Did nonviolent resistance fail in Kosovo?

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Abstract
A standard narrative is that nonviolence failed in Kosovo: the Milosevic regime was ended by a NATO bombing campaign. This essay exposes errors in this narrative. Nonviolent resistance inside Kosovo succeeded in unifying the Kosovar masses against the Milosevic regime. That solidarity was crucial to victory. A distinctive innovation of Kosovo’s nonviolence was that it built solidarity by decisively reducing violence. In particular, it reduced murders in blood feuds. Kosovo emerged from war with a comparatively low rate of violence for a post-conflict, post-communist society with a large organized crime problem. We contrast Kosovo with post-conflict societies where more people are killed by criminal violence after their peace agreement than were killed in the war. Learning to reconcile blood feuds restoratively as part of Kosovo’s nonviolent campaign for freedom contributed to this accomplishment. Nonviolent resistance campaigns can be evaluated through a criminological lens whereby averting war is just one means to reducing death rates from intentional violence.

Keywords
nonviolent resistance, peacebuilding, Syria, Kosovo, blood feuds

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Kosovo and Syria: Learning from repeated errors

The structure of this article is first to put our Kosovo research on crime and war in a broader context of learning lessons about taking nonviolent resistance seriously. The next sections of the article document the history of nonviolent resistance in Kosovo, including the campaign against blood feuds. That campaign reduces homicide both pre- and post-war. Nonviolent resistance in Kosovo might have been given the chance to prevent war. But our main conclusion in the quantitative analysis that follows is that even as it failed to do so, it succeeded in reducing violence by reducing crime.

Kosovo in 1999 and Syria today both seem cases of failed nonviolence. When the wave of unrest spread across the Arab world in 2011, the democratic movement on the streets of Syria was determined in its nonviolence, more committed to resist picking up guns than in most Arab Spring uprisings. Likewise Kosovo had an unusually vibrant nonviolent resistance to Serbian domination in the 1980s and 1990s. In both cases, when external powers opted for armed conflict—Milosevic and NATO in Kosovo—ISIS, al Qaeda, Hezbollah, the US, Russia, Iran and more in Syria—it became maximally difficult for nonviolence to succeed. In Syria, as in Kosovo, nonviolent resistance to tyranny received limited international funding, while armed fighters against Assad won cash and recruits aplenty (as did Assad to repel them).

Hence we consider a new frame in this article. When a country is caught in a multiplex regional cascade of violence, it is hard for nonviolence to prevail (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2017). The nonviolent resistance of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, sought support from Croatia to resist Serbian domination. But Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and also Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, pressed Kosovo to open another armed front against Serbia. This is one implication of cascades of violence analysis. Once a regional cascade of war is on the march, there will always be interests that seek to persuade a switch from nonviolent struggle against a shared enemy to a new front of their armed struggle against that enemy.

What had been needed was for the US, the EU and Russia to work in concert to restrain leaders like Tudjman from provoking Milosevic, and then to restrain Milosevic. Interposition of NATO and Russian troops between Serbia and Croatia to prevent the first dreadful cascade toward total war in
Yugoslavia was the needed intervention. Ultimately this kind of NATO and Russian peace
enforcement deployment did happen in Kosovo. Moreover, another subsequent UN peacekeeping
deployment prevented a further cascade of war from Kosovo to Macedonia. So what seemed difficult
in 1989 became an imperative from 1999. As UN and US diplomat David Phillips (2012: 348) put it:
‘The UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was a model for preventive diplomacy.’

Had the great powers behaved differently, might nonviolence have worked in allowing a peaceful
transition to separation of Kosovo and Serbia, as with the Czech and Slovak Republics, and indeed
the separation of Slovenia from Yugoslavia before total war broke out in Croatia and Bosnia. A less
terrible outcome for the people of Syria likewise might have been achieved by joint NATO, Russian
and regional diplomacy to put narrowly conceived interests aside to prevent a civil war. A peaceful
outcome was possible through joint NATO, Russian and regional resolve in 2011 to persuade Assad
and the Free Syrian Army that the great powers stood ready to put their troops at risk as
peacekeepers in order to prevent war.

Counterfactual social science has an important role to play if we hope to improve at diagnosing the
lessons to be learnt from such paths not taken (Weber 1949; Lewis 1973; Climo and Howells 1976;
Fearon 1991; Ferguson 2011). This essay asks a counterfactual question that intertwines with the
war prevention counterfactuals we have just discussed. Had the nonviolent resistance campaigns in
Kosovo in the 1990s never been launched would Kosovo have been better or worse off? Did
nonviolent resistance simply prolong the suffering of the people of Kosovo by deferring the war that
was their only path to freedom? Did nonviolent resistance distract the Kosovar resistance from
focusing its energy on arming and training itself for an inevitable war?

This study answers these questions in the negative. It concludes that even though the nonviolent
resistance strategy was flawed, even though western support for it was even more flawed, more lives
would likely have been lost in Kosovo had the path of nonviolence not been attempted. This
conclusion flies in the face of a standard narrative: that nonviolence failed in Kosovo; conversely, war
worked, the NATO bombing worked, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) insurgency worked.

History of late 20th century nonviolent resistance

1968 was a watershed year of bottom-up resistance to oppression around the world, including in
Kosovo. Protestors marched the streets of Prishtina on 27 November objecting to the ‘colonial’
oppression of Kosovo, chanting ‘We want a university’. The police crushed it brutally, though only
one demonstrator was killed. The next large protest did not come until March 1981 at the University of
Prishtina, which had been established by then. More protests followed in the weeks after the initial
spark, and unknown but large numbers, perhaps even 1000 (Malcolm 1998: 335), of the protestors
were killed. 1988 saw huge protests again after Milosevic started moves to dismantle Kosovo’s
autonomy within Yugoslavia. Trepça miners went on strike and marched to Prishtina to be joined by
factory workers and students, 100,000 in total. Throughout Kosovo perhaps 300,000 joined multiple marches (Clark 2000: 48). The confrontation escalated in February 1989, when 1200 miners locked themselves deep in shafts to disrupt production; thousands of other workers occupied other mines. At this point, the nonviolent resistance was proactive, creative and imposing real political and economic costs on Milosevic, forcing him to make political concessions to the miners, on which he subsequently reneged.

The political cost of Milosevic’s 1989 revocation of the autonomy of Kosovo was enormous: this was the domino that caused the rest to fall and disintegrate Yugoslavia. In September 1990, Kosovo enacted its first independent Constitution, also known as Kaçanik’s Constitution (Kushtetuta e Kaçanikut) (Bajrami 2011: 60). After this, in September 1991 – the referendum for Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state – was held successfully. In 1992 Kosovo-wide elections were held to elect a parallel government. Ibrahim Rugova was elected after he was approached by the leadership of the nonviolent resistance to become the head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Rugova continued the execution of nonviolent principles with impressive commitment. Whenever a demonstration occurred, LDK operatives would be on the street urging nonviolent discipline upon the protestors so as not to provide a justification for state violence. Establishing parallel institutions in health and education operating out of the homes of doctors, nurses, teachers and university lecturers were major accomplishments. 19,000 teachers and professors taught 330,000 students in Kosovo's parallel education system (Clark 1999). The Mother Teresa Association established 91 clinics attracting international humanitarian support.

The parallel parliament, however, was more symbolic than substantive. It did not meet (except symbolically); it failed as a listening institution for Rugova’s leadership. Most importantly, the leadership failed to respond to the dissatisfaction of the rank and file of the democracy movement, particularly the students, that the resistance strategy was too passive, losing the momentum it enjoyed between 1988 and 1992. The students were right in this critique. Convening the parliament in the presence of the international media as a venue for condemnation of the regime and for robust open debate on strategy would have posed a difficult dilemma for Milosevic. He would have had to bear the political costs of allowing the parliament to condemn his regime, or the awful international optics of forcibly closing the parallel democratic chamber.

It suited Milosevic to keep Rugova alive and out of prison because he was pacifying the nonviolent resistance. Western diplomats tacitly supported the status quo as they did not want to spook Milosevic from signing (and thereafter implementing) the Dayton Accord to secure peace in Bosnia. Signs of western support for the next (Kosovar) domino to fall in the disintegration of Serbian control over Yugoslavia indeed would have made Dayton a more difficult accomplishment. And Kosovo was the most symbolically important domino in the eyes of Serb elites. We were able to interview some members of Rugova’s inner circle. Even they agreed that Rugova allowed himself to be overly
influenced by western diplomats to keep the resistance passive. For example, he sought to dissuade the students from organising protests on the streets because this would provoke state violence. Rugova was wise to internationalise his people’s struggle, yet became overly dependent on that very international strategy. In addition, all major political movements in Kosovo failed to hedge with the option of working with the nonviolent resistance to destabilise Milosevic inside Serbia. Fretilin in East Timor at the same time was assuming a major leadership role in Jakarta in the democracy movement to overthrow Indonesia’s Suharto. The Timorese students were the most courageous shock troops in the nonviolent struggle for democracy on the streets of Jakarta. This was critical to the political genius of the East Timorese struggle for liberation (Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares 2012). There was only a tiny minority of Kosovo leaders, notably women, who advocated enhanced contacts with the Serbian opposition when hundreds of thousands of Serbs surged onto the streets of Belgrade to challenge Milosevic (Stephan 2006:74).

As a result of these errors, the nonviolent strategy ceased inflicting significant economic, political or diplomatic costs on the Milosevic regime. When Rugova and Kosovo were excluded from discussion at the US-brokered Dayton talks, popular frustration with the tame character of Rugova’s resistance passed a tipping point. Armed resistance was the main alternative that quickly built mass support in Kosovo after Dayton. Advocacy for an armed struggle, and funding of it, was particularly strong among the Kosovo diaspora in western democracies. By 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army launched its first set of attacks in defense of Albanian villages of Kosovo.

The second turn away from the passive style of Rugova’s resistance was the energising of new active resistance campaigns. After an Albanian student was shot by a Serb sniper in Pristina in April 1996, a women’s network mounted public protests in defiance of LDK orders. Then followed the major University of Pristina Students’ Union surges onto the streets. These were also in defiance of LDK. The student protests were successful as they spread mass participation to six cities. A heavy-handed Serbian response attracted international media coverage, waves of sympathy and practical support from civil society globally (Stephan 2006:74). The contrast between the nonviolence of the students and the violence of the police extracted the first open condemnation of Serbian rule in Kosovo by the leader of the Orthodox Church in Serbia, Patriarch Pavle.

This more proactive nonviolent movement did not have time to mature and spread, however, before it was pushed aside by the chatter of guns, the whistling of NATO bombs. The domestic error of overly passive nonviolent resistance was both caused and compounded by western diplomacy that only responded when there was armed resistance in the former Yugoslavia. So we must ponder this counterfactual: Had the west decided not to exclude Kosovar voices at Dayton, had it supported rather than suppressed proactive nonviolent resistance to the Milosevic regime inside Kosovo, that nonviolence might have liberated Kosovo Albanians peacefully and accelerated the nonviolent liberation of the people of Serbia from Milosevic. Flawed western diplomacy reinforced the flawed
conclusion that violence works in these situations. It undermined nonviolence that is only likely to work when ethical diplomacy rallies around it.

The Dayton piece of the harsh evaluation of western diplomacy in this counterfactual is probably overly harsh. At the time of Dayton it was critical to stem the bloodshed in Bosnia. It was perhaps understandable that Dayton put aside blood that was already flowing in Croatia, and the risk of future bloodshed in Kosovo, to prioritise the most massive violence du jour—Bosnia—and not frighten Milosevic over Kosovo. Peace plans that had failed prior to Dayton—the Carrington-Cutileiro plan of 1992, Vance-Owen 1993, Owen-Stoltenberg 1993—were a context that justified modest ambitions as opposed to a grand bargain for all Yugoslavia.

The long trajectory of Kosovar Albanian nonviolence

Albanian tradition places great importance on honour, in particular on men to avenge crimes against their family. Blood feuds have been recorded that continued between two families for 80 years across 32 instances of revenge killing (Mangalakova 2004:11). Such practices were in line with the Code of Lekë Dukagjini, the most influential customary law of Kosovo usually referred to as Lekë’s Kanun, or simply as the Kanun. Lekë’s Kanun is a medieval blend of tribal and Old Testament doctrines; most Kosovars did not become Muslims until quite late in the history of the Ottoman Empire. The Kanun relies on families and tribes to enforce the law rather than the state. Indeed, Lekë’s Kanun specifically resisted state authority in a variety of ways, even in the late Ottoman Empire. In laws passed by the Banner of Kurbin under the Kanun in 1906 it was a crime to become a policeman and even a crime to offer food to a policeman or allow policemen inside one’s house (Gjecov 1989: 256).

One point, however, is indisputable: for the clans of Northern Albania, the maxims of the Kanun were primary, i.e. they took precedence over all other laws, and for that reason both the church and the state opposed the application of the Kanun ... There is no doubt that [the Kanun is] the fundamental customary law employed in the Middle Ages in almost all of the areas of Albanian settlement (Camaj 1989:xiii).

Content of the Kanun

Honour (nderi) is just one of the four pillars of the Kanun, the others being hospitality (mikpritja), right conduct (sjellja) and loyalty to one’s clan (fis). Undoubtedly, the most violent aspect of the Kanun is that it institutionalises blood feuds by obliging killing a member of a family that has offended against your family. At the same time, it institutionalises reconciliation in various interesting ways. Here are some examples:

While the Kanun is an honour Code, it also honours the role of the mediator and shames a dishonourable mediator: ‘§1016. If it is discovered that an Elder has pronounced judgement with partiality and against the Kanun, due to having been corrupted by bribes from one of the litigants, aside from being dishonoured, he may no longer be known as an Elder.’
Like most medieval tribal (and indeed many late modern) traditions, reconciliation is led by male elders. Women and young people can, however, play important roles. §669 of the Kanun states that ‘A mediator may be a man or a woman, a boy or a girl, or even a priest.’

The Kanun provides for periods of truce following a murder to allow cooling down, and guarantees the safety of mediators. During that truce, the murderer is required to attend the funeral, accompany the body to the funeral and attend the wake (Kanun CXXII: The Truce). The murderer is entitled to ask a well-respected mediator to negotiate a besa—meaning generally a vow, in this case a vow that no one would hurt him during the specified truce.

With us a man who has got a besa has got dignity. People should be reconciled, there should be reconciliation. Lek Dukagjin says: ‘A bent head turns away wrath’ ... The besa is the institution of last resort with Albanians (Kosova man quoted in Mangalakova 2004: 12).

Traditionally the body of a murdered man would lie in his home for a number of days to allow others to pay their respects and offer condolences to the family. Village elders often required the murderer to sit beside the body, living with the family of the man he murdered, with his safety guaranteed by that family during the period of mourning. If ‘the hearts of the members of the family of the murderer and the family of the victim have been reconciled, they drink some of each other’s blood (§988).

According to the kanun, reconciliation requires four steps: laying down of weapons, opening of dialogue, finding a solution, and achieving forgiveness and reconciliation ... According to the kanun, the mediator (generally an older, well-respected male member of the community) visits first the murderer’s and then the victim’s family to hear each side of the feud ... Mediation processes are concluded with a traditional ‘blood meal’, during which both families share a meal in the offender’s home to symbolise the reconciliation ... mediation does not assume the guilt of one party because the long-lived nature of retaliatory blood feuds means that both parties have been both victims and perpetrator (Pratt 2013: 7–8, 12).

All families have a ‘right to participate in the conferences of the village’ (§ 26) and the head of the house has an obligation to participate in every village conference (§27).

As Suzanna Pratt (2013:1) put it:

the same social code justifying blood feuds also contains the foundations of a restorative justice process ... The restorative features of traditional mediation have the potential to lead to widespread reconciliation of blood feuds and alleviation of continued cyclical violence in northern Albania.

Throughout history, Albanians used besa not just among themselves, but also to give their word of honour to members of other ethnic groups. A good example, widely used as a proof of friendly relations with the neighbouring Serbs in the past, are the so-called Monastery Dukes—Albanians whose ancestors gave a besa to the Serbian monks to protect their monasteries in Kosovo from potential attackers (including from Albanians themselves). The Kosovo Albanians had kept their besa
for centuries—providing protection to several Serbian monasteries—including the medieval headquarters of the Serbian Orthodox Church (*Patriarchate of Peć*)—from invaders, thieves and robbers (Krasnici 1958; Karan 1985:48). The Church enjoyed protected status in the Kanun itself, which regulated its protection in the opening paragraphs, prescribing the “duty to defend it when it requires help” (§ 3).

In Kosovo today, a common view among legal and legislative elites is that independent Kosovo courts render the Kanun redundant or of diminished importance. As one Member of Parliament put it:

Kosovar Albanian society stands between the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini and the state based on the rule of law. We have never had our own state; Kosovo had autonomy, had its own judicial system, but Albanians never accepted that as their own, and so they had to follow their own law. It was law within the law, state within the state; although the court might have sentenced someone to 15 years in prison on a murder charge, the Kanun was much more powerful than the court. Now, little by little, Albanian society has to embrace the idea of implementing our own judicial system. There is a parliament in Kosovo, but UNMIK [the United Nations Mission in Kosovo] functions as a Ministry of Justice. Kosovo is going to have its own Minister of Justice and then Albanians will see they don’t need the Kanun (quoted in Mangalakova 2004: 11).

Despite the fact that the Kanun is mostly considered of diminished importance, there are still court cases in Kosovo to this day when in verdicts the judges mention institutions of Kanun such as besa. In one of the cases that we had the chance to see ourselves the judge refused release of a prisoner in pre-trial detention on the ground that the family of the deceased had not granted him a besa.

Mangalakova (2004: 11) also quoted two Albanian women from Prizren who manifested what is probably a more widespread view about contemporary relevance when they said: ‘Some parts of the Kanun should be practised, but the negative things ought to be rejected’. Most commentators conceive the influence of the Kanun in the twenty-first century as greater in rural areas, though many commentators note significant continuity of urban influence, as in Voell’s (2003) ethnographic work showing the Kanun to exist as ‘habitus’ in suburban Tirana, the capital of Albania.

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1 This suggests that the 2004 attacks on Serbian churches and monasteries (Grujic 2014:78) have not been rooted in Albanian ‘vengeful traditions’, but were related to post-war feelings of revenge. Lopes Cardozo et al. (2000) conducted a survey among Kosovo Albanians following the Kosovo War, in which nearly 90 per cent reported post-traumatic feelings of hatred toward Serbs; less than half reported strong feelings of revenge; and more than one third stated that they would act on these feelings.

2 For example President of the Constitutional Court Arta Rama said this in her interview. Nevertheless she said the campaign against blood feuds ‘created a feeling of community and of capacity at resolving important matters outside of the institutions of the regime. Because people did not trust the institutions, they solved their own problems through those reconciliations and other parallel institutions of government and justice. That was empowering self-help that helped Kosovo to be a more effective community at crime control’ (Interview 121519).
Reconciling feuds; resisting oppression

In Communist Yugoslavia the Kanun was banned and suppressed, as it was in Communist Albania. Yet it survived as a form of resistance. According to some commentators, the influence of the Kanun increased after the fall of communism (Pratt 2013: 4). The Kanun was in part an institution for reconciling feuds within Albanian society to unify resistance to Ottoman rule. At a number of notable points in the centuries of resistance to ‘the Turks’, there were concerted campaigns across the northern Albanian lands to invoke the Kanun to reconcile all internal blood feuds before launching a new surge of Albanian resistance. The last of these massive society-wide reconciliation campaigns under Ottoman domination were in 1910 (10 April; 1 May), with earlier campaigns including 1878, 1703 and 1444 (Clark 2000: 64).

In 1990 a group of Albanian university students decided to revive this tradition. Distinguished scholar of Albanian culture, Anton Çetta joined them to become the public face of their campaign, as did many leaders of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms and scholars from the Albanological Institute. It was initially called Action for Blood Feud Reconciliation. Approximately 500 activists criss-crossed Kosovo between 1990 and 1992 in a scaled-up reconciliation movement to end blood feuds. The students visited house-to-house to persuade Albanians that if they were to unite against the threat posed by Milosevic, they would have to resolve their own blood feuds first. Estimates vary on the number of blood feuds reconciled in this campaign, with the Mangalakova (2004) estimate for the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations of 1200 often cited, though Clark (2001) estimated 2000 ceremonies of reconciliation completion, and Luci (2014: 68, 101) 2000–2500. The campaign was expressed by one who attended as a contagion of reconciliation: ‘Someone forgiving the blood turned into an act of others to follow’ (Prishtina interview 121525). This informant described Çetta’s method as looking for promising cases where reconciliation could be achieved and then using those as virtuous examples to create a cascade of further reconciliations.

The numbers in the last paragraph do not capture the magnitude of what happened here. They do not count the number of people who attended each reconciliation. That number ranged from hundreds to thousands for each final gathering. According to one informant who worked on the campaign, it was common for there to be a considerable number of working meetings toward reconciliation that would be attended by an average of 30 people. Then there would often be more than a thousand people, dignitaries, food, dance and folkloric music at the final ritual of reconciliation. The largest was the reconciliation gathering at Verrat e Llukës on 1 May 1990 where even the official Tanjung Agency reported 100,000 participants, while Anton Çetta himself guessed 500,000 in the crowd (Clark 2000: 63). Parts of this event can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Braqs43CnmU.

Luci (2014:101) concludes ‘Over a period of two years, more than 500,000 people were said to or
were documented to have taken part in mass organised meetings of reconciliation. There may not be any other reconciliation or restorative justice process in recent decades that can claim this level of mass participation, of the order of a third of the total population of a society in a short space of time.

The female students of the campaign joined hands with local women to evoke a limited but meaningful feminist transformation of tradition through the campaign. As Luci (2014: 119) puts it:

In many ways, the reconciliation movement was characterised by the refashioning of previous ‘male domains’ in the public sphere of homes, which required specific forms of speech and narrative forms, into more inclusive spaces where women became agents in a new, even though temporary, vision of resistance. Serbian nationalist discourse and public imagery had constructed an idea of a backward Albanian culture, a violent masculinity, and thus dominated femininity. Therefore, a politics of culture emerged in Kosova, which sought not only to dispel such imaginings, but foremost to show that Albanian cultural traditions could animate emancipatory politics (Luci 2014: 246).

One Serbian NGO leader we interviewed in Mitrovica saw the campaign against blood feuds as part of a positive nonviolent movement, but one from which he was excluded because he was a Serb:

Rugova, it was good that he was peaceful but he was always Albanian. He never included Serbs living alongside Albanian society in his peaceful resistance movement. I was against Milosevic but I never could have joined LDK because I was a Serb. It was not a movement from multi-ethnic society. They wanted to build an Albanian society. Roma and other groups were also not part of LDK or PDK. They never even tried to include them ... With Albanian support the opposition to Milosevic could've got rid of him by electoral and other means. But that was not the goal (Interview 121530).

Although one person we interviewed claimed that some members of the Serbian community participated in the reconciliation processes of the early 1990s, other informants did not confirm this. Taking into account the positive use of besa in maintaining friendly relations between Albanians and Serbs in the past, the leaders of the nonviolent resistance might have used certain paragraphs from the Kanun to invite members of the Serbian communities to join their nonviolent struggle against Milosevic. One of the important Albanian traditions is giving social honour to their guests (miku). The Kanun itself contains more than sixty paragraphs (§§ 602-66) regulating how guests should be treated with honour, hospitality and protection from abuse and violence by third persons—even to the point of risking one’s own life (§ 643). The most vivid example of how this tradition served to prevent violence towards non-Albanian ‘guests’ was the way Albanians protected Jews from the Nazi-led Holocaust during World War II (Sarner 1997; Weinstein 2000:97; Sadiku, 2014: 102).

After the war, the unifying motivation of resisting tyranny that was present in the campaign against blood feuds during the 1990s was missing. It took years before NGOs became strong that made blood feud reconciliation work a priority. The Committee for Nationwide Reconciliation, the Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes, Partners Kosova and the Peace
Missionaries Union have done important work in reconciling blood feuds but have not had the human resources to tackle a growing backlog of unaddressed feuds. The post-war struggle for international recognition of Kosovo’s independence hindered the use of the Kanun’s guest-friendly provisions for a political narrative that would prevent violence against Serbs and their exodus from Kosovo.

**Impacts of the campaign**

No one would claim that blood feuds were eliminated to zero in the 1990s as a result of the campaign, but most commentators believe most extant blood feuds were resolved. Some scholars even comment that ‘virtually no blood feuds continued’ (Clark 2001: 2). As a result of the campaign against blood feuds, it became an act of disloyalty against the resistance to pursue a blood feud against fellow Albanians. Aggrieved families ‘pardoned the blood ... in the name of the youth, the people and the flag’ (Clark 2001: 2; this language was often repeated in our interviews). For many of the youth, this was also part of a more general move away from patriarchal traditions and toward becoming modern Europeans, while at the same time embracing the reconciliatory traditions of the Kanun. This changed cultural habits, perhaps even permanently to some degree.

With the end of the war in 1999, however, and the end of the patriotic obligation to avert blood feuds, new feuds did spring up, including some caused by killing during the war and by testimony against defendants in war crime trials. These surged back to a significant degree between 2000 and 2004, though many of the murders of this period undoubtedly harnessed the blood feud narrative to what was strategic political murder. Then murders pursuant to blood feuds almost certainly fell again in the twelve years since 2004 once the initial surge of post-war revenge violence settled.

The Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms has reported data from the end of the war until 2003 on about 40 murders related to blood feuds recorded in Kosovo (Mangalakova 2004: 11), though there were undoubtedly other unreported cases. Partners Kosova in our interview and in other forums see the incidence of blood feuds as lower than this today. Before 1990 there is no systematic recording of blood feud killings in Kosovo, though the New York Times quoted Pristina’s Institute for Albanian Studies as estimating as many as 100 murders in single years during the 1980s (Sudetic 1990). This seems an implausibly high claim to the Kosovar experts, statisticians and scholars we interviewed. In 1989, the year before the campaign started, Clark (2000: 61) reports only 15 deaths from blood feuds. This is still a larger number than the average of 10 a year in the years immediately after the war and a much larger number than has been reported for any single year since.

Boyle (2014) characterises Kosovo more generally as a society that suffered a high level of strategic violence in its first five years of ‘peace’. Strategic violence is defined as violence aimed at transforming the balance of power and resources in a contested area. While Bosnia suffered a much more deadly war than Kosovo, it was Kosovo that suffered the more deadly post-conflict strategic
violence. Boyle (2014: Chapter 6) found Bosnia, with twice the population of Kosovo, to suffer only 42 cases of post-conflict strategic violence, while Kosovo had 213 in a comparable five-year period, largely as a result of strategic attacks against Serb, Roma and other minority communities throughout Kosovo. Mostly this amounted to threats of violence and burning of houses. Sometimes it was sniper fire to terrify populations to flee. On 92 occasions, it included grenade attacks recorded by the UN and 27 other attacks with mortars or rocket-held grenades. There was also extensive factional violence between rival Albanian groups. This persisted for longer. One former member of the KLA intelligence organization, SHIK, Nazim Bllaca, has confessed to multiple murders himself and alleged that SHIK killed 450 people in the decade after the war, mostly by 2004, mostly political opponents of PDK, particularly members of LDK. Leaked reports of the EU’s rule of law mission, EULEX, and leaked German intelligence reports, support the analysis that SHIK was responsible for a large PDK-directed campaign of political assassinations and kidnappings against its opponents (Boyle 2014: Chapter 6). While strategic political violence in Kosovo with 213 killings in the 5-year post-conflict period was much worse than Bosnia, it was not as bad as Iraq (with 82,682), Rwanda (with 8,439) or East Timor (with 322).

Moving beyond strategic political violence to the general level of violence, Boyle 2014: Table 6.3) compared the level of violent crime in the first year after the war with Northern Ireland, which also terminated its conflict at the end of the 1990s and has a slightly higher population than Kosovo. Kosovo had 245 murders in 2000, while Northern Ireland had only 44. On the positive side Kosovo had half the recorded rapes (115) of Northern Ireland (232) though in both jurisdictions there was hesitation of women to report rape cases.

There are many structural reasons why criminologists would predict a high homicide rate in Kosovo. It is a society in which a patriarchal honour code is still part of the habitus of the people (Färnsveden et al 2014: 16) a characteristic of many of the societies with the highest homicide rates, particularly Latin American societies such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela and Colombia. This characteristic of these societies, in turn, helps sustain a formidable male gang and organised crime culture which can stake a competitive advantage in trafficking in drugs, humans or guns. In the case of Kosovo, organised crime grew after the mass dismissal of Albanians from the legitimate economy in 1989, causing many to turn to the illegitimate economy and the violence so often associated with it. Two decades later, UNMIK in 2008 estimated the share of entrenched organised crime in Kosovo’s economy at between 15 and 20 per cent (Proksik 2013: 284). In 2004, UNMIK estimated that 80 per cent of the heroin destined for Western European markets passed through Kosovo or Macedonia. UNODC estimated a value of profits from heroin sales though the region as many times the value of the entire Kosovo state budget (Proksik 2013: 284). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that approximately 200,000 women annually in this period were stripped of their identity papers and bought and sold by Balkan sex cartels and their extensions (Giatzidis 2007: 328).
Kosovo is a post-war society; participation in a war increases post-war homicide (Archer and Gartner 1984; Ghobarah et al 2003). After its peace agreement was signed in the 1990s, the homicide rate in El Salvador spiked to 135 per 100,000, a huge contrast to Kosovo’s single digit rate. More people were being killed by homicide after El Salvador’s successful peace agreement was signed than were being killed during the worst years of its war (Geneva Declaration 2011: Chapter 2). El Salvador is not exceptional as a case where the extent of killing increases after a peace agreement ends a war. We have seen this with Iraq (Boyle 2014: Chapter 8) and a number of African and other wars (Duffield 2001: 188). Widespread disruption of settled institutions by refugee flows contributes to post-war violence (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2017: Chapter 3) and Kosovo had a much larger scale of refugee suffering compared to countries that suffered bigger, longer wars. By 2000, 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo had been driven from their homes, the majority of them being Albanians (Naimark 2002: 182) who were driven out first, followed by Serbs (and Roma) in a reverse cleansing. Kosovo inherited a gun culture that was worsened by an avalanche of weapons flowing in from Albania during the war. 65% of households continued to own at least one firearm after years of UN and EU effort to destroy weapons (Pozhidaev and Andzhelich 2005: 63). Kosovo is a post-Communist society and such societies tended to suffer steep increases in homicide after the collapse of Communism (Karstedt 2006). ‘The fall of the communist regimes prompted the virtual collapse of the states’ control functions’ (Giatzidis 2007: 328), especially so in Kosovo after 1989 when Kosovo Albanians withdrew all cooperation with what limited state functionality was left. Karstedt (2006: 55) concludes that increased homicide rates following transitions to democracy are not usually short-term results of disruption from the demise of an autocracy, but involve anomic tendencies that persist through quite a long duration of transition. We saw extremely elevated homicide rates for many years in most post-communist transitions, and in South Africa, for example. Karstedt (2006:64) argues that the data show that ‘when the grip of an authoritarian regime loosens, the anomic tendencies produced during the preceding period of autocracy erupt in violent conflicts and a wave of violent crime’.

Kosovo has a youth bulge, a forty per cent unemployment rate and is the poorest society with possibly still the weakest state in Europe. There can be no dispute that it started this century as the weakest state in Europe because in 2000 it had no well-established state institutions. All the factors discussed in the last three paragraphs mean that in a counterfactual analysis (see references above), Kosovo is a most likely case (Eckstein 1975) for a high homicide rate. The grip of corruption, organised crime that implemented a widespread assassination policy against its enemies, outlier levels of drug and other trafficking, extremely high gun ownership, the honour culture, revenge culture, in a post-war, post-authoritarian society with a weak state, 90 per cent of the population refugees, a youth bulge and 40 per cent of the population unemployed all would lead us to expect an above average homicide rate in post-war Kosovo. In the next section, however, we ponder a Kosovo homicide rate in recent years at one third the world average homicide rate per 100,000 adults (6.2 according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime). Counterfactual analysts are attracted to
cases like these to move from quantitative analysis to a qualitative search for particular historical conjunctures associated in changes to homicide patterns. This is the analysis undertaken in the next section.

**Historical trends in Kosovo homicide rates**

**Data sources**

Homicide rates herein are based on data on intentional homicides collected from: (1) Official Country Statistics (1953–2013); (2) Ismet Salihu’s Dissertation (1957–77); (3) Kosovo Police (1999–2013); (4) UNMIK Police (2000–05); (5) UNODC and World Bank (2008–13). As presented in Figure 1, there are discrepancies between different sources due to different data collection methods; however, they converge on a common pattern. Our research also delved qualitatively into the data, for example through interviews with Sanije Uka from the Agency of Statistics in Kosovo who has remained behind the data presented here since 1990 (sources 1 and 3) and Professor Ismet Salihu (source 2). Salihu’s qualitative work revealed many cases in the last century where the Serbian police had not reported correctly, for example by substituting homicide with suicide on many occasions. This critical qualitative individualisation of the data gives reason for suspecting an even sharper comparative reduction in the homicide rate since the Kosovo war compared to the period of Serbian domination of the justice system. Professor Salihu’s qualitative analysis of cases from different courts in Kosovo importantly concludes that the most common cause (21% of intentional homicides) in former Yugoslavia was vengeance, as would be predicted in a culture with an honour code.

Official Country Statistics cover the longest period measuring homicides in Kosovo. They are based on data collected by civil registry offices, usually based on death certificates issued by physicians, and reported in the Official Country Statistics since 1953. Due to historical changes of the status of Kosovo, three different states collected the data throughout the six decades: (1) Yugoslavia 1953–90 (SAP Kosovo 1976: 44; 1981: 47; 1985: 41; 1989: 41; SR Jugoslavija 1992: 90, 229), Serbia 1991–97 (Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije 2007:142), and Kosovo 2002–13 (Republika e Kosovës 2015: 62). The 4-year disruption in the data (1998–2001) is due to the Kosovo War and its aftermath. Dotted lines are used to project homicide rates in the period of data disruption, knowing that the homicide rate is significantly lower during this period.

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3 We excluded the data on homicide in Kosovo presented in latest edition of the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (Aebi *et al.* 2014: 34) due to serious doubts about their accuracy. The rates of intentional homicides in Kosovo according the Sourcebook ranged from 10.5 in 2007 to 14.5 in 2011, which substantially differs from the Official Country Statistics (provided by the Kosovo Agency of Statistics) and from the data provided by the UNODC.

4 In other cases, the information about the cause of death can be provided by the family of the deceased as revealed in a court decision (in case of a missing person) or based on a police report (e.g., when a missing person’s corpse was found).
increased very sharply in the course of the war and post-war violence, as is also demonstrated by the Kosovo Police data.

Salihu (1982) used several sources combined to measure homicides in Kosovo: statistical reports (Vjetari Statistikor i KSA të Kosovës 1978: 30), Salihu’s own inquiry into court files on homicides that took place in the period 1966–75 (Salihu 1982: 125), reports from public prosecutors and police (e.g. Pokrajinski sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove 1969), as well as data cited in the literature (e.g. Marković 1978).

The Kosovo Police data for the period between 1999 and 2013 were obtained directly from the Information Office of Kosovo Police in March 2016. UNMIK Police Data for the period between 2000 and 2005 was reported in a survey published by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC 2006).

The most recent UNODC (2016) and World Bank (2016) data on homicides for the period 2008–13 correspond to those reported by EUROSTAT (2016), however EUROSTAT’s homicide rates are lower due to the discrepancy in the population estimates for Kosovo. The fact that there has not been an accurate population census in Kosovo for decades poses a particular problem in determining homicide rates. Albanians and Serbs boycotted the last two censuses in 1991 and 2011 respectively. All estimations encounter difficulties in determining how and when migrations that resulted from the Kosovo War and its aftermath affected the country’s population, which led to lack of accuracy in those estimations. For example, some official statistical reports claim that Kosovo’s population never exceeded 2 million (Raporti i Zhvillimit Njerëzor në Kosovë 2014: 23). Official estimations, however, by the Serbian authorities as well as the World Bank (2016), claim that the population of Kosovo exceeded 2 million at some point during the 1990s. A report prepared by Blayo et al. (2000: 153) for

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5 The latest UNODC data do not accord with a previously published study which measured lower homicide rates in Kosovo – e.g. 4.4 in 2008, 3.2 in 2009, and 3.6 in 2010 (UNODC 2013: 131).

6 The greatest discrepancy was in the period until 2010, when the discrepancy reached almost half a million. For that year EUROSTAT (2016) reports Kosovo had 2.21 million inhabitants, while the World Bank (2016) reports 1.78 million.

7 Even one of the official statistics acknowledges this (Raporti i Zhvillimit Njerëzor në Kosovë 2014: 24).

8 It is hard to dispute this, bearing in mind the 1981 census count of 1.5 million, the official estimation based on the partially boycotted 1991 census counting 1.9 million and the population growth rate. Some sources claim that the Kosovo population exceeded 2 million even in the 2000s. According to EUROSTAT (2016), the major change in the Kosovo population took place in 2010–1 when it measured a population decrease of nearly half a million: 2,208,107 in 2010, 1,794,180 in 2011. Since there is no evidence that supports such a dramatic population decrease at that time, we can consider it delayed acknowledgement of a population drop based on the 2011 population census. Sanije Uka who is in charge of gathering the homicide data from civil registries for the Kosovo Agency of Statistics told us that, according to the data available to him, even in 2011 Kosovo had more than 2 million people. We could not find any reports that support this estimation.
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and IOM confirms this—estimating that the total population of Kosovo in 1999 would have been 2,311,000 persons, if between 611,000 and 911,000 persons had not been absent on the date of the survey. In the post-war period most of the Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo; however, at the same time a substantial part of the Serbian population was displaced to Serbia. Thus, it would be difficult to dispute the fact that the major population drop occurred in the course of the Kosovo War and its aftermath.

Due to these considerations, we had to combine two sources of data that reflect such population trends. As the source of the estimated Kosovo population until 1997 we used the Official Country Statistics (SR Jugoslavija 1992: 27; Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije 2007: 36). For the subsequent period, we could not rely on the Official Country Statistics due to significant gaps and discrepancies in the data, but for the period between 1998 and 2013 we relied on the estimations reported by the World Bank (2016), whose estimations had been compatible with the Official Country Statistics in the previous periods.

The homicide patterns

Historians of Kosovo identify the 25-year history of nonviolent struggle against Belgrade’s domination as starting in 1981. Even though there was an important eruption of resistance in 1968, sustained, resilient resistance did not start until 1981. Figure 1 shows that while the first year of the concerted campaign of nonviolent resistance, 1981, was a year of comparatively high homicide rates, that rate fell sharply and then gradually to be at extremely low levels during the 15 years of nonviolent resistance (up to 1996). Then homicide spiked to very high levels during the armed struggle, but also experienced the largest homicide drop in the aftermath of the Kosovo War. The drop has been described as the steepest decline in homicide in Kosovo’s history (Alvazzi del Frate & Mugellini 2012: 145). The homicide levels remained moderately high, however, in the years of strategic violence immediately post-conflict (up to 2004). The picture is of gradual decline since then to the point where by 2013 Kosovo had become a low-homicide society with the rate falling to 2 per 100,000 inhabitants, one-third of the world average of 6.2, yet still twice the homicide rate that averaged less than 1 before the conflict, between 1984 and 1996. In 2014 the homicide rate seems likely to have fallen further. Our sources within Kosovo Police state that the number of murders in Kosovo in 2014 was 35 cases, whereas in 2015 this number has dropped to 25 (a 29% further fall).

The final important point to note is that during the long period of very low homicide during the nonviolence era, the stepping up of the nonviolence campaign between 1990 and 1992 through the campaign against blood feuds knocks the homicide rate sharply lower still during those three years,

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9 According to UNHCR (2016), Serbia (including Kosovo) still has 220,227 internally displaced persons, most of whom are Serbs from Kosovo.
10 Professor Salihu’s more qualitative analysis reached the same conclusion for the 1980s fall.
when it is closer to zero than to 1. Indeed it remains so until the war begins. After 1996 homicide escalates sharply until it reaches levels that can no longer be counted in a meaningful way, though the Kosovo police counts peak at 15 per 100,000. We presume this count excludes huge numbers of murders by the police themselves and large numbers of murders classified as suicides or accidents. Most state and KLA assassinations of people were not counted until the UN administration arrived.

<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>

The Kosovo peacebuilding literature is consistent with the international literature in generating a great deal of qualitative evidence of outbreaks of domestic violence after the war in Kosovo (Farnsworth 2008: 21), though systematic comparative survey research evidence is absent for Kosovo.

While the cross-national evidence is clear that wars increase national homicide rates post-conflict, it is equally clear that wars elevate suicide rates post-conflict (Ghoborah et al 2003). In addition, we know that certain societies with exceptionally low homicide rates also have suicide rates ten to twenty times higher than their homicide rate — leading instances of this exceptionalism being Japan, Korea, Slovenia and Slovakia (comparisons based on UNODC homicide data and WHO suicide data). This has given birth to a longstanding Durkheimian criminological literature on whether the control of violence in low homicide rate societies can be displaced into high suicide rates (Henry and Short 1954). Our purpose here is not to engage with that literature, nor to contribute to resolving those debates. It simply seems important in a post-war analysis to check out the possibility that unusually low homicide rates in Kosovo are not displaced into massive internalization of violence as self-harm.

Figure 2 shows this is not the case. In comparative terms, the impact of the Kosovo war on post-war suicide rates is extremely slight. Kosovo has become a low-homicide, low-suicide society. Of great interest is the fact that Kosovo has an exceptionally low suicide rate during the years of the nonviolent resistance up to 1996. Moreover, the 1990-2 campaign against blood feuds does not displace homicide to suicide. On the contrary, 1991-3 have the lowest recorded suicide rates in modern Kosovo history. Sometimes administrations wilfully conceal the truth or negligently record suicides or homicides as accidental deaths. Figure 2 shows that these also plunge to their historic low during the campaign against blood feuds and fall quite sharply during most of the years of nonviolent resistance. The massive magnitude of the decline in accidental deaths in 1991 has caused commentators to query whether blood feud deaths had been hiding inside the accidental death statistics until the campaign against blood feud brought them to an end, even if only temporarily.

<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE>

To conclude our analysis, then, the data suggest six conclusions:

1. Kosovo is a case where violent death declines after war, in sharp contrast to the common scenario of intentional killing and suicide increases after a peace agreement is signed;
2. The decades of nonviolent resistance are associated with a large reduction in violent death;

3. The campaign against blood feuds was a restorative element of the nonviolence campaign that was associated with a particularly sharp reduction in violent death within the nonviolence period;

4. Kosovo is a unique example of a massive reconciliation process with participation of nearly one third of the total population in a short space of time.

5. The ethnographic evidence as well as quantitative evidence converge on the likelihood that the campaign against blood feuds sharply reduced blood feud murders during the early 1990s and that blood feud murders have never returned to the levels that prevailed before 1990.

6. In summary then, while the various components of the nonviolent campaign against the Milosevic regime failed to prevent war, they did almost certainly prevent violence in a historically transformative way. This in a post-authoritarian, post-war society that suffered much higher immediate post-conflict strategic assassination than in other recent European conflicts such as Bosnia and Northern Ireland and in one of the worst examples of post-war capture of state and society by a murderous organised crime network.

Kosovo is a case study of applying the criminological lens to struggles against tyranny. Looking through a criminological lens, we evaluate nonviolent campaigns of resistance not only according to whether they prevent war. Rather, the criminologist evaluates them according to whether they reduce violent death, where war death is just one form of intentional killing. On the war-prevention test, nonviolent resistance in Kosovo failed. On the criminological test, it succeeded.

**Beyond the NATO bombing narrative**

Scholars from NATO countries tend to buy the narrative that the prolonged NATO bombing of Serbia was a necessary evil. Scholarly debates about the various NATO bombing campaigns mainly focus on whether they were a breach of international law. Were they justified crimes of aggression? This of course was not the debate in non-NATO countries, particularly China. It saw the loss of life when its embassy in Belgrade was bombed as a crime of aggression by NATO. In this section, we use our field research in Kosovo to make the point that, viewed through the wider criminological lens we have adopted, the NATO bombing as necessary evil appears a myopic analysis.

**Revisionist narrative 1: Had NATO supported Kosovar nonviolence, it might have succeeded**

The negotiators at Dayton excluded Rugova and his team because their struggle was not deploying violence to unsettle stability. As a result, the people of Kosovo turned against Rugova’s strategy. When the KLA transformed the resistance into an armed struggle, the west took notice. Indeed the
west saw an opportunity to remove and indict Milosevic for war crimes in Kosovo. Western diplomacy underwrote KLA violence; it punished the patient nonviolence of the mass of Kosovo Albanians. The US provided cash to the KLA and training in violence, instead of providing training in more effective techniques of nonviolent resistance. Worse still, western diplomacy punished most the more effective forms of nonviolence. Our theory would be that in these ways, western policy created a moral hazard of armed violence. This means that the hazard of violence is increased because there are international rewards for opting for violence and international punishments for opting for nonviolent resistance. Western diplomacy shunned the proactive nonviolence of the students and the miners that was succeeding in inflicting real costs on the regime and was succeeding in discouraging Serbs from following the pressure from Milosevic’s regime to settle in Kosovo.

Kosovo’s nonviolence met many of Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) conditions for the success of nonviolent resistance, particularly in mass participation, Albanian defection from the security services, and in sheer creativity and energy. It can be argued that had the west supported that nonviolence instead of threatening withdrawal of western support as soon as the nonviolent campaign got sufficiently robust to impose political costs on Milosevic, nonviolent resistance may have succeeded politically during the mid-1990s in both Kosovo and Belgrade.

Revisionist narrative 2: Reducing violence is the ultimate aim of nonviolence, not preventing war; Kosovo succeeded in reducing violence

In spite of the timidity of western support, nonviolence did succeed in achieving the ultimate aim of nonviolent strategy—resisting domination by means that reduce the amount of violence in the world. This even though it failed to avert war. Reviving Albanian reconciliation skills and traditions not only opened the door to more peaceful and effective conflict resolution in the long term; in the short term (by 1992) it ended at least 1200 deadly blood feuds each of which risked multiple murders. A theoretical account of how this was accomplished is embedded in the customary justice theory of reconciliation in the Kanun, and in restorative justice theory (Braithwaite 2002). In the long run history of almost every society during the past half century, homicide kills many more people than war and terrorism. A limitation of the nonviolence literature is that it puts all the emphasis on preventing, healing and ending war to the neglect of the commonly recurrent forms of violence such as gender based violence, male revenge violence, and strategic post-conflict violence (Boyle 2014) which are at the same time associated with war and independent of it. Restorative justice theory does not commit that theoretical error (Braithwaite 2002), and recently that has become true of wider criminology informed by a criminology of war developed, among others, by leading figures of the discipline (Rafter 2016; Walklate and MacGarry 2015; Hagan et al 2015; Karstedt 2012).

A balanced narrative: The mixed legacy of reconciliation and forgiveness in Kosovo and Serbia.
While our limited data triangulates on efficacy, we cannot be certain about whether there were long-term benefits of the campaign against blood feuds as one key plank of civil resistance in Kosovo. The qualitative data allows us to be rather certain that there were large short-term benefits. And we can be certain that the dominant western narrative that NATO bombing did all the decisive work of ending violence in Kosovo is false.

A balanced narrative is clear about the short-term benefits of nonviolent resistance in immediately reducing violence associated with blood feuds and in building mass social solidarity to resist tyranny on a wide front. It also sees some profound tactical errors in Rugova’s nonviolent strategy. In the aftermath of the errors of domestic and international leaders, the rise of the KLA and the NATO bombing did play the critical final role in ending the Milosevic regime’s domination of Kosovo in the bloody finale of this historical drama. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the preventive UN peacekeeping deployment and negotiated peace in Macedonia points, however, to a better path that might have been taken in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Croatia had they only been taken early enough (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2017: Part I).

**Future research**

Our analysis is sufficient to show that a good hypothesis is that the extraordinary breadth of the engagement of Kosovo civil society with nonviolence between 1968 and 1996, especially between 1981 and 1996, and more especially between 1990 and 1992, helped leave a legacy of a comparatively low violence post-conflict society. On the other hand, war did cascade to terrible corruption, organised crime and violence associated with this in Kosovo, as it did throughout the former Yugoslavia. This is the topic of another paper (Marsavelski and Braithwaite 2016).

An interim test of the impact of nonviolent resistance on violence cross-nationally will be possible at the completion of the Peacebuilding Compared data collection of which this research is a part. A number of variables about the character and strength of nonviolent resistance in countries that have experienced wars are being coded. This will permit assessment of whether our qualitative conclusion that civil resistance in Kosovo did make a contribution to non-war violence reduction has wider relevance across more than 50 wars since 1990. 37 wars beyond Kosovo have preliminary coding so far. Quantitatively, we will be able to test whether post-war homicide rates are lower when there is a history of vibrant nonviolent resistance. Qualitatively, we will be able to explore a diversity of cases for differences and similarities with Kosovo. That analysis should not be seen as having an n of a meager 50 national cases. This case study shows that within one country case there can be many degrees of freedom from multiple historical turning points to armed conflict and to nonviolence, and many villages across space that move from being a village afflicted by blood feuds to a reconciled village. We hope this article shows why this is comparative macrocriminological research that matters.
 Figures

Figure 1: Homicide rates in Kosovo in the period between 1953 and 2013.

Figure 2: Rates of intentional homicides, accidental deaths and suicides in Kosovo in the period between 1953 and 2013.
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