Rape, Shame and Pride

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To cite this article: John Braithwaite (2006) Rape, Shame and Pride, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 7:S1, 2-16, DOI: 10.1080/14043850601029059

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043850601029059

Published online: 07 Dec 2006.

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Rape, Shame and Pride
Address to Stockholm Criminology Symposium, 16 June 2006

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Abstract

A proposition of the theory of reintegrative shaming is that a reason some societies have lower rates of rape is that rape is unthinkable to most men in those societies. This presentation shows how war interrupts the unthinkable ness of rape. Bougainville society seems to have had a low level of rape until its war of the 1980s and 1990s. A single rape was one of the important sparks that lit its civil war. It caused perhaps over 5% of the population to lose their lives and perhaps over a third to be displaced from their homes. As in most wars, rape became common in Bougainville.

A theory of why war causes epidemics of rape helps criminologists understand rape better. It can also help international relations scholars to see that the bigger problem caused by armed conflict today may be crime rather than battle deaths. Rape in peace and in war is interpreted according to Eliza Ahmed’s theory of shame management and pride management. Ahmed’s work is seen as an important advance in evidence-based criminological theory. A deficiency of reintegrative shaming theory is that it neglects pride as the flip side of shame as an emotion. Shame displacement may be important to the explanation of rape; yet narcissistic pride may be more important. In war we see more vividly the social dynamics of how shame displacement and narcissistic pride allow both rape and the onset of war itself. Bougainville helps us to ponder how historically sustained, deep and broad restorative justice processes may be part of what is needed to return a society to peace and to low levels of rape.

KEY WORDS: Bougainville, Conflict, Peace, Pride, Rape, Shame, Restorative justice

Rape in War

Anzac Day is the big national day in Australia and New Zealand. It commemorates the shock at the magnitude of the loss of young men at the Gallipoli landing in 1915. A quarter of a century ago in Canberra, the women’s movement decided to join with veterans in the Anzac Day March to protest rape in war. Veterans banned the women and threatened violence if Anzac Day were desecrated. Police warned the women they would be arrested. Val Braithwaite decided to go in the march. Val agreed to our pleas to stay at the very back as those at the front would suffer violence and arrest. As the live television images of the march appeared I was surprised that Val was leading the Women Against Rape in War. Aggressive women spoiling for a punch-up with the veterans had positioned themselves at the front. The organizers in their wisdom wheeled them 180 degrees, so the most timid women at the back were pressed against police and veterans. It was an upsetting day for Val and for our nation. But those women were effective in raising a then non-existent consciousness of the importance of rape as an issue in war. Rape in war has also not been an important topic in criminology (some important exceptions being recent, e.g. Lilly 2007).
In the years since, the unsystematic data we have on sexual assault in recent wars suggest that the feminist analysis has become even more valid than it was then, not long after the independence war in Bangladesh in which 200,000 women suffered rapes so systematic and all-inclusive that only a conscious military strategy can have been behind them (Seifert 1994: 63; Niarchos 1995). To most criminologists, the evidence is of low quality. But I take note when researchers return from places like Timor Leste saying that large proportions of the women they interviewed had been raped. I take note of the 2005 UN Human Development Report (2005: 160) concluding that mass rape occurred in the wars of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia, Peru, Somalia and Uganda. A 2001 survey of 991 Internally Displaced Persons in Sierra Leone reporting victimizations of 9166 male and female members of their households found that 13% had experienced war-related sexual violence (Physicians for Human Rights 2002). I note a less significant armed conflict than all these in the Solomon Islands in which guns and knives killed perhaps only 100–200 people. Yet one Australian National University (ANU) PhD scholar, Matthew Allen, reports evidence from one of the areas where he has been doing field-work in the Solomons this year that 15% of women and girls had been raped (most victims being 11–15-year-old girls).²

It is not ridiculous to ponder if it might be the case that in many contemporary wars, soldiers inflict less suffering directly with guns than they do through sexual assault. One reason is that in wars of the ethnic cleansing type, which have become more common as population pressures on scarce resources have grown, rape has been consciously used as a weapon to terrorize ethnic groups to flee their homes. Bosnia is the leading European example (Nikolic-Ristanovic 2005; MacKinnon 2006: 141–209). A Bosnian Muslim woman explains the peculiar terror of rape in war:

I do not fear the shells and bombs that may fall on my house. They do not ask for my name. I fear the foot soldiers who come into my house and kill and wound in a very personal way and commit atrocities in front of my children (MacKinnon 2006: 209).

Throughout human history it has been harder to recruit soldiers to attack other armed men defending cities than to recruit for the task of rape and pillage of isolated villages. This is also why death rates sometimes actually increase after warlords sign cease-fire agreements. The cease-fire allows young toughs under their command to devote more of their time to unchecked crime against civilians. While the most geopolitically significant wars of recent years—Afghanistan and Iraq—are atypical of contemporary wars in important

¹When I gave my Stockholm presentation, I reported on the basis of the 2005 Human Development Report that in the case of Sierra Leone victim surveys suggest more than half the women of the nation suffered some type of sexual violence. I was negligent in not reading the underlying survey data (Physicians for Human Rights 2002) which does not support this claim in the Human Development Report.

²Based on a letter from the Peochakuri community in Guadalcanal to Paul Tavua, Chairman of the National Peace Council, and Stephen Halapua, from the 2006 field-work files of Matthew Allen.
ways, one feature they share with many other contemporary wars is that it is after the set-piece wars between major armies ends that most of the killing and human rights abuses begin. My hypothesis is that the greater part of the problem of contemporary warfare is actually a crime problem (and rape is the most devastating part of this). The ANU Centre for International Justice and Governance (under the leadership of Hilary Charlesworth and the author) has begun to research this systematically in a study of 60 wars that have occurred since 1985.

Whether we are proved right or wrong in that hypothesis, the hypothesis the veterans confronted the women with on that Anzac Day has certainly been proved wrong by subsequent history. This was their view: that adult male combatants are the overwhelming victims of war. The UN estimates that two-thirds of worldwide deaths related to violent conflict since 1990 have been of children (UN Human Development Report 2005: 155). This includes many child soldiers, some girls who are treated as sex slaves by commanders, and many civilian girls who are raped then killed or killed then raped.

A proposition of the theory of reintegrative shaming is that the reason some societies have low rates of rape is not that rapists are more often locked up in those societies. It is that rape is unthinkable to most men in those societies. And that it is reintegrative shaming that constitutes the unthinkableness of abuse of women. I will now attempt to argue how war interrupts the unthinkableness of rape.

**Rape in Bougainville**

In 1969 I spent 6 weeks living in a village in Bougainville. Earlier this year, in a lovely ceremony I was adopted as a chief of the Naboin clan in Toretei. Bougainville seemed in 1969 to be a society with an extremely low level of rape and of child abuse until war broke out there two decades later. My data are anthropological-ethnographic rather than criminological-statistical. This means that they are superior data on a difficult-to-measure phenomenon like rape. A good ethnographer talks to everyone in her village many times, builds more rapport to bolster honesty than a one-off victim survey interviewer or a police officer sitting in the station waiting for a rape victim to arrive with a complaint. The ethnographer also observes whether patterns of behaviour in the village are consistent with the story of sexual mores that villagers report to her. In a Melanesian village, cries from a rape victim and blows of domestic violence can be heard through the papery walls of adjoining homes. Good ethnographers report what they hear as well as what they see.

There have been a number of important ethnographic studies on Bougainville and among culturally similar people in the Western Solomon Islands (for a recent overview see various essays in Regan and Griffin 2005). The ethnographies report occasional rape in the context of incest with children, but once girls were promised in marriage, which in the past they tended to be at an early age, rape was not detected. While Harvard anthropologist Douglas Oliver found among the Siwai of Bougainville from 1938 that rape was...
‘practically non-existent’ (Oliver 1955: 82), it is of interest to our analysis that his informants concurred that ‘rape no longer occurs, as it did during times of warfare, when raiders used to rape the enemies’ women’ (Oliver 1955: 145).

It was not a coincidence that Beatrice Blackwood (1935) from 1930 conducted one of the great early ethnographies among the people where I lived in 1969. That was a reason I was sent there as an undergraduate anthropology major. The other reason was that there was an anthropology major at the University of Papua New Guinea from the village that Blackwood studied. I was twinned to live in his village. Like many other great female anthropologists of her generation, Blackwood was very interested in sex, fascinated with Freud. The most tedious part of her book is an extremely long chapter describing the countless dreams the villagers reported to her.

In 1969, I found sexual mores to be potent in the village. Even though I was a hormonal undergraduate, I dared not contemplate any kind of physical contact with any of the young women I found attractive in the village. However, being interested in girls at the time, I asked endless questions about the nature of boy-girl encounters, particularly of my peer anthropologist, Paul Marcus. I would be surprised if extra-familial rape were something women had to much worry about in this community between 1920 and 1970. But I did uncover a great deal of gossip about two instances which may have been rape—both intra-familial. One of the most powerful and feared men in the region who I met in 1969 was a man viewed with repugnance because his wife was also his daughter. Perhaps incest does not automatically imply rape, but I expect it did in this case. How did he get away with this in a society where sexual mores were so strong, indeed where the penalty for incest not so long ago, according to Blackwood (1935: 114), was that the village would eat the offender? He got away with it for a long time by cultivating an image of himself as a powerful sorcerer. When people died who had crossed him at some time, he essentially took credit for killing them through sorcery. This was why he was feared. When war came, the local Bougainville Revolutionary Army commander, who was one of the younger chiefs from Toretei, used the rule of the gun to put things right. He shot him. Then, proving the power of the victim’s sorcery, the commander was shot during a fire-fight, some informants said in the back of the head by one of his own men in revenge for killing our incestuous sorcerer.

One day in the village in 1969 people rushed up to me to say I must hide my possessions because a large group of women from a neighbouring village were arriving with a right to take any property from the village they fancied. I grabbed my most valuable possession, my camera, and recorded their movement around the village taking a great many of Toretei’s most valued possessions. The right to this orgy of legal theft arose because our chief had expected his wife (who was from the clan of these women) to have more sex with him than she wanted, and therefore to have babies more closely spaced together than she wanted. Again it is not at all clear that our chief was guilty of rape within
marriage in a Western legal sense. Perhaps the wife always consented, but if she did, it was consent to do something she felt was deeply unfair and unwanted. And she told her women friends so. They in turn not only shamed our chief in all our eyes for his sexual excess, but also made us all very annoyed with him for losing our stuff.

So my conclusion is that sexual deviance happened in Toretei, but when it did it had high risks of detection and attracted great shame and other sanctions as well. I believe I am a typical Bougainvillean in the limited sense that when I have been in the village, sexual deviance has always been absolutely unthinkable for me.

In recent years, my colleague Peter Reddy and I have interviewed more than a hundred Bougainvilleans; we will do another hundred over the next 18 months, so this is in the nature of an interim report from the field. About half of them discussed the question of sexual assault and domestic violence. Without exception it was their view that the war was associated with large increases in rape and/or domestic violence. Most of them thought that with the return to peace in the current decade, rape had fallen again.

The background to this war was resentment of Bougainvilleans at the terms for the expropriation of land for a huge copper mine by the Australian colonial power and the national government of Papua New Guinea. In addition, there was ethnic tension between local Bougainvilleans and mainland Papua New Guineans who arrived to work the mine. A major source of that tension was the disrespect of the immigrant workers for local sexual mores. The rape of a Bougainvillean nurse by Highland New Guineans was in fact one of the more important sparks that lit a civil war that is variously estimated to have cost 10,000 to 20,000 lives (5%–10% of the population) and to have displaced more than a third of the population from their homes.

Of course, everyone believing rape went up with the war does not mean it is true, however consistent it might be with what has happened in other places. Crime statistics suggesting quite a deal of rape in recent years do not settle much because during the war the police mostly ceased to function. One good source of data, however, was the local Catholic priest I interviewed who, without disclosing identities, told of young men who had confessed to rapes they had committed during the war. On a devoutly Catholic island where the institution of confession is taken seriously, priests are useful informants on

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3 Thirty rapes are known to have been reported to Bougainville police in the years prior to our field-work in 2006. It is not clear whether this means whether Bougainville has a high or a low rape rate by, say, contemporary European standards, mainly because it is not clear from police records how many years of crime-reporting these 30 rapes represent. In recent years, villages of 100–200 people have each had a number of (sometimes 5 or even more) Community Auxiliary Police Officers who live in the village as part-time police funded by the New Zealand government. Because these officers are extremely close to the people 24 hours a day, it is possible that they are more likely to detect rape than the average European police patrol. It may well be that our interview informants, including our Catholic priests, are right that rape today is still much higher than before the war, but nevertheless not the problem it is in other parts of Papua New Guinea nor in Western societies with high rates of rape, such as the United States.

4 The 20,000 figure has often been used by political leaders. However, it is almost certainly far too high as it turns out to be an invention of those political leaders, intent on talking up the importance of their contribution in restoring peace to Bougainville.
whether rape has increased or decreased (and we have interviewed a few). Another source was the thousands of victim files once kept by the Leitana Nihan Women’s Development Agency, which won a UN Peace Prize for its work. These files were subsequently destroyed by a Papua New Guinea (PNG) Defence Force fearful of what they revealed about patterns of war crime. The indirect evidence is enough for me not to doubt the consensus that a once low-rape society became a high-rape society.

Bougainville was a low-rape society before the war because the authority of chiefs as regulators of deviance was very high, respect of men for women was high and mothers had distinctive forms of power As Mothers of the Land (Sirivi and Havini 2004) in a mostly matrilineal society. The interviews that Peter Reddy and I carried out revealed that war took young men out from under the hegemony of male chiefs, female elders and mothers. The allegiance once owed to the chief was shifted to a military commander. While the authority of the chief was deeply constrained by both kastom and the voices of senior mothers telling chiefs ‘this is what the women want’, commanders in the bush were unconstrained; a law unto themselves, in the way warlords are in most modern wars.

**Deterring Wilful Blindness to Rape**

Warlords have a military interest in being wilfully blind to rape by the young men they command. Should they lose the war, they do not want to be tainted with the knowledge of the rapes, so they look the other way. They know rape is viewed as a just reward by some of their most useful warriors, or as just retribution for those they conquer. And even if rape is not a conscious strategy for driving civilians out or for persuading them against helping the enemy, commanders are well aware that rape works in instilling fear and flight. This analysis applies even more strongly to the political leaders and financiers of modern wars. And because of their greater physical distance from the actual fighting, it is even easier for them to be wilfully blind to rape than commanders in the field.

One of the hard realities of contemporary wars is that combatants will not cooperate with a cease-fire and hand in their weapons until they are promised amnesty from prosecution, often including for rape. Amnesty for past rape can in some contexts prevent future rapes. Even so, the wilful blindness of the political strategists and financiers who so often stand behind the combatants suggests one path to at least partial deterrence of rape in war. This would involve a principle of international criminal law that in conceding amnesty to combatants in order to get them to surrender their guns, negotiators should try to hold out against extending this amnesty to their political leaders and paymasters. Often enough, by the point when a war has reached military stalemate, combatants who control the guns are disillusioned with the promises made by their political masters. At that point, it can be possible to drive a wedge between combatants and political leaders—promising amnesty to combatants in the field but not to their political paymaster in the air-conditioned offices of the capital. Then a post-conflict...
justice priority can become prosecution of war leaders for systematic rape, relying upon the criminal law doctrine of wilful blindness (Wilson 1979).

What has to be proved then is that a lot of rape happened by soldiers of a particular army, without the demands of proving that it was a specific soldier who perpetrated a specific rape (and without creating incentives to kill after rape to eliminate witnesses). Sierra Leone is a key current case, where former Liberian President Charles Taylor is now being charged with mass rape in Sierra Leone. Taylor was the principal backer of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) who allegedly repaid him from their seizure of diamonds. Victim survey data suggest a patterned propensity of the RUF to use rape as a weapon of war. A total of 53% of survey respondents (male and female) who experienced ‘face-to-face’ contact with the RUF reported experiencing sexual violence (Physicians for Human Rights 2002: 2). In comparison, sexual violence prevalence never exceeded 6% for those who had face-to-face contact with any of the other various combatant groups. Rape was the predominant form of reported sexual violence (89% of individuals reporting sexual violence victimization reporting rape as part of their experience), followed by being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37%), gang rape (33%), abduction (33%), molestation (14%), sexual slavery (15%), forced marriage (9%) and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus (4%).

On this analysis, what is needed is an international criminal law that gives the more rationally calculative political strategists reason for pause about failing to deploy their political power to prevent systematic rape by analysis of such patterns of data after wars. Even if leaders are utterly in control of their combatants in the field now, international enforcement policy should give them reason to worry that if they do lose total sway over the men with the guns, those men might take a deal for their own amnesty that excludes amnesty for them, the political boss.

Restorative Justice

My hypothesis is that the rapes of the more impulsive, less rationally calculating young men and boys in the field are much harder to deter through prosecution. Ultimately, however, restorative justice can be designed to bring them to experience the shame they should feel for rape. In a context like Bougainville, the priority is to reintegrate boys to the authority of chiefs and mothers. This is how many of our informants themselves spoke of the peace-building priority. In Bougainville, reconciliation ceremonies are how this is done. Sometimes they are ceremonies family to family, moving up to village to village, region to region, and sometimes between entire armies. In my adopted village of Toretei, there was a large reconciliation ceremony, they claim the first, between their local Company of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and the PNG Defence Force in which many guns were flung into the sea by the women from a military helicopter as villagers watched from the cliffs where once the PNG Defence Force had strafed their homes.

Each reconciliation requires a series of three or more meetings between all the elders of the two communities in which
harm are discussed and options for reconciling them. At the final reconciliation itself, gifts of pigs, food, traditional shell money are exchanged, spears may be ritually broken, exhumed bones returned to their women, prayers said, speeches of apology and forgiveness made, undertakings given for future peaceful behaviour, a great deal of sharing in singing of songs with shared meanings, and tears shed, especially by the mothers of the land, but by combatants too. My hypothesis, and that of more experienced observers than me (Howley 2000), is that integrative shame and shame acknowledgement is experienced at these rituals. In Bougainville at least, they seem to stick most of the time. Breaching the commitments made in a reconciliation ceremony seems to come at a large cultural cost.

The people of Bougainville say to us that most of the reconciliation is still to be done, that it will take decades after such a major war. Yet what they have done already seems formidable compared to the extent of reconciliation mounted in other post-conflict societies. My adopted village is in the region of Selau, which has a population of only 6,000, where we were told 87 separate reconciliation ceremonies had been held in the decade to 2006, each of them involving not just one meeting, but a sequence of meetings as outlined above. You can view a UN Peace Award-winning video of two reconciliations just a few kilometres from my adopted village at www.firelight.com.au/break1.html. For the whole island, such post-war reconciliation ceremonies have already numbered not in the hundreds, but the thousands, or so we were told by leaders who had been to many. The Bougainville experience suggests that part of what may be required to return a society to peace and low levels of rape may be restorative justice processes that are historically sustained, deep and broad.

**Beyond Impunity for Rape**

Reconciliation ceremonies between villages that address the issue of rape of women in one village by militia from another are a far cry from impunity for rape. Young men do not want the experience of their mothers and other relatives hearing about their rape of neighbouring women and girls. The pain for the relatives of meeting survivors and paying them compensation is designed to be painful for perpetrators. Part of the genius of culturally attuned restorative justice approaches is that they break down the segregation of audiences so that combatants cannot get away with being a Rambo in the bush, a lamb at home; a pillar of respectability in church on Sunday, a serial rapist on Monday.

Andrew Nori, strategist and spokesman for the Malaitan Eagle Force in the armed conflict in the neighbouring Solomon Islands, was one of many informants there who drew a contrast between the greater investment in reintegration of combatants in Bougainville. When young Malaitan ex-combatants returned to Malaita from their former homes in Guadalcanal after their cease-fire, neither the Malaitan Provincial Government nor their village elders had prepared a strategy for reintegration back to the authority of

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5Nori was unusual in wanting to go on the record with all his remarks when interviewed.
their elders. There was no land for them, no social niche; in the words of Nori they were ‘lost in the crowd’. Consequently, a great many of them turned their military skills and weapons to organized criminal activity against their own people in Malaita; others returned to Guadalcanal and criminal work there. This was one of those armed conflicts where the post-conflict organized crime was in some ways as big a problem as the armed combat before the cease-fire, certainly a more enduring problem.

**Ahmed’s Shame Acknowledgment**

In terms of criminological theory, my inclination is therefore to underpin our understanding of rape in war by comprehending first the social dynamics that create a state of shamelessness in the mostly young men who do most of the rape. Second, we need to understand rape as an act of hubris, pride in militaristic domination of a space and a people. Field-work in the Pacific reveals that rape in war is often enacted to humiliate men and boys as well as women and girls (see also Lilly and Marshall, 2000: 321). Sodomy with the barrel of a rifle where people are made to watch in the open space of a village is about a politics of humiliation. Making a husband or a father watch while his wife or daughter is raped is about the politics of hubris and humiliation. This is also what American policy in Abu Ghraib was about.

The major advance in the criminological theory relevant to this way of seeing rape in war has been made by Eliza Ahmed (Ahmed 2001; Ahmed and Braithwaite 2004; Ahmed and Braithwaite 2005; Ahmed and Braithwaite 2006a, Ahmed and Braithwaite 2006b). She is a quantitative psychologist who studies the more micro and mundane phenomenon of bullying in schools and work-places. Yet bullying is abstracted (and operationalized) by Ahmed in the same way that feminists abstract rape—for both, a defining feature is that they are acts of wilful domination over another. Ahmed (2001) concludes that different ways of managing shame as an emotion can make crime or bullying worse.

She finds that shaming is counterproductive when it is stigmatizing and shame is unacknowledged. However, to acknowledge shame and discharge it, and to shame acts of injustice reintegratively, are both important for preventing injustice and enabling restoration. No progressive social movement is likely to be effective without shaming and promoting the just acknowledgment of shame. This is what I interpret the women’s movement to have done in that Anzac Day march against rape in war. While social movements can never change the world for the better by sweeping shameful truths under the carpet, a restorative justice argument is that they can be more effective through truth and reconciliation (shaming that is reintegrative) than through truth and stigmatization. Effectiveness depends on shaming the act while reintegrating the person as redeemable—a good person who has done a bad thing.

Ahmed (2001) shows that failure to acknowledge shame and discharge it is in different ways a characteristic of both bullies and victims of bullying. Healthy shame management is important to
preventing bullying on both the offender side and the victim side. Ahmed (2001) distinguished between ‘shame acknowledged’ and ‘shame displacement’. Shame acknowledgment involves the discharging of shame through accepting responsibility and trying to put things right. Shame displacement means displacement of shame into blame and/or anger toward others. The combination of acknowledgment without displacement is a shame management style of people who avoid becoming either perpetrators or victims of bullying (Table I).

The shame problems Ahmed found victims have, which restorative justice might address, is internalization of the idea that ‘I am being bullied because there is something wrong with me as a person’—internalization of shame. The shame problem bullies have is a failure to acknowledge shame when they have done something wrong and a tendency to externalize their shame as anger. Restorative justice needs to help them be more like non-bully/non-victims who acknowledge shame when they do something wrong, who resist externalizing or internalizing their shame, and who thereby manage to discharge shame.

Reintegration of the ex-combatants of modern wars in developing countries should not be conceived as a problem of rehabilitation of bullies in Ahmed’s matrix. Most are bully-victims. Bully-victims suffer both the shame management pathologies of bullies and those of

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<tr>
<th>Bully status</th>
<th>Shame management skills</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-bully-non-victim (15%)</td>
<td>Acknowledge shame (feel shame, take responsibility, make amends)</td>
<td>Shame is discharged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resist displacement of shame (resist blaming others, feeling retaliatory anger and displaced anger)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim (25%)</td>
<td>Acknowledge shame (feel shame, take responsibility, make amends)</td>
<td>Shame is not discharged</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Internalize shame (internalizing others’ rejection—self-blame)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bully (13%)</td>
<td>Resist shame acknowledgement (resist feeling shame, taking responsibility, making amends)</td>
<td>Shame is not discharged</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Displace shame (blame others, feel retaliatory anger and displaced anger)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bully-victim (11%)</td>
<td>Resist shame acknowledgement (resist taking responsibility and making amends)</td>
<td>Shame is not discharged</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Internalize shame (internalizing others’ rejection—self-blame)</td>
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<td>Displace shame (blame others, feel retaliatory anger and displaced anger)</td>
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victims (see Table I). Combatants suffered their own shocking traumas during the war, just as they caused trauma to civilians. Part of the large investments that wealthy countries put into the recovery of war-torn nations should be help with the post-traumatic stress of combatants as victims. From criminological research in developed societies, there is encouraging evidence that restorative justice might be a good delivery vehicle for that (Angel 2005). Angel found that post-traumatic stress was lower for victims whose case had been randomly assigned to restorative justice. Another part of that investment should be in the social cognitive programmes in the community that Lösel and Schmucker’s (2005) meta-analysis suggest are the most promising paths to preventing recidivism of sex offenders. There are also encouraging reasons for suspecting that restorative justice for former combatants in the communities where they have raped may be the best delivery vehicle for the social cognitive rehabilitative support they should get (Braithwaite 2002: 90–102).

None of this detracts from my fundamental point, which is sociological rather than psychological. This is that the top priority is to give ex-combatants an alternative to the criminal economy so they will put down their guns—village-level development assistance that helps them find a new productive niche back in their village, in parallel with job creation in the waged economy through restoring flows of trade and investment. To make this economic reintegration work, village chiefs need to see themselves as keystones of national reconciliation through the local healing they broker as they reintegrate ex-combatants into village life. Private and public sector wage-economy employers must also see themselves as having reconciliation responsibilities as they help ex-combatants build a new future through jobs in their organizations. That means, for example, helping rather than firing them when they collapse into binge drinking as they work through their post-traumatic stress.

Warlords understand that reintegration of young combatants into the embrace of their communities is a threat to their war project. This is why in Africa (e.g. Uganda) it has been common for the first assignment of a child soldier being to assassinate a member of their own village (to make it impossible for them to return). In Bougainville, prisoners of war were often required to assault their relatives on pain of death, and defectors from one army to another were required to burn villages of their relatives.

**Pride Management**

The work of Cooley (1922) and Scheff (1990) implies that pride and shame are together the primary social emotions. For Scheff, pride is the sign of an intact bond with other human beings, shame of a severed or threatened bond. Scheff and Retzinger (1991: 175) have been critical of the original formulation of reintegrative shaming theory in *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* for its neglect of pride.

Ahmed and Braithwaite’s (2006a) study of 824 Bangladeshi adults confirmed previous results in showing that a propensity to shame acknowledgment was associated with less work-place bullying, and shame displacement with more bullying. In addition, humble pride
(respecting self and others) correlated with lower bullying, and narcissistic pride (feeling dominant and arrogant) with higher bullying. Hence, just as there is good and bad shame, so there is good and bad pride (Webb 2003). The unhealthy version of pride is vaunting pride, hubris that projects a sense of superiority over others. This form of pride renders adults more capable of acts of predation against others (Table II).

Warlords encourage this form of pride in their troops. So do drill sergeants in many Western armies in the kind of chants they teach their charges as they march. Before and during the armed conflicts of Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, Rambo movies were popular among boys who became combatants. Some cultivated a Rambo identity in their dress. Hubris fosters fearlessness and a will to dominate the enemy, fear and submission in the vanquished. Our theory is that just as narcissistic pride fosters bullying, so does it encourage rape.

Shame acknowledgment in the Ahmed and Braithwaite (2006a) data was highly correlated with humble pride, shame displacement with narcissistic pride. Nevertheless, healthy pride management has positive effects on relationships with others over and above the effects of pride management. Ahmed and Braithwaite’s (2006a) bullying results are consistent with this interpretation that shame and pride management are an emotional intelligence package that together is somewhat more than the sum of its parts. By teaching our children, or perhaps more importantly by displaying in our interactions with them, the values of humility and respect for self and others, we may be simultaneously teaching them the underlying principles of both healthy pride management and healthy shame management.

When young combatants in Bougainville are reintegrated to the care and love of their village, the hubris and domination of others during the rule of their guns can be replaced by the humility and respect the elders expect of young men. On the other hand, throughout Melanesia we can see the problems of rape and violence that arise when unemployed young men are not reintegrated into their villages and continue to seek money and excitement illegitimately in towns. On this theory, the humble pride of being either a useful contributor to the village economy by fishing and gardening, or a useful contributor in the paid employment sector of the economy, is what we should want to substitute for the narcissistic pride of the table.

| Table II. Conceptual model of relationship management through shame and pride |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| **Shame**                                      | **Pride**       |
| **Constructive**                               | **Destructive** |
| **A**: Shame acknowledgment (social solidarity) | **B**: Shame displacement (social alienation) |
| **C**: Humble pride (social solidarity)         | **D**: Narcissistic pride (social alienation) |


Rambo of the bush war becoming the Rambo of street crime.

Advancing Social Science Through Criminology

This article has sought to give an inkling of how to develop theories of justice that are emotionally intelligent (Sherman 2003) and pragmatically engaged with both macro and micro power structures. Like Tom Scheff (1994), in previous writing I have attempted to show how figures like Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein and George Bush cultivated shame displacement and narcissistic pride in their nations (e.g. Braithwaite 2002: Chapter 6). Warlords in smaller conflicts in places like Guadalcanal do the same. The contribution of this paper has been to argue that the same shame and pride dynamics that are exploited to motivate the onset of war also motivate rape in war. In the end I hope this journey helps us to see the problem of modern war differently—as being more a problem of predatory crime against civilians than battles between soldiers. And to see the problem of rape differently—as a shame management problem, a pride management problem, an alienation versus reintegration problem and a victim trauma problem that might be repaired by restorative justice. It is also a deterrence challenge that might be tackled less by punishing rapists and more by regulating those who are wilfully blind to rape and to their obligations to prevent the root causes of rape (for this kind of deterrence analysis see Braithwaite 2002: 102–22). This means that we look to cases like that of Charles Taylor as imperative in setting the right kind of international precedents.

All this for me illustrates the way criminology can be and is becoming one of the great contributors to the social sciences. Through its lateral contributions to understanding phenomena like war and peace, cyberspace, Wall Street, it enriches itself by drawing in new sources of lateral insight. At the same time it establishes itself as more than a tradition focused on fixing a narrow set of problems, but as one of the sources of the most foundational social science theory.

References


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6There was an early precedent of a military commander executed for, among other crimes against humanity, rape by his troops. This was the Japanese commander in the Philippines, General Yamashita (Yamashita v. U.S., 327 U.S. Reports 1 (1946)). It is not a happy precedent because General Yamashita was not granted due process, was executed before having an opportunity to prepare a defence properly, without evidence even being presented that he knew or could have known of the rapes. After this, further development of the jurisprudence of commander responsibility for rape in war had to await the 1990s and the war in Bosnia, which has provided a more productive legal framework and a more principled precedent (Lilly and Marshall 2000).


