chairs on the Titanic.

Universities became a good training ground for authoritarian under-labouring
as they became less democratic, shunning the democratizing reforms of the 1960s
and 1970s that removed deans and heads who ‘managed up’ in favour of leaders
deliberatively accountable to, and chosen by, faculty and elected student represen-
tatives. The trick of living noble lives within universities, or one of them, is to
use them as a platform for work that contributes to a less dominating world, while
speaking your truth to the power of university domination as you do it. The point
and paradox of authoritarian under-labouring in my geopolitical sense is to find a
fulcrum that levers an undermining of authoritarianism as it advances protection
of our grandchildren from tyrannies such as nuclear war, other forms of mass
violence, mass unemployment, and ecocide.

Environmental under-labouring

In my homage to Richard Sparks at Leuven, I referred to my hope to make a con-
tribution to understanding how Chinese environmental police can be more effec-
tive, working with Chinese colleagues as an authoritarian under-labourer while
always of course being a critic of authoritarianism. I sought to advance some vir-
tues of being a cosmopolitan social scientist who might see it as important to help
an authoritarian society, with authoritarian traditions of policing, to become more
effective in its environmental enforcement. I referred to something of note under-
way in Chinese policing. China since 2017 sharply increased investment in envi-
ronmental regulation on the back of more gradual increases in the previous twenty
years (van Rooij, Stern, & Furst, 2016). Since 2017, recognizing that Chinese
environmental regulators have in the past been prone to capture and corruption,
the Communist Party has encouraged courts and police departments to establish
dedicated environmental divisions. ‘Environmental police’ (Wunderlich, 2017)
played a significant role in increasing prosecutions of individuals for environmen-
tal offences in 2018 by 21 per cent to 42,195 and arrests by 52 per cent in 2018 to
15,015 (South China Morning Post, 2018).

That said, Zhang Zhijie, a senior prosecutor with China’s Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, announced that even though environmental fines collected
increased by 32 per cent in 2018, normally a more restorative approach to enforce-
ment is used: ‘We are punishing crimes, with the purpose not to impose simple
criminal punishments on suspects and defendants, but to repair social relations,
restore environmental damage and demonstrate a favourable course of develop-
ment’ (South China Morning Post, 2018). This means that arrests are followed by
mediation, often in police stations, for many cases. Chinese authoritarianism more
generally uses restorative justice in millions of criminal cases every year in order
to take the law seriously, while co-opting Confucian conceptions of ‘harmony’ to
that project in order to avert the defiance to state authority that was engendered by
previous ‘strike hard’ policies (Braithwaite & Zhang, 2017; Li, 2015; Trevaskes,
While it is important to deconstruct the restorativeness of the largest restorative justice programmes in the world, which are Chinese, it can also be useful to construct the work of Chinese environmental police through a restorative lens.

When environmental complaints are made by Chinese citizens, they are contained by channels ‘within-the-system’ and have no impact on enforcement levels. But when local environmental protests boil up ‘outside-the-system,’ environmental enforcement responds to public protest with what Marquis and Bird (2018) demonstrated statistically to be heavier penalties compared to penalties applied against managers of corporations in cases where there was no civic protest. So we can also deconstruct some democracy out of Chinese authoritarianism. In circumstances of crisis, China proves willing to bend to and use its ‘mass line’ to quell domestic disquiet. It indulges some ‘responsive authoritarianism.’ Then China promotes its geopolitical ascendency by selling its responsive technological solutions to a world that ultimately needs these technologies to survive the same environmental crises. Marquis and Bird’s (2018) responsive authoritarianism engages in dialogue with China’s publics, who are already in dialogue (on the streets) over environmental crisis, by acknowledging the discourse of the mass line. Through these various channels, China since 2017 has been mandating the capacity to tackle environmental challenges and to decarbonize with more enhanced checking of corruption and decarbonization fraud than might have been expected in the past.

Engaging with Chinese environmental police, seeking to learn from them, and also connecting them up to evidence-based regulatory compliance literatures definitely seems a form of authoritarian under-labouring. It may not be as important a form of it as transnational environmental diplomacy, financial regulatory diplomacy, and nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy that helps great powers to work together to avert financial and climate crises and nuclear wars. Yet refusing to work with Chinese environmental police because that would be authoritarian rather than democratic under-labouring is instructive in the way it reveals that there are so many important paradoxically democratic aspects of authoritarian policing projects, just as there are authoritarian aspects to the most democratic of policing in ‘democratic societies.’

I came to see the possibility of research on Chinese environmental police as a valuable kind of contribution to engage with after reading a manuscript by Peter Drahos (forthcoming). It argues that China is the only slim hope if the world is to avoid a 2°C average increase in global warming in the decades ahead. When President Obama was elected in 2008, it was a time of hope. But Obama dashed those hopes, opting for renewables talk but action that promoted carbon investment, as the United States became the newly dominant oil and gas power through massive expansion of fracking. In an important sense, being a democratic under-labourer under Obama’s and Hilary Clinton’s Democratic Party was a more dangerous practice than under Trump. Obama was the president who first campaigned during 2007 for a Green New Deal; he was the president gifted the crisis of 2008 that was the opportunity for just that. Instead, his administration placed crisis management into the hands of big banks, big oil, and gas. Nor did he move...
back from authoritarianism to democracy by closing down detention without trial in Guantanamo Bay as he had promised. He took a Nobel Prize with talk of peace, but walked the walk of wars through ‘surges’ and escalated extrajudicial assassination by drones that cascaded authoritarianism globally (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018).

Fortunately, East Asian geology is not so friendly to fracking. So we have seen Japan become responsible in the past decade for as much renewables investment as all of Europe, and China has surged past the United States to account for 45 per cent of global investment in renewables, dominating innovation in most renewable energy technologies. The Richard Sparks ‘observer-turned-player’ says: ‘democratic under-labouring – do you mind if I don’t run that one past the minister’; s/he speaks of the game that matters as being ‘inside the machine.’ This worldly-wise observer-turned-player is inside the wrong machine, however, according to my analysis. In the North Atlantic, they talk the talk of inconvenient truths with worldly-wise ‘yes minister’ platitudes; in East Asia, especially China, they are seriously beginning to walk the walk. If we articulate our under-labouring to those inside North-Atlantic policy machines, our grandchildren may perish. There is more appeal in the Loader and Sparks dialectic between the ‘social movement activist’ engaged in more global forms of politics and their democratic under-labourer’s sympathy for, indeed embrace of, civil society. This embrace is combined with determination to sustain a critical sensibility and wariness of suppressed criticality ‘for the cause’ (Loader & Sparks, 2011).

Dancing with authoritarianism should imply even more wariness of suppressed criticality in societies where arrest, and worse, for local colleagues can await the critical. With China, it is important to frame its superior acceleration of green investment compared to the West by acknowledging that its authoritarianism was adept at climate denial until the pollution in its cities became so catastrophic that it threatened political stability. No nation contributes anywhere near as much carbon to the crisis as China, and few are exposed to the same levels of risk from global warming.¹ For all that, I do suspect Peter Drahos may be right that China has the best prospect of leading to avert environmental apocalypse by pulling considerable state regulatory levers to decarbonize through new energy paradigms. China is the industrial Titanic of post-industrial capitalism and its bridge is the only command post with levers formidable enough to steer clear of catastrophe.

Democratic hopes and authoritarian environmental levers

Chinese environmental innovation is enabled by experimental cities designed from scratch that include hydrogen cities, circular cities, smart cities that connect green information technologies and artificial intelligence (AI), forest cities of buildings that suck carbon with horizontal trees and vertical gardens, and sponge cities (designed to capture/recycle all run-off water). The scale of China’s green authoritarianism in constructing completely new cities is so unprecedented that even though many cities may fail, the programme might succeed. They amount to the largest suite of technological experiments at scale in human history. There
are 285 new eco-cities planned (Shepard, 2017). Even if only half are built, they could come to house populations exceeding the current population of the European Union or the United States. Some former ghost cities that a few years ago were standard fare for derision of Chinese state planning by Western journalists are now boomtowns fuelled less by carbon than China’s old cities and more by a green growth vision of transformation. They are also part of China’s New Deal for its staggeringly rapid urbanization that has avoided many of the worst excesses of the slums, favelas, and shantytowns of other developing countries, and the extremes of violence of the slums that devastated US urban growth in the last century. These grand urban technological experiments are complemented by history’s largest rural organic experiment – the Green Great Wall plan to plant 88 billion trees along a 4,800-kilometre frontier to hold back the expansion of the Gobi Desert. It is well underway, as is Chinese help for Africa to hold back desertiﬁcation with Africa’s Great Green Wall at the Southern extremity of the Sahara.

Drahos (forthcoming) thinks that Western thinking puts too much emphasis on putting a higher price on carbon as the solution, because at times of immediately impending crisis, the price mechanism delivers change too slowly compared to state research and development (R&D) investment in energy paradigm shifts. Drahos believes that crisis has cascaded to the point where earth systems are shifting to new equilibria at a pace that overwhelms the top speed at which market equilibria can shift. Markets can be particularly slow when commercial interests that fund democratic political parties are ossified around extant paradigms and sunk investment in them, and weak ‘progressive’ leaders like Obama and Clinton who talk green but act brown. Green start-ups are short of funds to buy politicians compared to established brown capitalism in the West.

On the other hand, China is mostly a prudent state investor in steering strategies that hedge its bets by also steeply increasing the price of carbon, through lifting taxes on petroleum, for example, and by recently elevating various other environmental taxes on industry and experimenting with regional environmental trading that is now becoming a national emissions trading scheme. China sees markets as a thin reed of transformation on its own, but useful when bound together with a bundle of more dirigiste measures. Whether decarbonization is driven by carbon trading, carbon taxes, Green Great Walls, or by measuring the success of state R&D investments in new green cities with revolutionary production paradigms, cheating to hit carbon targets is a profound risk. This is especially true in a China with a history of rampant corruption. Investment in carbon fraud detection is an area where we authoritarian under-labourers might have some useful regulatory ideas and evaluation strategies. Most analysts underestimate the weak integrity of carbon measurement systems under both communism and capitalism. Incentives for fraudulent overstatement of carbon abatement are profound for managers pursuing their next promotion in the bonus cultures of neoliberal and authoritarian capitalism alike.

At the same time as China taxes carbon more heavily, Braithwaite (2021) argues in more detail that it shifts the shape of the economy toward services and welfare and it strengthens its steering, particularly of R&D that has delivered
cheaper and better solar panels, electric cars, cityscapes, and much more that matters to human survival. The Drahos argument is also a kind of responsive authoritarianism story of transformation that is plausible because China is still growing GDP per capita at two to three times the rate of Western economies, while also growing renewable energy capacity at three times the rate of both the US and the EU (Smith, 2018).

China has far more electric cars on its roads than any other country (Pressman, 2017), increasing its proportion of the world’s electric car sales from zero per cent in 2012, to a sixth in 2014, a third in 2015, and more than half in 2017 (Busch, 2018; Niu, 2018). Its domination in electric buses and electric two-wheel vehicles is steady at 99 per cent of world production (DiChristopher, 2018). While it grew its economy faster, China worked out how to produce the most successful renewable energy alternative (solar panels) at one fifth the cost that the West had managed; China became the largest generator of solar power and the largest manufacturer of solar panels. China is also the world’s largest producer of wind energy (OECD, 2019), leads in batteries and smart grids, and is the largest domestic and outbound investor across all forms of renewable energy (Jaeger, Joffe, & Song, 2017). By 2017, China accounted for 45 per cent of global renewable energy investment which was delivering a steeply increasing proportion of the planet’s renewable energy patents (29 per cent by 2016). China has also been the world’s biggest importer and recycler of scrap metals, plastic, and paper. It has now decided to concentrate on recycling its own rubbish, where it has been a laggard (far behind economies such as Germany). It has cut off imports to force exporting countries to recycle their own waste. Australia is one country that is beginning to respond to this cut-off, for example, by becoming home to the world’s biggest scrap metal recycler.²

The list of accomplishments I have described above cannot be dismissed as the fabrications of decarbonization fraudsters. One can wander around the wind turbines of Australia and observe how they are all the work of Chinese corporations. While other countries will eventually narrow green technological gaps with China, they will do that by following China’s top-down regulation of technological paradigm shifts, just as China got where it is by state R&D investment in improving pre-existing electric cars, solar panels, and smart grids.

Mutual learning between liberal and authoritarian capitalism may be the only hope of survival. For all these accomplishments, Drahos (forthcoming) is no optimist that the greening of the reds will be enough to turn back China’s massive carbon footprint, let alone the planet’s. Drahos’s point is that responsive authoritarians can pull quite strong levers, even if push-back, corruption, and gaming the party’s agenda from local levels of Chinese society is common, indeed widespread. Western states in the past have also pulled formidable top-down R&D levers when they cared enough to put massive taxpayer resources into putting a ‘man on the moon,’ developing nuclear weapons and nuclear power, or the Anglo-American defence establishments’ development of the internet and AI, semiconductors, jet engines, cellphones, robotics, and much more (Drahos with Braithwaite, 2002). Democratic experimentalism (Dorf & Sabel, 1998) and
authoritarian experimentalism are both capable of producing smart stealth bombers by hybrids of top-down Pentagon R&D and strategic planning. These are hybrids combined with tournaments of private tendering to build weapon systems, the winners of which partner with private winners of other tournaments to build airframes, jet engines, and IT systems. In liberal and authoritarian systems alike, these accomplishments are hybrids of planned state R&D investment and capitalist markets, rather than of one versus the other.

Stimulating Sparks

My authoritarian under-labourer provocation was not intended to be a frivolous one. And I was pleased that the appeal for a criminology focused on the survival of future generations resonated with Richard’s family, new generations of Sparks, assembled at Leuven for his lovely occasion. But authoritarian under-labouring was just a provocation intended to jolt the audience into thinking in a more fundamentally critical way about the whole project of public criminology. In the next section, I begin to lay that foundation by arguing that the discipline of criminology may be a bad idea, and therefore public criminology or critical criminology might be seen as putting a prettier face on an ugly intellectual practice. Pat Carlen (2010: 98) makes this point more pungently: ‘I would suggest that, ironically, it was only as a result of the advent of critical criminology, in the United Kingdom at any rate, the discipline of criminology was reinvigorated sufficiently to put up a successful fight to become recognized and institutionalized as a university discipline.’ Then this chapter argues that communities of scholars who study crime organizationally, institutionally, and transnationally can be more useful to a social science and a politics of prevention of climate change from global warming or nuclear winters than card-carrying critical criminologists. And scholars of organizational crime can also make better contributions to combating the authoritarianism fuelled by global economic crises, rather better than most people and most criminologists might think. I argue against a public criminology that is democratic in a narrowly national sense. I argue for public social science that is cosmopolitan rather than national, interdisciplinary, and republican rather than democratarian (Pettit, 1997).

Hence the paradox is possible that a social science diplomacy (to use another key word from the Sparks oeuvre) might ‘spark’ criminology (Braithwaite, 2011) to engage authoritarian nuclear and carbon powers on how they might collaborate with universities and diplomats in the West on how to prevent each other’s economic crises, how to prevent accidental and ill-conceived nuclear exchanges, how to combat climate change, and how to prevent more minor crises that arise from the globalization of new diseases. Loader and Sparks (2010, 2011) deftly deploy Bruno Latour’s device of the diplomat: the democratic under-labourer is a knowledge diplomat who respectfully shuttles between different camps to promote self-reflection. Regulatory strategies are at the heart of all this work. The idea is that great powers, be they ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian,’ have less to fear from each other than they have to fear from failures to collaborate with one another on crisis
prevention. Interdisciplinary social science can bring a lot to this table of great power deliberation, and criminology can be an important contributor to interdisciplinary social science. It follows that it might be desirable to pull resources away from democratic under-labouring and move them to the interstices between mostly authoritarian, murderous, and exclusionary great powers.

There are no neat distinctions in democratic-authoritarian under-labouring that might help prevent the destruction of us all by great powers. All great powers are capitalist and socialist to different degrees, and all are authoritarian to formidable degrees. Yes, China puts Muslim Uighurs into re-education camps in massive numbers. But the United States has maintained detention of Muslims without trial in Guantanamo Bay for two decades; their British and other Western allies barely whimpered when their own citizens were detained there without trial, nor when the West detained much larger numbers without trial in Abu Graib and many other prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the one that incubated Islamic State and its leaders, and actively participated in extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists so they could be tortured by the most authoritarian regimes in the world, such as that of Gadaffi’s Libya. The West, its media, and pretty much its critical criminology as well (with noble exceptions such as Penny Green and Tony Ward [2017]), were quiescent as Islamic State fighters were executed in Iraq in the name of what the media call ‘the US-backed coalition against Islamic State’ after 30-minute trials in which no witnesses spoke for the defence. Is it possible to be a democratic under-labourer with any of these authoritarian nuclear regimes that are certain to continue extinctions of species and ultimately to extinguish human civilizations unless global civil society mobilizes to shift the politics of nuclear powers and carbonized powers? Not really, yet shape-shifting authoritarian under-labouring is possible. If we are politically serious about sincere engagements with all protagonists along the democratic–authoritarian continuum, we can build limited kinds of trust in the long run across the deepest geopolitical divides, but only after many episodes of distrust along the way. These will involve great intrusions by spooky people into our research, our computers, our elections, and our lives.

Criminology: good and evil

It is fine to be a scholar who is relaxed about being described as a criminologist. I am one. Crime is an important concept; it is valuable to study crime. We can love our friends in criminological communities while rejecting the idea of criminology as something important. The discipline of criminology is a bad Northern idea. It is not yet too late for universities to reject it beyond the North Atlantic. This is so because the fact still remains that few universities in the East and the Global South have criminology departments. Yet it is likely that criminology will discipline the East and South rather like all imperial disciplines do. The day when a social science discipline of wide sway will be invented in the Global South remains something for the future. One reason is that struggling young scholars from the Global South are attracted to the better incomes, better universities, greater intellectual...
influence, facilities and higher-paid part-time jobs to support their study in the North. So they submit devotion to the disciplinary structures set by Northern institutions and jump through Northern hoops.

Critical criminology certainly has well intended progressive pretences toward dominant hoops. Yet it sets different kinds of hoops, still crimino logical, to discipline Southerners who jump during the qualifying rounds that equip them to participate in the grand Northern tournaments of critical criminology. I agree with Richard Sparks that no worthwhile criminology will fail to be reflexive and critical, will fail to speak truth to power, so one of the unhealthy aspects of the discipline is that it has a special (somewhat marginalized) tribe dedicated to being critical in these ways (with many members of this tribe also having an unhealthy aversion to mastering quantitative methods). Loader and Sparks (2016) share the critical criminology prescription to denaturalize neoliberal orthodoxy. Critical criminologists tend to see neoliberalism everywhere because their myopic vision has a narrow range. Yes, there are still neoliberal Western leaders like Emmanuel Macron of France and even social democratic leaders who head conservative parties like Angela Merkel, and doubtless we will see some more of these kinds of leaders return in future. Yet now their politics are both marginalized old variegations of capitalist politics (Braithwaite, 2019). The political protagonists who are actually shaping the future of the globe today are, on one side, authoritarian capitalist leaders who steer the largest economy in the world (China), most of the fastest growing 100-million-plus societies that are mostly Asian (Bangladesh, Philippines, Indonesia), indeed most of the most populous societies (including the largest European society, Russia), and the riches of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Iran, Israel). On the other side are a different variety of authoritarian capitalist leaders who are neoconservative and committed to dismantling the global liberal market order, such as Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and various Eastern, Central, and Southern European leaders. This side of the contest has significant minority factions in all European polities, with representation in the European Parliament, including for France and Germany. This is not neoliberalism, but a contest between these two newer ideological formations, and real political economies associated with them, that is now shaping the future.

Even the most progressive, inspiring, social democratic, or green leader in the world today by my civic republican lights, Jacinda Adern, only clings to power in coalition with New Zealand’s version of that authoritarian capitalist, neoconservative political formation that is rather racist on immigration policies, New Zealand First. Moreover, Adern has her own kind of politics of rapprochement with China. New Zealand became the first ‘Five Eyes’ country to formally show it has an eye on both political formations by signing up for the Belt and Road, as implausible as a Belt and Road from Beijing to New Zealand may seem. In the era of variegated capitalism, we must be as vigilant against essentializing these two currently dominant formations as we are with essentializing the neoliberalism trope. Chinese and US capitalisms are not unitary phenomena; different, and rather sharp, variegations of capitalism can be identified in different regions and different industry sectors within China and the United States (Braithwaite, 2019).
One reason I find the Loader and Sparks (2010, 2011) version of public criminology more attractive than other public criminologies is that it is comparatively humble about criminology as rendez-vous, as a pragmatist conversational crossroads where liaisons lead to hybridities with other fields (Sparks, 2019). They eschew the objective of wanting to persuade others to become public criminologists. They do not push the notion that policy must be disciplined by evidence-based criminology. Instead they seek to ‘contribute to a better politics of crime and its regulation – or what we shall call democratic under-labouring’ (Loader & Sparks, 2010: 116–117). I like this because it fits how I would think about restorative justice as a democratic practice of justice rather than as a criminological practice. It by no means involves rejecting the fruits of variegated versions of evidence-based criminology. The restorative practice of justice involves stakeholders in an injustice sitting in a circle deciding what is to be done about the injustice: who has been harmed, what needs do stakeholders have that should be met, and more. The ‘more’ includes stakeholders democratically empowered to discuss whether the evidence supports the idea someone in the circle has that it would be good to send an offender to a scared-straight programme or to wear a T-shirt that reads ‘I am a thief.’ On the democratic under-labouring view, those who study crime make available to the restorative conference people who are trained to provide information to the circle in response to their questions on what the research reveals about certain counterproductive effects of these proposals. Much has been written in the restorative justice literature about why expert interpretive conversations are helpful, while the deliberative democracy of the circle should ultimately decide what use to make of it (Burford, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2019).

At this point, after acknowledging the importance of these democratic under-labouring arguments, my kind of restorative justice tempers democracy as an ideal that can be dangerous. It becomes important for courts to be able to overrule the democratic will. This is not because the rule of law is good in itself, but because rule of law is good for something, where that something, as Martin Krygier (2019) puts it, includes ‘tempering power.’ Philip Pettit (1997) conceives democratic decision-making in a restorative circle as something that should be checked by judges, because freedom as non-domination is a more fundamental ideal than democracy. Domination by democracy is something that can happen in a restorative circle, and this needs to be checked and balanced by other institutions of the republic. Likewise, the domination of Muslims in Kashmir by a fundamentalist Hindu Indian state under Prime Minister Modi is a kind of ‘domination by democracy’ (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018). When Americans vote again and again for presidential candidates who sustain detention without trial at Guantanamo Bay, they vote for domination by democracy. I am reluctant to say the United States is no democracy because its institutions allow detention without trial; I would say it is not a republic.

As Pettit (1997) argues, ‘democratarian’ sentiments are dangerous unless domination by democracy is checked by well-designed separations of powers (Braithwaite, 2019). What we want of restorative justice is deliberative justice that checks and tempers state justice institutions and state justice that checks and
tempers deliberative justice. So we want to encourage more deliberative justice that encourages mothers in the restorative circle to say, as they occasionally do, that ‘while it is right that my son admits responsibility for this crime, it is wrong that you, constable, have not admitted to excessive force in the arrest of my son.’ And it is important that channels meaningfully connect this kind of checking of power to other institutions of the separation of powers, such as an ombudsman. It is important that police, prosecutorial, and judicial corruption are challenged by the deliberative democracy of restorative justice in complaints processes. It is imperative to reject the tripartite separation of powers in the West in favour of more variegated separations of powers underwritten by a fourth accountability branch of governance that can perhaps, prosecutors, and presidents, as in Sun Yat Sen’s constitutional vision for his Chinese republic and in the Thai Peoples’ Constitution of 1997. That Sun Yat Sen Constitution and that Thai Peoples’ Constitution so threatened military power that coups dismantled them (Braithwaite, 2019).

So civic republican under-labouring has more appeal for me than democratic under-labouring. Democracy is one centrepiece of any republican mix that needs to be taken more seriously in various ways that include injecting more deliberative democracy into criminal justice through restorative justice. And yes, republican under-labouring includes the democratic sentiments articulated by Loader and Sparks (2010) as well – being humble in the face of democratic politics, not putting ourselves above it as criminological experts. Loader and Sparks are wise and tempered to say that criminology should not be privileged, should not be an expert-led calculus of what is evidence based and what are normatively important forms of knowledge in the calculus (like crime prevention). They stand against excluding norms that should not be relevant to the scientific discourse of experts (such as democratic contestation of arbitrary power). The republican under-labourer might go further and say that not only should the discipline of criminology not be privileged, the world would be a better place if criminology as a discipline did not exist at all. And it would be good if public criminology and critical criminology disappeared with it. The greater epistemological humility of critical criminology and public criminology help legitimate criminology as something one can and should embrace rather than the healthier choice of being an interdisciplinary scholar of the biggest problems of the human condition and the condition of the planet.

We inherited more fertile biological sciences when they abandoned organization around categories like animals (zoology), plants (botany), insects (entomology), and bits of humans (anatomy) in favour of organization around ideas like evolutionary biology, ecology, and the micro-macro new molecular biology of DNA. Likewise, the social sciences must consider abandoning disciplinary organization around categories of institutions, such as the economy, politics, law and criminal justice, or time and space as separate disciplinary categories (history versus geography), or human beings and social formations as separate categories (psychology versus sociology). For me, these are all appalling intellectual formations for Northern universities to have constituted, and for Southern
ones to follow. In that fundamental sense, any kind of public criminology is not so attractive, but a public social science can be when it is suitably humble in the sense advanced in the work of Richard Sparks (Braithwaite, 2011). On these matters, scholars of my ilk probably have hubris and humility at the same time. On the one hand, there is the hubris of thinking that something like restorative justice or responsive regulation or variegated regulatory capitalisms might be better organizing theoretical ideas than criminology, sociology, or economics. This is not a reasonable comparison to the way evolutionary biology, ecology, or the new molecular biology were better organizing ideas than the old biologies of categories of living objects. On the other hand, there is the humility of understanding that we have not re-organized social science fields around them because they are simply not good enough as ideas – nowhere near as good as the ideas behind those biological revolutions. Humility in the face of our failures should not discourage us from urging a new generation of social scientists to have a crack.

Hence, not only should the criminology piece of Richard’s public criminology be problematized, the democratic under-labourer piece also has its limits. Criminology is not only pathologically Northern, it is also pathologically national; the greater part of it is a conglomerate of different Northern national policy sciences about crime. This undermines its scientific pretensions. When we cite a meta-analysis in a criminology journal, as I often do, the sampling frame is akin to a geologist studying a conglomerate rock where there is one rock (US society and its policy settings) that is huge compared to all the rest, then a large British rock, then Germany, and at the end of the long list of meta-analysis inclusions, perhaps some assorted oddments of Southern pebbles. Geologists would think it odd to build laws of geological science based on samples non-randomly selected from different parts of conglomerate rocks. That does not trouble us criminologists. Usually there is almost no data from Asia that accounts for more than half the population of the world, none from Africa or Pacific Island states, a little bit from Latin America. Whatever this aspires to be, it is not a criminological science of human beings or human societies. Elsewhere, in my writing about what kind of social science is worth struggling for, I conclude that humankind is quite unlikely to survive for more than a century or two, or at least it is quite likely that existing civilizations will perish. So we might still be waiting for criminology to mature into a science of human beings or human societies when our world ends. Global warming is one huge risk and so is nuclear winter. We need a social science that is relevant to the very possibility of our continued existence.

The key challenge for the social sciences as I see it is that economic crises, ecological crises, and security crises in conditions of late modernity have increasing propensities to cascade more globally and to cascade into each other. The three kinds of crises are progressively more interdependent. Crime, I have argued, is a cascade phenomenon (Braithwaite, 2020), and criminality is increasingly entangled in security crises, economic crises, and ecological crises. When a powerful general of Pakistan (a nuclear power) says that he will interpret a collapse of the
Karachi Stock Exchange that cannot be explained as an act of war by India, we get a feel for the new character of crisis risk. It can cascade to a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan that sends pulverized South Asian cities in clouds high above the Himalayas to cause deadly famine across the rice basket of Southern China as well as South Asia (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018). That would cause a global financial crisis driven by the inability of farmers and homeowners to repay their loans to banks in a geopolitically central part of the world. Given the multitudinous character of these risks, a focus of criminology on policy conversations of democratic under-labourers within specific national democratic communities needs tweaking.

Cybercrime has become the most popular course in many Northern and Asian criminology departments. Good thing. Cybercrime prevention is relevant to cyber-war prevention. It is unwise to think of cyberwarfare as more benign than military violence. Cyberwarfare that disables defensive military systems could cause a sudden escalation that might mean the end of human civilizations (Beebee, 2019). A cybercrime attack aimed at the conventional defence system of a country might well unintentionally disable the systems that defend its nuclear missiles. If the targeted state interprets the cybercrime as a clever way of disabling the hardening of its nuclear targets as a precursor to nuclear attack, there is risk of human extinction. In the ultra-short timeframes for making calls in the fog of nuclear war missile launches, the targeted state might choose to ‘use or lose’ its nuclear weapons in what it wrongly fears is the impending final showdown with its old enemy. This means scholars of crime have an important new role in the prevention of this kind of catastrophe.

This is but one illustration of how criminality is entangled in security crises, economic crises, and ecological crises and how crime prevention lessons can be useful in a much wider frame. Of course, criminology is not the main disciplinary game of my longer-term project of understanding more systematically how financial crises tend to cascade warfare, how war cascades ecological crisis, and how ecological crises cascade to war and financial crisis in cycles of deepening crisis entanglement. Yet the criminological contribution to this project can be more important than non-criminologists are able to see.

Criminologists in Australia might be the ones to detect early specific risks of financial crime before they afflict the geopolitically central economies of tomorrow like China and India. I have argued how astute use of restorative justice in Australia might have prevented past economic crises and environmental crises in the United States and the United Kingdom. What matters most is not a crime science of Australian crime policy, but perhaps in the spirit of Richard Sparks, an Australian diplomacy of research on crime. Perhaps Australian criminologists might be the first to see insidious new forms of cybercrime that might cause reckless Pakistani generals or terrorists to start accidental nuclear wars. Perhaps Australian social scientists will discover new ways that carbon markets are being gamed by corporate criminals that might cause carbon trading markets to collapse and fail globally. With Australia being the closest country to one of the world’s three largest remaining areas of tropical rain forest on New Guinea, perhaps
Australian criminologists might be the ones to discover how markets in carbon reduction by tree planting are being criminalized. Of course I only think of missed past and future contributions of Australian criminology because this is a national world of social science I know. My advocacy is of a cosmopolitan social science everywhere, more so than a criminology that connects to national democratic conversations about crime. The latter are important to the current generation, while cosmopolitan criminology is more important to bequeathing survivability to our grandchildren and their children.

Australian social scientists and Chinese, US, and Russian diplomats and technocrats together can help one another avoid accidental nuclear wars, avoid the kind of criminal risk shifting that cascaded to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and make environmental regulation and collaboration work more effectively to save the planet. When great powers refuse to collaborate, we in universities can sometimes step in with even better forms of transnational collaboration than states: environmental technology sharing, sharing of financial regulatory ideas, sharing ideas on nuclear war prevention on a preventive diplomacy wiki (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018). Technically this is too risky a time for a new Cold War. South Korea and Japan may become nuclear weapons states because of many escalating fears: fear of states that can cheaply use 3-D printing to produce millions of invading killer robots, fear of North Korea, fear that Trump might cut a deal with North Korea that allows it short-range genocidal weapons against Japan but forbids long-range genocidal weapons that can reach the United States, fear that the only realistic choice for the United States is to cede Asia (most specifically Taiwan and Hong Kong) as China’s sphere of influence as it did Eastern Europe to Moscow. The rise of authoritarian factions in Japanese politics heightens these risks and fears. Even Australia’s most respected strategic affairs commentator, Hugh White (2019), argues that Australia should have a nuclear armament debate in light of these new realities. If that happens, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime will collapse and the risks of accidental nuclear wars devastating global climatic conditions will multiply greatly. The great powers have less to fear from the ambitions of each other than they have to fear from their failures to collaborate with each other on prevention. If they reject that collaboration, as Albert Einstein said 70 years ago, ‘I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.’

Conclusion

A crude way of summarizing the responses of Richard Sparks and Ian Loader at Leuven to the ideas in this chapter was that they embrace this kind of social science alternative at the intersections of global crises that cascade one into the other. They seemed to embrace it as a worthy part of social science pluralism. Sparks and Loader (and Garland too, I suspect) might be seen as fellow-travellers who value interdisciplinary public social science more than public criminology or public sociology. That valuing of criminological pluralism harks
back to what I replied to Sparks in *The Sparking Discipline of Criminology* collection:

Lode Walgrave in this volume draws attention to the Sparks … distinction between ‘floaters’ and ‘players’ … With homage to Richard Sparks, I would like to value ‘sparkers’ above both players and floaters. The best scholars are rarely as wise, rarely as good at listening and adapting as the best players of the policy process. Yet it seems such a waste if all they do is float. A good way for them to use their talents is to spark players with ideas, let the players play, then spark competing players when earlier sparks extinguish as embers. It’s a collaborative contribution to a dialogue that connects to attempts at transformative change in which scholars have humility about their gifts as players. By not descending right down into the policy game, sparkers do continue to float, keeping a distanced perspective on the whole societal panorama. From above, they are not siloed as criminologists, but they can spark synapses that connect criminologists to economists, to demographers, to all the disciplines of the academy, and they can connect policy to professional to critical to public social science. Put another way, sparkers who float above the silos seem likely to add more intellectual, policy, critical and democratic deliberative value than scholars with an identity within a silo who virtuously network with scholars in other silos.

(Braithwaite, 2011: 137)

For me, this still summarizes Richard’s gifts as a sparker. As someone who is not a signed-up member of ASC’s Division of Critical Criminology, for example, he sparks more criticality in criminology than most of those who are. No need to labour the evidence of what his sparks have ignited; embers of them that continue to glow are found throughout this volume. Public social science in the Sparks oeuvre is conceived as one evolving response to the heating up of penal populism, and cooling down with a more nuanced or evidence-based democratic debate. Public criminology can also be engaged with more macro diplomacies of cooling (on a planet struggling with the geopolitics of global warming, with cooling by a nuclear winter that freezes us all and with the unknowability about when nuclear winter will come and how it will interact with global warming). So social science pluralism is bound to be something worth cherishing between now and then. And sparking social science to relevance to the geopolitics of the struggle to survive is bound to be imperative.

Politics inside state machines ultimately becomes important to saving us, but at this juncture, the politics of reframing transformative ideas in universities is probably more important. The politics of conversation with our youngest students, with social movements, may be more fecund than conversations with the observers-turned-players inside Western state machines. Our green students may say what is to be done to save us; the state players may say ‘yes, minister, do push that to young voters and let’s chat with the business community after the election about whether we can do it.’ It is the sparkers who can ignite and enliven
a panorama of such players, and more, contest transformative politics. They can spark collaboration across overly essentialized democratic–authoritarian divides.

Notes

1 China is still building coal-fired power plants where demand peaks, and its fleet of plants grew five-fold between 2000 and 2018 (Carbon Brief, 2019). The better news is that China is also closing the worst plants now, and its pipeline of new and planned plants has shrunk by 70 per cent since 2016 (Carbon Brief, 2019).

2 Sims Metal Management. Sims is a beautiful example of the kind of geopolitical paradox of survival that interests me. Sims started his business before World War II collecting scrap metal by horse and cart around Melbourne. After World War II he was helped to take off by collecting the scrap metal left by the war machines of the imperial powers all over the Pacific. Now it is impelled across new frontiers by China cutting off Western waste exports.

References


