

Polycymaking and Peace

A

Multinational

Anthology

Edited by

Stuart Nagel

Introduction by Paul

STUDIES IN PUBLIC POLICY

SERIES EDITOR: PAUL J. RICH, POLICY STUDIES ORGANIZATION

Policymaking and Peace is the third volume of a three-volume set that examines the multidimensional role of policy in the development and promotion of democracy, prosperity, and peace. The *Peace* volume brings together international contributions on the policy challenges faced by national and multinational bodies to counter violent separatism and encourage the acceptance of an increasingly pluralistic world. The chapters analyze the pivotal role of the United Nations, arms control and international security, mechanisms of internal and international dispute resolution, the growth of international crime, and the development of multinational bodies to promote law and order.

Contributors


John Braithwaite, Gavin Cameron, A. W. Harris, Aaron Karp, H. Peter Langille, Timothy J. O'Neill, Brandon C. Prins, Paul J. Rich, Richard Saull, James H. Seroka, Courtney B. Smith, Christopher Sprecher, John D. Stempel, Yannis A. Stivachtis, Douglas A. Van Belle, Jarrod Wiener, Jing-dong Yuan

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For Alex Inkeles, scholar of peace and democracy

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Introduction—Policy and Peace: Prospects and Prejudices

Paul J. Rich

Peace is obviously an international issue, and perhaps the most international of all issues. The fourth article of the Policy Studies Organization constitution reads, "The word 'American' is not used since the organization is open to members and is concerned with policy problems throughout the world."

We live, as all of us with an interest in political science know, in a time when completely contrary movements seem to simultaneously gather strength, including globalization and nationalism. So, to speak about a common scholarship is immediately to bring to mind such disturbing and valid challenges to academic ecumenicism and to peace as the demands for recognition of those struggling for autonomy in Quebec and Chiapas, of native peoples throughout the continent, and of strong but still frustrated movements for the overdue revision of the academic record to include women, gays, and ethnic groups. In those areas we are still, to paraphrase Winston Churchill on World War II, not at the end but perhaps at the end of the beginning.

We are certainly not going to have peace without more attention to minorities like the Palestinians, the Tamils, the Kurds—it's a long list. Proponents of a world focus for scholarship have to take very seriously the concerns of those who feel that research has ignored their identity, some of whom now fear that our enthusiasm for a new world approach inadvertently will leave them out. Looking back over past publications, only a small amount of the work, although undoubtedly good work, has been concerned with peace and gender, or peace and indigenous peoples, or with policy studies regarding, for example, peace in Canada and Mexico.

Perhaps it would in this respect be appropriate to mention specifically the need for more policy studies regarding separatist movements such as in

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Domination, Quiescence and War Crimes

John Braithwaite

One of the generalizations that seems mostly true from my reading of the criminological literature is that domination engenders crime. As a generalization, “domination engenders crime” is not always true and when it is, it is often true in a complex rather than a direct way. For example, the direct relationship is that women tend both to be more dominated than men do and to commit *less* crime than men do. Yet, empirical criminology in the feminist tradition demonstrates a variety of ways in which the domination by men of women engenders crime.

“Domination engenders crime” is a generalization with force from the most micro to the most macro of contexts. At the micro end, relationships based on domination in the schoolyard engender the violence that we call bullying.¹ Domination in families engenders family violence. At the macro end, structures of national economies that dominate or exclude fractions of the population are criminogenic. Inequality of wealth and power fosters crime not only by creating an underclass that are dominated, but also by creating an upper class that dominate. Both need and greed are implicated in different kinds of crime.² Some economies bring about greater extremes of need and greed than others. Need motivates the accumulation of goods for use, greed the accumulation of goods for exchange. More specifically, greed motivates unaccountable accumulation and nonstationary accumulation—fast money. Hence, greed militates against the kinds of investments that might alleviate need—investment that creates decent jobs for those in need. The other reciprocal relationship here is that when large, segregated sections of a population are in need, they are easy prey for the greed of the fast money set. They are prey both as consumers and suppliers of goods like

heroin and as consumers and suppliers of services like loan-sharking, as suppliers of prostitution, and so on.

All this is why Edwin Sutherland was so theoretically muddled when he said that "If it can be shown that white-collar crimes are frequent, a general theory that crime is due to poverty is shown to be invalid."³ Sutherland failed to see that both need and greed are criminogenic, that the political economy of need is causally dependent on the political economy of greed, inversely that the political economy of greed preys on the economy of need. The economy of need creates market niches for greed.

In the debate over inequality and crime, some criminologists point to selected time-series studies which find that crime rates do not go up when unemployment goes up. These criminologists also fail to see the whole picture of the evidence we have. At the empirical level, most time-series studies, especially those that include more recent years, do support an association between unemployment and crime.⁴ Secondly, some recessions actually hit the rich harder than the poor, reducing income inequality in the economy.⁵ Since the criminological theory at issue is not about unemployment per se, but about inequality and poverty, studies of the effect of income inequality on crime are the theoretically relevant ones. And more often than not, income inequality is a stronger predictor of crime than the unemployment rate.

Time-series studies of unemployment could be more theoretically relevant by measuring the volume of long-term unemployment and the average length of long-term unemployment. The criminologically important effect is not year to year variation in short-term unemployment, it is the longer term impact of whole generations of truly disadvantaged people, year after year, bereft of hope, giving up on their own future and that of their children. So I am more persuaded by the fact that most people in prison were unemployed for a long time before they were arrested than I am by the less powerful associations in time-series studies. A further reason for the time-series association of unemployment and crime being weaker than other inequality-crime relationships is that there are other criminological theories which also contain truth and which predict a rise in employment will increase crime. An implication of the routine activities perspective is that more employment means more homes unguarded during the day when both adults go out to work. More employment; more burglary.

Finally, we now know that the relationship between unemployment and crime is complex in a patriarchal society where women are expected to be guardians of children and housekeeping. For example, we know that patriarchy as an ideology entails men feeling humiliation at the suggestion that their wife could be equal or superior to them on as critical a dimension of male dominance as breadwinning. This is why you get a result such as that of Gartner and McCarthy that employed women married to an unemployed husband had six times the homicide victimization one would expect, given

the proportion of the population in this group.⁶ Just as such facts complicate the direct employment-crime nexus, they affirm the more general underlying proposition that domination engenders crime. In short, there are half a dozen reasons why the time-series unemployment-crime association is weaker than other kinds of associations between inequality and crime. None of them cast into doubt the claim that domination engenders crime.

This proposition continues to have explanatory power at the supra-national level. Consider the crime of genocide. Much persuasive historiography has shown how the domination of the Allied powers at Versailles was used to humiliate Germany. Tom Scheff has argued how the appeal of *Mein Kampf* was an appeal to a humiliated people. Hitler's rhetorical calculation was to foster a shame-rage spiral. Each page of *Mein Kampf*, according to Scheff, bristles with shame and rage. Similarly, U.S. and British hegemony in Asia and the Pacific between the wars, and the way it was used to crush Japanese expansion through trade, was actively read by Japanese ultranationalists as the white man's humiliation of Japan. Some of the extraordinary crimes of the Japanese during World War II can be understood in part as a rage against what they saw as white oppressors. My father was a victim of one of those war crimes. He was one of six out of 2,500 Australians and British who survived the Sandakan Death March. My mother's first husband also perished on the Death March.

Why do I interpret this crime as a shame-rage spiral? Well, there are a lot of circumstantial things about it. There were some of the death marches themselves—rituals of public display to local Asian peoples of the literal collapse of white masters. There were more specific incidents along the way such as local prostitutes encouraged by Japanese guards to urinate on the men from the balconies of the buildings where they worked. There was the fact that when the commandant of my father's camp was hung, he bit the hangman's hand, drawing blood, and would not let go. Such anger in playing out an evil that one might have thought should have commanded remorse. The righteous anger, I surmise from his statements, of a man engulfed by the humiliation of his people, determined to resist to the end the idea of white men being masters over Asians. My father recalled him saying near the end: "We may lose this war. But if it takes one hundred years, one day we will be your masters."

As a young man I hated Emperor Hirohito of Japan. The Emperor, unlike the militarists, had been brought up in a culture of civility. He knew about the war crimes and I felt he commanded the respect in Japan to do something to stop them. I also have no affection for General MacArthur who vetoed an Australian Operation to rescue survivors of the camps in 1945. But it was MacArthur who resisted pressure from Australia and elsewhere to hang the Emperor. This was an act of great wisdom. It was a profoundly important gesture of reintegration to the Japanese people. Not

only in Japan but also in Germany, the United States showed that it had learnt the lessons of Versailles. The Marshall Plan was the finest moment of the American century. The politics of retribution and humiliation of Versailles were replaced by the politics of reintegration.

Desert theorists have to say that justice was corrupted by leaving the Emperor unpunished. I have to say, notwithstanding my anger, that social justice was advanced by MacArthur's act of grace. It was where just deserts *were* administered, on the lesser minions of the Japanese army who were hung, that justice was corrupted. Some of them were set up as scapegoats by more corrupt men than themselves. My father could not face up to giving evidence at the war crimes trials. He was excused on medical grounds. He was, after all, barely alive. Only one stronger survivor was willing and able to attend throughout as a witness. That man was stronger because the Japanese fed him better than the other prisoners. I do not want to taint the memory of that long-dead man unfairly. We cannot be at all sure; there is no proof; but it was the openly expressed suspicion of more than one survivor that this man was a collaborator. If this is true, the testimony that decided who would hang and who would go back to their families was tainted testimony. Another Australian survivor admitted before he died that he had testified falsely against one certainly brutal guard who was hung for a murder he did not commit.

It is typical when crimes of the powerful do come to justice that there is scapegoating, that power is used to buy collaboration. Rats tend to turn in a way that submits mice to the greatest vilification. I have referred to this as a theorem of retributive justice: *where desert is greatest, punishment will be least*. In a fundamental sense, I therefore see the philosophy of retribution as an enemy of social justice in any world where unequal power puts some in a much better position than others to cover up their crimes.⁷ That means any world. Mercy is a more plausible instrument of justice.

Mercy for Emperor Hirohito helped interrupt a vicious circle of humiliation and violence; mercy for an apprehended school bully can open his mind to the idea that there are better ways to fight fire than with fire; mercy for an Australian Aboriginal offender can interrupt the accumulation of lived injustice that Aborigines experience and resent in their dealings with the criminal justice system; and yes, mercy for a wife beater can interrupt the spurious righteousness of his anger with a space for dialogue, a space where righteousness might be supplanted by an understanding of the consequences of domination, where problem solving, empowerment and redress for victims can occur. By eschewing *punitive* justice, we can often, though not always, give *social* justice a better chance in the long run.

If "domination engenders crime" is of general explanatory import, is there anything of general import we can say about how criminologists might engage with struggles against domination at each of these levels—the micro contexts of schools and families, the macro context of the nation state and

beyond to global struggles against domination? Yes, I think so. The most productive general answer I can give is a civic republican one—engagement with the institutions of civil society, those institutions that are intermediate between the individual and the state that will support survivors of domination.⁸

At the macro level, I have argued elsewhere that in Australia family violence, drunk driving and corporate crime are our deepest crime problems in terms of loss of property and injury to persons.⁹ They have become our deepest crime problems because their perpetrators have been shielded from shame by certain realities of power in Australian society. For that very reason those crime problems are profoundly susceptible to social movement politics—family violence to shamefulness constituted by an active women's movement, environmental crimes to shamefulness constituted by greens. At the macro level, through social movement politics, we have made real progress in beginning to mobilize community disapproval against our deepest crime problems. Yet domination gets played out in micro arenas. After two hundred years of social movement politics against corruption, bribery is regarded almost universally as a bad thing in Western democracies. But politicians, police chiefs, and business leaders continue to give and take bribes because they continue to dominate the micro contexts in which they do business in a way that shields them from shame. They dominate those micro-contexts to ensure that their bribery is never defined as bribery. So we need to complement a vigorous social movement politics with micro strategies for infusing the disapproval of civil society into dominated micro spaces. That requires a creative interplay between state power and local community dialogue. Without that, we will never come to grips with the fact that the shielding of powerful men from both formal and informal sanction is a practical political accomplishment transacted in a very micro context.

So how do we help civil society to communicate its disapproval of a school bully who is shielded from confronting community disapproval by his reign of fear in the schoolyard? Progress in the micro context of schools has been particularly encouraging in recent years. There has been a proliferation of anti-bullying programs, some seemingly quite successful. The best known is the Norwegian Ministry of Education program that reduced the prevalence of victimization by 50 percent.¹⁰ It involved a school conference day on the bullying problem, establishing new monitoring policies for quick decisive interventions and social milieu development groups, among other elements of a whole school approach.

In the context of both schools and families, many of us have learned from New Zealand traditions of justice as institutionalized in the family group conference. Schools, churches, Aboriginal communities and welfare agencies as well as the police themselves are running these conferences in New Zealand and Australia as an alternative to reporting offences to the police

and prosecuting them through the courts. A facilitator invites to the conference both the offender and the individuals who care most about the offender, who enjoy most respect from the offender. The victim and victim supporters are also invited. These two communities of care engage in a dialogue that both brings out the consequences of the crime and comes up with a plan of action to restore victims and prevent recurrence. Conferences can empower citizens affected by a crime to engage in problem solving in relation to it, can provide a politically practical alternative to the politics of punitiveness, and they can structure both shame and reintegration into a ritual that seems just and sensible to ordinary citizens. In a South Australian study, 90 percent of a small sample of 71 victims surveyed reported that participation had been "helpful" for them.¹¹ Preliminary evidence on their effect on recidivism is encouraging.¹²

Conferences are controversial when used for offenses like domestic violence, rape, armed robbery, attempted murder and serious white-collar crime, all of which have been conferenced in Australia or New Zealand. The controversy is about imbalance of power between offenders and victims for these kinds of offenses. There is not time here for the detailed exposition of how community conferences can solve some of the problems traditionally associated with Alternative Dispute Resolution or Peoples' Courts. Given my theme, however, let me at least illustrate the difference between traditional victim-offender mediation and conferences on the imbalance of power issue.

The problem with dyadic victim-offender mediation is that you have an imbalance of power if the offender is the school bully and the victim is a nerd; if the offender is a child, the victim an adult; the offender a man, the victim a woman. Worse, we have had conferences where the offender is a transnational insurance colossus like Norwich Union and the victim a young illiterate Aboriginal woman. What is different about a conference is that it is a meeting of two communities of care, both of which contain men and women, children and adults, the cool and the uncool, the organized (like an Aboriginal Community Council in the Norwich Union case) and the unorganized. To illustrate formally the significance of these cross-cutting matrices of power imbalance, let us assign the arbitrary quantum of power 4 to an adult and 1 to a child. The adult has four times as much power as the child in a dyadic victim-offender mediation. Add to both sides of the dialogue two other adults and one other child. The imbalance of power falls from 4 to 1 to 1.3 to 1.

The examples of whole school approaches to bullying and community conferences highlight how we must discover in criminology more productive ways of thinking about the interface between the state and civil society. We can reconceive the role of the state as one of enabling and empowering community problem solving rather than enfeebling it. The history of criminal justice across the world in the last two centuries has been one of enfeebling

community problem solving because of fear of private vengeance combined with the political appeal of centralized law and order politics. I have argued that this centralized state law and order strategy no longer works politically in extending the use-by dates of political leaders, if ever it did.¹³ This is why a new package based on restorative conferencing and crime prevention is already beginning to prove a political winner in some parts of the world.

The philosophy I have espoused is a responsive regulatory strategy. Occasionally we will encounter individuals who are so beyond shame or deterrence that they will have to be incapacitated by incarceration. Or companies (like the Bank of Commerce and Credit International) so beyond shame and deterrence that they must be incapacitated by withdrawing their license to engage in an activity like banking. Corporate capital punishment is occasionally necessary. The theory of a responsive regulatory pyramid (see figure 9.1) is that the capacity to escalate to state deterrent and then incapacitative remedies is displayed, not threatened but displayed, in a way that




Figure 9.1. A Responsive Regulatory Pyramid

motivates dialogic control, shame-based and preventive control at the base of the pyramid.¹⁴ The most important form of preventive crime control is the obverse of incapacitation. It is capacitation.

The best way to prevent environmental crime is to capacitate firms with pollution control technologies and management techniques. This capacitation is best mediated through institutions of civil society such as the engineering profession, environmental auditing professionalization, universities and green social movements. The best way to capacitate the poor is with jobs and decent education: good old Cloward and Ohlin,¹⁵ legitimate opportunity structures that render resort to illegitimate opportunity structures less appealing. Some criminologists in Australia have been active in persuading our government to promise a job compact with the Australian people. A compact that no Australian will be allowed to continue in long term unemployment without being offered either a job or placement in a paid retraining program. The compact in the former Keating government's White Paper on Employment was much more feeble on the implementation detail than we would have liked, but at least it was a framework of state commitment to a compact into which we might have injected more content in future years. Moreover, it did reinvent the state as nourishing institutions of civil society rather than supplanting them. So our Commonwealth Employment Service was partially privatized by a Labor government. Citizens are still guaranteed access to state funded job placement services. But if they prefer, they can get those services from regulated private or NGO providers of job placement and training services.¹⁶

In the contemporary world, state capacitation of civil society to be active in job creation or environmental protection quickly runs up against severe constraints. In Australia we lost the political battle for tax increases that would have seen corporate Australia and individuals with jobs pay a jobs levy to fund a grander Jobs Compact than the version we got. In addition to the politics of greed, the argument that defeated us was that tax increases would make us less internationally competitive and therefore would cost more jobs than would be created. While this argument is overblown (strong welfare states can compete), it cannot be dismissed.

What follows is that as criminologists we should become interested in global capacitation, because it is important for crime prevention. This means global cooperation to restore declining revenues that threaten employment-enabling and environment-protecting welfare state policies. A global carbon tax is one promising option, and here the European Union is showing some leadership toward a pan-European carbon tax. The other promising option is the Tobin tax named after its inventor, Nobel Laureate in Economics, James Tobin.¹⁷ The Tobin tax is a global uniform tax on trades involving foreign exchange. If the Group of 7 agreed to a global uniform tax on foreign exchange transactions, the temptation for smaller economies to join them would be

enormous because the revenue from such a tax in a world where fast money can shift from one currency to others many times a day would be stupendous even if it were applied at a very low rate. The other attraction of Tobin's idea is that it would buffer vulnerable currencies by acting, in the words of Keynes, "to mitigate the predominance of speculation over enterprise." And remember as criminologists we should be interested in that reciprocal relationship between the political economy of need and the political economy of greed. We should be interested in how we can reduce both crime in the streets and crime in the suites by shifting investment from fast money speculation to slow money job creation.

At the 1995 Social Development Summit in Copenhagen, activists attempted to work through civil society more so than states with these ideas, through the International Council of Social Welfare, the World Council of Churches, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Oxfam and so on. The fact that long-term transformative struggles can be more cumulative within civil society than within states is well illustrated by the little victories we did have with states in Copenhagen. We persuaded the Australian delegation to support the idea of a Tobin tax at the Summit. But our Deputy Prime Minister, who pushed this through, stepped down last month. President Mitterand spoke in favor of the Tobin tax. But now he has been replaced by M. Chirac.

Weak social movements of course suffer constant defeats on such issues. Yet weak social movements are learning how better to harness the power of the strong in the world system. A good example is the remarkable accomplishments of the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. The green movement substantially prevailed over transnational business in that campaign because it divided them. First, the U.S. environment movement won legislative victories on the phasing out of ozone-depleting substances in the U.S. Congress. Then U.S. business became an ally of the global green movement against European and Japanese business because U.S. business did not want to suffer a competitive disadvantage at their hands.

There is every reason to be optimistic about engagement with social movement politics. As my family made its tiny contribution to the vigil outside the French Embassy in Canberra in 1995 concerning the French nuclear testing in the Pacific, I did feel pessimistic about stopping the French from the crime they are contemplating which would cause such loss of life from increased cancer among the people of the Pacific. But I felt optimistic that, through all our little contributions to Greenpeace, we will teach the French people that their President had made a political mistake and France will never do this to us again. The voices of global civil society also put a break on the considerable momentum that had built up for a resumption of nuclear testing by the UK and the United States. Just as global civil society has stopped atmospheric testing, so shall it soon

stop underground testing. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime is an incredible accomplishment when you put it in historical context. Thirty-five years ago President Kennedy was saying that it was inevitable that within two decades there would be more than twenty nuclear powers. That inevitability never went close to realization, and at this moment the number of nuclear weapon states is being reduced. What enabled this implausible accomplishment was a global peace movement that harnessed U.S. hegemony and U.S. satellite monitoring technology to its cause.

My message in this chapter is that the way to resist the dominations that engender crime is by building democratic institutions that nurture a propensity to speak up against violence and exploitation. At the most macro level that means global social movement politics. At the meso level it means rethinking interfaces between the state and civil society so that the state is enabling and empowering of civil society rather than enfeebling of it. For example, that means a regulatory agency enabling an Aboriginal Community Council to negotiate alongside Aboriginal victims of the fraud of an insurance multinational. At the micro level, it means simple, practical institutional changes that enable a deeper sense of democracy in workplaces, families and school grounds. Community accountability conferences are an example.

To prevent the kind of war crime I have discussed, we need to build a genocide-preventive community through the institutions of civil society, not just through Amnesty, but through more mundane institutions as well. On this I commend to you a paper by one of my Ph.D. students, Jennifer Balint.¹⁸ Civility means for Jennifer a community commitment to dialogue as the preferred means of social decision. It means "processes of public dialogue through which individuals come to an understanding of the sufferings, miseries and humiliations. [she adds, hopes and dreams] of those fellow citizens who are quite unlike themselves."

Why not leave the miseries of the past behind, critics say? One answer is that reminiscence constitutes the shamefulness of war crimes to new generations. My mother is old and wise. She comprehends the history of why she and her two husbands suffered as victims of the Sandakan Death March. Her government during and after World War II did not speak out against the war crimes of the Japanese for three basic reasons. Early in the war, the Australian government did not speak out against the Japanese brutality in Manchuria because of an implicit racism: "an incredulous smugness . . . an unshakable belief that it would not, could not happen to white people."¹⁹ After the murder of British soldiers and rape of captured white nurses in Hong Kong, the Australian government wanted to mobilize national and international outrage against the atrocities. They were prevented from doing so by their imperial masters in Britain and then the United States. MacArthur was clear in orders that the Australian Prime Minister was too weak to resist:

1. The Commander-in Chief has laid down the policy that news material discussing atrocities performed by the Japanese upon prisoners in their hands should be suppressed.

2. The reason for this is purely military. These stories are known to be having a bad effect on the morale of Allied airmen. The fear of mistreatment by the enemy in case they are forced to land in enemy territory cannot but have a bad effect upon the morale of the air forces.²⁰

After the war the Australian government continued to cover up its weakness in failing to prevent further atrocities that it might have prevented by speaking out and by giving higher priority to the rescue of prisoners. The influential Returned Servicemen's League continued to support this policy until 1950 on grounds that the gruesome facts would "cause distress to families." It is easy to understand why the Allies suppressed their own crimes in the Pacific War, terrible as they were. And now recent historical research also helps us to understand why we suppressed public distress at Japanese crimes as well.

My mother understands that distress from evil cannot be avoided by refraining from speaking of evil. She grasps the importance of the older generation engaging in a public dialogue about the evils of their generation so that the next generation is educated to confront those who dominate. I commend her testimony to you.

NOTES

This chapter is the edited text of a Plenary address to the British Criminology Conference, Loughborough, 19 July 1995.

1. See, for example, David P. Farrington, "Understanding and Preventing Bullying," in M. Tonry, ed., *Crime and Justice: Annual Review of Research*, vol. 17, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993); Dan Olweus "Annotation: Bullying at School: Basic Facts and Effects of a School Based Intervention Program," *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 35, 1994: 1171-1190.

2. See John Braithwaite, "Poverty, Power and White-Collar Crime: From Sutherland to the 1990s," in K. Schlegel and D. Weisburd, eds. *White-Collar Crime Reconsidered*. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992).

3. Edwin H. Sutherland, *White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 7.

4. T. G. Chiricos, "Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence," *Social Problems* 34, 1987: 187-212.

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11. Timothy Goodes, *Victims and Family Conferences: Juvenile Justice in South Australia*. (Adelaide: Family Conferencing Team, 1995).
12. See John Braithwaite (forthcoming), *Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation* (New York: Oxford University Press), chapter 3.
13. John Braithwaite, *Law and Order Politics*, The Media and Building the Safer Society. Address to the Australian National Press Club, Canberra, 1 June, 1995.
14. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, *Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
15. R. A. Cloward and L. E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).
16. Since the time of this address in July 1995, a new conservative Australian government has dismantled most aspects of the job Compact except the privatization of job placement services, which it has accelerated!
17. See James Tobin, "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," *Eastern Economic Journal* 4, 1978: 153-58. For an illuminating current discussion of the Tobin tax, see David Felix "Suggestions for International Collaboration to Reduce Destabilizing Effects of International Capital Mobility on the developing Countries," in UNCTAD, *International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s*, volume 3, 1993.
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