II

THEORY AND METHOD IN CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Conceptualizing Organizational Crime in a World of Plural Cultures

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BEYOND WHITE COLLAR CRIME

Edwin Sutherland (1983) invented the term white-collar crime, changing not only the English language but criminology in a profound way. No longer was it possible for criminologists to present data based on police records to show that one neighborhood, one socioeconomic group, had a higher crime rate than another. The question being asked: “How would this result change if we took white-collar crime?” How could poverty be a cause of crime when elites commit so much fraud? Sutherland rescued criminology from the confusion that arose from its systematic neglect of crimes of the powerful. He took the vigilance of Gilbert Geis (1982, 1984), the only scholar who engaged with Sutherland’s project through the 60s, 70s, 80s and rescued criminology from Sutherland’s own confusions and from complacency back to the study only of crimes of the powerless. But how should we conceptualize this perennially neglected terrain?

Should we talk of white-collar crime or organizational crime or corporate crime? Or, instead of crime, should we talk of law-breaking (Reiss and Biderman, 1980); or deviance (Ermann and Lundman, 1987); or violation of trust (Shapira, 1990); or misconduct (Vaughan, 1988); or transgression (Michalowski and Kramer, 1987)? None of these definitional positions is necessarily an obstacle to good scholarship. What is an appropriate definition depends on one’s purposes. If one is concerned about transnational corporations playing an international law-evasion game,
It follows from such a version of legal pluralism that at every level there is virtue in ambiguating the definition of what is going on. Over the past decade my colleagues and I have observed hundreds of nursing home inspectors as they do their jobs. When we observe the inspector in dialogue with the director of nursing, we can view the inspector as an agent of the state enforcing state law, and the director of nursing as an agent of the corporation with the job of protecting its interests. But often we observe the two conspiring together against both the state law and the economic interests of the corporation. As they so conspire, they refer to “maintaining high nursing standards” and “the interests of the patient.” We cannot analyze what is happening as the inspector being captured by the corporation or the director of nursing being captured by the state. Better to shift the definitions of the affiliations of these actors from the state and the corporation to their shared affiliation with the nursing profession. Best to shift attention somewhat from the state justice system to the private justice system of the nursing profession as a semiautonomous field (Moore, 1978).

THE CASE FOR DEFINITION BASED ON THE LAW IN THE BOOKS

Having conceded that work under a variety of definitional frameworks can be of value, having argued that research that works with neatly sharpened definitions can be less important than work that problematizes, let us now consider how to operationalize the key construct when we do try to expand our knowledge via traditional positive social science methods.

In the context of positive social science, there is a special attraction of definitions based on the law in the books because of their superior capacity for consistent operationalization. Hard cases at the boundaries of definition are many because for some sharp operators it is a conscious strategy to play the game in the grey areas rather than in the black or the white. If we adopt the law in the books as definitional of crime, then we have recourse to the massive intellectual effort that has been devoted by the courts to developing more or less consistent ways of deciding hard cases. On the other hand, the scholar who attempts to count deviance or misconduct is on her own in grappling with the monumental problems of classifying the hard cases.

SUTHERLAND’S MESSY LEGACY

How then should we approach the problems of operationalizing organizational crime for quantitative work? Edwin Sutherland achieved two great things for criminology by inventing white-collar crime. He began a process of correcting systematic class bias in criminology, a discipline that had focused almost exclusively on the crimes of the powerless. Second, Sutherland forced a rejection of almost all criminological theory that had preceded him by pointing out that it flew in the face of the facts of the widespread nature of white-collar crime. But we must balance against these achievements the definitional mess Sutherland left in his wake. No scholar has operationalized Sutherland’s definition to good effect. The definition was: White-collar crime is “crime committed by a person of respectability in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1983, 7). The concept of respectability defies precision in use (Geis, 1984). Moreover, the requirement that a crime cannot be white collar unless perpetrated by a person of “high social status” is an unfortunate mixing of definition and explanation (Reiss and Biderman, 1980), especially when Sutherland used the widespread nature of white-collar crime to refute class-based theories of criminality.

The concept of organizational crime excludes that part of white-collar crime often defined as “occupational crime” (Clinard and Quinney, 1973), for example, embezzlement, Medicare fraud. But it also excludes crimes against organizations by poor individuals—social security fraud, credit card fraud. This gets us out of the most vexed definitional issue: should we adopt an offense-based definition of white-collar crime that can be operationalized in a way that results in most white-collar criminals having blue collars?

The most influential definition of organizational crime has been Schrager and Short’s (1978): “Organizational crimes are illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or a group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization in accordance with the operative goals of the organization, which have a serious physical or economic impact on employees, consumers or the general public.” This is an unnecessarily complex definition. Why are the impacts limited to employees, consumers, or the general public? What about the environment or domestic animals (as in an animal welfare violations)? Why require “serious physical or economic impact” at all? Are unsuccessful attempts or conspiracies to be excluded? Are bribes that actually have beneficial economic consequences to be excluded? The phrase “In accordance with the operative goals of the organization” poses the question of the exclusion of crimes perpetrated in accordance with the operative goals of a subunit (the Australian subsidiary) but in defiance of the goals of the whole organization. Moreover, the definition needlessly locks us into a goal paradigm of organizational action.

All this argues for adaptation of the Schrager and Short (1978) definition to simplify operationalization problems by handing them over to the law and the courts. If the courts say it is an organizational crime for a pharmaceutical company to implant electrodes into the brain of a conscious monkey, then we count it as an organizational crime. So a simpler definition would be something like: “Organizational crime is crime perpetrated by formal organizations or by individuals acting on behalf of organizations.” This definition makes no assumption that the crime is for gain (contrast Reiss and Biderman, 1980), this being viewed
as a matter of explanation rather than definition. Moreover, it does not exclude organizational crimes that do physical harm to persons, as do definitions that restrict the scope to economic crime (e.g., Edelhertz, 1970; Leigh, 1980).

In his operationalization of white-collar crime Sutherland was content to consider illegal behavior as white-collar crime if it were punishable, even if not punished, and if the potential penalties provided for infringement were civil rather than criminal (Sutherland, 1983, 51). Tappan (1947) led a tradition insisting on proof beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal court before anything could be called a crime (see also Burgess, 1950; Orland, 1980).

Few today would refrain from taking Sutherland’s side against the strong form of Tappan’s (1947, 101) position that “adjudicated offenders represent the closest possible approximation to those who have in fact violated the law, carefully selected by sieving of the due process of law.” For many purposes, data on arrests, crimes reported to the police, and self-reports on victim survey reports are accepted in mainstream criminology today as superior to data on convictions. The reasons criminologists pursue the “dark figure” of crime are all the more profound with white-collar crime, where offenses tend to be more difficult to detect and prove, and where the invisibility of offenses is enhanced by the reality that many victims of offenses such as price fixing and carcinogenic emissions to the environment are not aware that they have been harmed.

Tappan’s position is untenable also because criminology must be concerned with the social forces implicated in the state selectively invoking the criminal label in some cases rather than others. In particular it must be concerned with why law enforcement in action is biased in favor of organizational actors in a way that the law in the books is not.

**KEEPING THE PROBLEMATICS OF CRIME IN PERSPECTIVE**

This essay opened with a plea for problematizing crime, deviance, and organizations and a plea for tolerance, for drawing strength from a chaos of competing definitional constructions. But I do not take this plea for problematics so far as agreeing with those who say that what is compliance with the law is such a situational social construction as to be beyond the grasp of positive social science.

It is possible for scholars who do adopt this position to accept the considerable consensus that most criminal laws should be criminal laws as revealed in the public opinion survey literature (Grabosky et al., 1987). But then they may say the following: “We might all agree that rape and environmental pollution offenses are terrible crimes in the abstract, but when people are confronted with concrete allegations there can be profound disagreement over what is rape and what is seduction, what is an environmental crime and what is an accident.” It is of course true that what is a crime is socially defined through processes of situationally negotiating meanings from subjective interpretations of social action. Yet just as there is a tendency of positive quantitative criminology to underproblematize crime, there is a tendency of interpretive criminology to overproblematize it. The latter tendency arises from a methodological predilection to focus on the interpretive work of the offender.

What is a crime will always be contested by those accused of being criminals. Scholars who study the way offenders contest the social reality of crime risk a dangerous kind of political partisanship. One can study the perceptions of convicted rapists that what happened was seduction rather than rape, that the victim gave him the come on (Taylor, 1972), that she was his wife who had always liked such treatment before, and one can conclude from the persistent repetitions of such accounts that the crime is so ambiguous and contested as to be an ephemeral category of analysis. One can study the perceptions of business executives and their legal advisors that breaches of environmental or occupational health and safety laws of which they are convicted are not really crimes, and conclude that the law is inherently tentative rather than fixed and certain in these areas. Yet we should not forget that we are talking to actors who have an interest in rendering the law ambiguous. We could equally talk to feminists or victims about rape, trade unions about occupational health and safety offenses, environmental groups about pollution, to prosecutors or regulatory agencies. These constituencies might just as actively struggle to project clarity into the law as accused offenders struggle to project ambiguity.

It is an enormously valuable type of scholarship to study the struggle between those with an interest in clarifying and those with an interest in muddying the criminal–noncriminal distinction. My first concern is that we do not get carried away with the interpretive work being done on one side of that struggle in a way that leads us to misperceive the criminal law as nothing but shifting sand. Rather, the product of that interpretive struggle is a core area of uncontroversially criminal conduct with a fringe of shifting sand of varying widths, depending on the domain of law—wide with tax law, narrow with weights and measures offenses.

To get at that uncontroversial core of the criminal law, one might do better than to tap the perceptions of either rapists on the defensive or feminists on the offensive. One might be more interested in the interpretive work of actors who are in a kind of Rawlsian original position—who do not bring a history of personal interest to their interpretive work, which inclines them to want particular cases to be either ambiguous or clear. Where do we find such people and how do we study them? This line of thought might lead us to a remarkable discovery—the judge and jury! Moreover, the interpretive work that matters is that which constitutes the content of the law in practical institutional contexts, which are the arenas where law is made.

There is, then, a contradiction in studying the views of those with an interest in problematizing the law to study the problematics of legal definition. Interestingly,
when we put offenders in more of an “original position” by asking them about how they interpret the delinquencies of their children rather than their own crimes, all the evidence is that they disapprove of delinquency in a similar way to law-abiding parents, rather than excuse it as problematic (e.g., West, 1982, 49).

The study of how offenders problematize the criminal law is valuable for a number of reasons. It helps illuminate how conflict over the content of the law unfolds; it engenders an appreciative stance toward the offender; and it sensitizes us to the possibility that crime is a more problematic category than we might otherwise concede. All I am saying is that on this last score, we should be wary of the partisanship of taking the offender’s perception of the problematic nature of the law as definitive. The most valuable contribution of this style of research is not in the way it can undermine the possibility of explanatory criminological theory, but in the way it can contribute toward it.

Most of us refrain from crime most of the time because to seize the criminal opportunity is unthinkable to us—we would not consider beginning to calculate the costs and benefits of committing murder, rape, or a Love Canal disaster. Studying the views of criminals on how the law seems so problematic to them is one route to understanding why a particular crime was thinkable to them in a way it is not to others. Far from defeating the mission of explanatory theory building, interpretive sociology should be one of the most important tools of the theory builder’s trade.

In suggesting that we rely essentially on the definitional work of legislatures and the interpretive work of judges and juries in deciding what is organizational crime, I am certainly not advocating a return to Tappan. Rather, what I would have us do is use the law-making of legislatures and the interpretive work of judges and juries to locate that consensual core area of the criminal law, which is not shifting sand. Then one can begin to face the challenge of operationalizing white-collar crime in a way that will generate a cumulative body of positive social science data that can be used to build theories of organizational crime.

TIGHTENING UP SUTHERLAND

This might imply a limited parting of company with Sutherland’s view that “A combination of two abstract criteria is generally regarded by legal scholars as necessary to define crime; namely, legal description of an act as socially injurious and legal provision of penalty for the act” (Sutherland, 1945, 133). Sutherland’s definition excludes torts for which the law provides only for remedy by compensation, but it includes civil breaches of the law for which punitive damages are provided and civil offenses for which noncriminal penalties can be applied. This may be an insufficiently cautious approach to ensuring that the definition is confined within the core area of consensus. On the other hand, one suspects that the community is insensitive to lawyers’ distinctions between criminal and civil penalties because, as Sutherland pointed out, the differences tend to be unprincipled and arbitrary. Under the Australian Trade Practices Act, antitrust offenses need only be proved on the balance of probabilities and are sanctioned by “pecuniary penalties,” while consumer protection offenses in the same act must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and are punished by criminal fines. Yet the maximum “pecuniary penalties” provided for the former are ten times the maximum criminal fines provided for the latter! Little wonder then that Australian journalists invariably report antitrust cases as “prosecutions,” which result in “fines” for those “convicted.” But the suspicion that the community views civil penalties imposed on organizational law breakers as in the same moral category as criminal fines is only a suspicion. Until systematic empirical work is done to show that this is the case, we are probably best to reject Sutherland’s advice and limit the definition of organizational crime to criminal violations.

OPERATIONALIZATION BY CIVIL ADJUDICATION

Does this mean that research that measures rates of organizational crime by counting impositions of civil penalties should be ignored? Certainly not. So long as the civil penalty proceedings relate to forms of conduct that could have been prosecuted criminally, civil penalties data are in fact comparatively good. They are superior to arrests, police reports, self-reports, or victim survey results in the sense that there has at least been a formal adjudication that found the law was violated, if only adjudication to a balance of probabilities standard. In the American legal system most civil penalty proceedings against business are for forms of conduct for which, if the prosecution could only prove criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt, they could proceed criminally. Moreover, in areas such as occupational health and safety and environmental protection, American civil penalty proceedings are generally for forms of conduct that are dealt with as strict liability criminal offenses in British Commonwealth countries. So there is an international comparability dimension to the debate.

To adopt the view that civil adjudications of guilt should not be taken as evidence of crime is to constrain criminology with class-biased methods. This is so because a characteristic of the mobilization of law is that power is exercised such that ruling-class crimes are diverted to civil adjudication much more than working-class crimes.

This, however, does not justify counting either civilly adjudicated or voluntary recalls of dangerous products in operationalizing white-collar crime. Even a governmentally mandated recall by no means implies that the law was breached, and the action taken is remedial rather than punitive. Such administrative actions are therefore not even a satisfactory way of operationalizing Sutherland’s definition. The inclusion of this particular form of administrative action was a weakness of the classic Clinard and Yeager (1980) study.
OPERATIONALIZATION BY QUALITATIVE METHODS

For many purposes, it will be preferable for the organizational crime researcher to attempt to get closer to the reality of the level of crime by relying on self-reports such as the data on bribery revealed by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s voluntary disclosure program of the 1970s (U.S. Senate, 1976; Herlihy and Levine, 1976). Self-reports of white-collar crime can also be obtained by unstructured interview research (e.g., Braithwaite, 1985). Then there is the possibility of observational studies of offending or of enforcement directed at offending (e.g., Hawkins, 1984).

It is unfair to criticize a researcher for analyzing the Ford Pinto case as if it has some relevance to our understanding of organizational crime because Ford was acquitted of homicide. It is possible for scholars who have worked on the Pinto case to have the view that the jury was right to acquit Ford in the particular case that was brought to trial (because of particular circumstances of that case) but that if another instance of an exploding gas tank had been tried the result would have been different. I know scholars of the case who, rightly or wrongly, have this view. The Ford Pinto case is a troubling one precisely because this view may be wrong (Lee and Ermann, 1999). The point is that we cannot expect researchers who have that view about why their case study is of organizational crime to come clean and openly argue for it in print. I have had enough threats of lawsuits from large corporations to come counsel them against this. All they need do is describe the facts as they found them and leave it to others to make the judgment whether the findings constitute a contribution to our knowledge about organizational crime.

To some extent we simply must tolerate this state of affairs if we are to rectify the class bias of empirical criminology. In deciding to tolerate some definitional inexplicitness with respect to white-collar crime, we should also be mindful of tolerance of it in mainstream criminology. We would not necessarily disapprove of a qualitative gang researcher reporting how an observed delinquent act unfolded even though the actor was subsequently acquitted on certain charges relating to the behavior.

Some readers will think this much ado about nothing. What one ought to do is simply study social control—analyze cases of social disapproval being mobilized in the community in different ways such as by media moralizing, regulation, or criminalization. One does the research because one is interested in understanding the different ways that social control is mobilized, why it is mobilized in some cases and not others, why it is patterned the way it is, and what the consequences of these different modalities of control are. There is of course a great deal to be said for doing research for these reasons. However, there is also something to be said for generating data that will inform theories of crime. If it is theories of crime that we want rather than theories of social control or of the mobilization of law, then we must study phenomena that fit the definition of crime. If we want our scholarship to make a contribution toward the control of crime, then we are also required to generate data that fit the definition of crime. To the extent that it is the latter purposes we wish to serve with our research, then the very great difficulties of definition and operationalization discussed in this article cannot be ducked.

The greatest intellectual dishonesty is to side-step the question of what is crime by orienting one’s work as a study of social control or of the sociology of law, and then drawing inferences from the work concerning the explanation of crime or suggesting from it causal propositions about the effects of certain policies on organizational crime.

GETTING ON WITH THE JOB

When we do qualitative work, the important thing is that our description be thick, fair, eliciting the contrary social constructions of what happened embraced by different actors. Then we can be true to the aspiration set by Aubert for our scholarship. Equally, by doing this we best serve explanatory social science. The positive social scientist can then go to our data and make her own judgment: “Yes, I am persuaded that this should count as a case of crime” for purposes of refuting a particular theory. Or perhaps, “No, this does not satisfy the requirements of a definition of organizational crime, but it does satisfy the requirements of a definition of organizational ‘transgression,’” and can be used with other cases to refute a theory about organizational transgression.

We have advanced a number of grounds for tolerance of definitional chaos in our field and for work that problematizes definitional orthodoxy. These include the need to be open to multiple moralities, the need for an appreciative stance toward the offender, to understand the politics of conflict over different conceptions of wrongdoing and the role of the power over definition in it, and the need to understand how definitions change historically and cross-culturally.

For the purposes of explanatory theory, I have argued a preference for violations of the criminal law as the foundation for defining organizational crime as the key dependent variable. The statute books and case law supply the most passably coherent and consensually accepted definition in contemporary democracies. Until it can be shown empirically that civil penalty impositions are in the same moral category, sharing in the community consensus over the seriousness of organizational crime, it is best to reject Sutherland’s position that only a legal description of an act as socially injurious and legal provision of penalty for the act are needed to regard conduct as crime.

Apart from this, we might take Sutherland’s side against Tappan, operationalizing crime as behavior that is criminally punishable but not necessarily criminally punished. This renders permissible the operationalization of organizational crime by civil adjudication, self-report, and observational methods. Despite
the difficulties, greater attention must be directed to ensuring a correspondence between the behaviors analyzed by these methods and that which is criminally punishable.

FROM CONCEPT TO THEORY

So far I have not stated a fundamental reason for advocating this dialectic within our research community between work that problematizes definitions and work within a positive tradition where definitions are sharpened by conformity to law. The reason is that we can see fertile theoretical and policy advances down both tracks, and even more fertile possibilities if both paths are pursued to the point where they constructively intersect.

Sutherland’s project of a unified theory of crime that can account for both common crime and white-collar crime continues to be the most exciting one in criminology. Some bold contributions have been made to this enterprise (e.g., Cohen and Machalek, 1988; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1987). Elsewhere I have argued at length that much conventional criminological theory can be adapted to the explanation of organizational crime (Braithwaite, 1989a,b). In our enthusiasm for debunking theories that ignore the widespread nature of organizational crime, we have mostly failed to take seriously the challenge of building theories that do.

My own preference is for theory that construes processes of shaming as central to understanding variation in rates of both common and organizational crime. In Crime, Shame and Reintegration I argue that shaming can be counterproductive, making crime problems worse. The key to why some societies have higher crime rates than others lies in the way different cultures go about the social process of disapproving wrongdoing. When disapproval is communicated within a cultural context of respect for the offender, as opposed to stigmatization of the offender, shaming can be an extraordinarily powerful, efficient, and just form of social control.

If this is a fertile field to plough, it implies attraction to the criminal law as the basis of definition. This is because violation of the criminal law is uniquely designed to be shameful or stigmatic, and for most people in most cultures it is to some degree so perceived. When actors know that a particular way of behaving is a crime, the choice to engage in that form of conduct takes on a very different meaning to them from other behavioral choices. If shaming is crucial to understanding variations in misconduct, then violation of the criminal law is likely to be the best definitional foundation on which we can build.

The role of the state in conferring the shameful status of crime on certain forms of misconduct is crucial. But at the same time it is clear that the most potent forms of shaming are not those undertaken by the state, but those of intimates. Thus following this theoretical path implies both an interest in crime as defined by the state and pursuit of the problematics of how wrongdoing is socially constructed in informal processes of social control.

My position here is not so different from that of Habermas (1986) when he complains of legalization supplanting communicative action with legal norms. Habermas argues for a shift in the way we view law, from law as regulator toward law as “institution,” with laws functioning as “external constitutions.” Rather than enforcing norms, the law sets down procedural guidelines for informal settlements that facilitate communicative action. Niklas Luhmann (1986), like Habermas, is concerned about an overproduction of positive law, about attempts to impose the rationality of the legal subsystem on other subsystems in the society. A crisis of the contemporary regulatory state occurs because the legal subsystem is unresponsive to the patterns of life in the other subsystems it tries to regulate.

The solution according to Luhmann and Teubner (1983) is reflexion, an approach where each subsystem internally restricts itself, thereby enabling integration with other subsystems. For the control of organizational crime, reflexive law means the legal system empowering and enabling self-regulation. Close American resonances with this Continental tradition are Nonel and Selznick’s (1978) responsive law and Sigler and Murphy’s (1988) Interactive Corporate Compliance (see also Frank and Lombness, 1988). So is the cooperative regulation tradition that one sees in the work of Scholts (1984a, 1984b), Bardach and Kagan (1982), and in different ways in the work of the Oxford regulation scholars (Hawkins, 1984; Baldwin and Hawkins, 1984) and the work of our Australian group on the interaction between government regulation and self-regulation (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988, 1993; Braithwaite, Grabosky, and Fisse, 1986; Fisse and French, 1985; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). This all means taking self-regulation and business ethics seriously as the crucial mediators of regulatory effectiveness rather than as subjects to be sneering and cynical about.

There are in fact a disparate array of emerging scholarly traditions that converge on the need to view law as constitution rather than medium, on the need for flexibility, discretion, and exploration of ambiguity. Joel Handler (1988) has masterfully depicted how this convergence can arise from the attack on formalism and liberal legalism that one can discern in business regulatory scholarship, the new scholarship on the regulation of dependent people, alternative dispute resolution, feminist jurisprudence, Critical Legal Studies, Continental reflexive law, and modern/postmodern communitarian moral philosophy. The emerging theoretical currents are exciting and challenging.

I have not had space to say anything of analytical value about them here except this. Reaping their rewards requires an openness to ambiguity in the way we define our terms. I concur with Donald Levine (1985) that one of the problems of Western social science has been the Flight from Ambiguity. We would do well to reverse the tendency in positive social science discourse to root out metaphor, irony, and analogy. In the natural sciences as well as the social sciences
progress can be hastened by valuing language for "being vivid and evocative more than for its denotational precision." (Levine, 1985, 1).

Darwinian theory will not resolve to a single significance nor yield a single pattern. It is essentially multivalent. It renounces a Descartian clarity, or univocality. Darwin's methods of argument and the generative metaphors of The Origin lend ... into profusion and extension. The unused, or uncontrolled, elements in metaphors such as "the struggle for existence" take on a life of their own. They surpass their status in the text and generate further ideas and ideologies. They include "more than the maker of them at the time knew." (Boer, 1982, 9).

At the same time I have argued, like Levine, that the appreciation of ambiguity has its limits: "it must be linked to a willingness and an ability to press toward disambiguation at appropriate moments" (Levine, 1985, 219). The form of disambiguation I have advocated is operationalization of organizational crime according to the law in the books, and the appropriate contexts suggested for disambiguation are those where we seek to build and test explanatory theories of crime.

REFERENCES


From Concept to Theory


Theory and Method in Criminological Research


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The Relationship Between Research Results and Public Policy

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GOALS OF RESEARCH

Rosenberg (1988) has presented two ways of conceiving the goal of social science: improving prediction or increasing intelligibility. The latter does provide an epistemological basis for many branches of the social sciences, such as anthropology and urban sociology. But prediction is central for social scientists (Rosenberg 1988, 197, 198) "interested in knowledge that can be applied to informing social . . . policy, that can be used to predict the consequences of planning or its absence."

Not only is it likely that most criminologists would subscribe to the goal of improving prediction generally, but the use of their research results for purposes of recommending policy directions has been a focus from the earliest days. Indeed, as Petersilia (1991, 2) has pointed out in her Presidential Address before the American Society of Criminology [ASC], the formation of criminology as a field of study and the foundation of the ASC were "strongly grounded in practical concerns of the criminal justice system." Moreover, she argues in her concluding statement (1991, 14); "[Criminology] is defined by a major social phenomenon—crime—and the system and agencies established to address that phenomenon," and that, consequently, criminologists should be policy-directed in their research. Similarly, two years later, Blumstein (1993, 1) argued in his Presidential Address to the same body that "an important mission of the ASC and its members involves the generation of knowledge that is useful in dealing with..."