The first wave of Muslim–Christian violence in the province of Maluku in Eastern Indonesia broke out in 1999. Most of the 5,000-plus deaths occurred in and around the city of Ambo. In the analysis presented here, the conflict will be interpreted in anomie theory terms (Durkheim 1897; Merton 1949). Anomie is defined here as instability resulting from a breakdown of the regulatory order that secures norms.

The source of anomie in Maluku in 1998 was the 1998 collapse of Suharto’s New Order in conditions of uncertainty created by the Asian financial crisis. Jacques Bertrand’s (2004: 5) analysis is that ‘when institutions are weakened during transition periods, allocations of power and resources become open for competition’. In some contexts of anomie, violence becomes an effective form of competition. Maluku was one of those contexts. Institutions are a society’s most embedded rules of the game. The situation in Indonesia in 1998 was that the old rules were swept away for a period. What the new rules of the game would be was up for grabs. This was also the context for a post-1998 upsurge in separatist violence in Aceh (Aspinall, this volume), East Timor (Harris Rimmer, this volume) and West Papua and in interethnic or interreligious violence in other parts of Indonesia such as North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Jakarta. All of these conflicts have diminished, greatly, and in most cases, perhaps even permanently.

Merton (1949) gave anomie a meaning in terms of the structure of institutions. The unfettering of individuals and organizations from settled norms arises in conditions where there is a discrepancy between widely shared societal goals and legitimate means to obtain them. Structural shifts in the society prevent actors from achieving valued goals legitimately. So they experience pressure to resort to illegitimate means of attaining those goals, such as violence. For many villages in Maluku, this pressure was mediated by a security dilemma. The valued goal at issue for village leaders was security for the village. The legitimate means to that goal was calling in protection from the security forces. Unfortunately, it was often the security forces who were doing most of the killing, with local police killing many Muslims and (mostly non-Malukan) military accounting for much of the slaughter of Christians. The security dilemma was that both Muslim and Christian villages wanted peace; yet Christians came to believe that unless they drove out
Muslims first, Muslims would attack them, and vice versa. The blockage of access to legitimate means to achieve security resulted in resort to illegitimate means — forming militias, making home-made weapons to attack neighbours and burn their homes to the ground.

The security dilemma was in turn driven by security sector anomie. The New Order had been forged by the military following the 1967 coup that made General Suharto president. When the New Order collapsed, there were various factions within the military. Some generals wanted the military to step back from its political role and submit to democratically elected leaders. Others wanted to destabilize the emerging Indonesian democracy and assert political control by the military elite. Others simply wanted to exploit the climate of instability to enrich themselves by demanding protection money from frightened people, or from selling weapons or ammunition. In Maluku there were even military snipers who sold their assassination skills to both sides. In short, when legitimate paths to power were blocked for the military, many seized illegitimate opportunities to recoup wealth and power.

While the security dilemma was not a central part of the post-1998 conflicts in other parts of Indonesia, security sector anomie played a role in all of them, as did attempts by political opportunists of various kinds to impose new rules of the game in conditions where the old rules had collapsed. In this period, eight of Indonesia’s provinces experienced conflicts that resulted in the slaughter of a thousand or more people. Yet Indonesia is the fourth largest nation in the world, and most of its regions survived this period without any escalation of political violence. Three factors distinguish the regions where national anomie played out as regional conflict:

1. regional grievances that were structurally deep;
2. leaders with an entrepreneurial determination to connect those grievances to an identity politics that could mobilize people;
3. security sector anomie sufficiently deep (in that locality) to accelerate the insecurity.

Maluku illustrates these three factors.

**Background: Discrimination and grievance**

Dutch colonialism in Ambon provided mission education that equipped Christian but not Muslim Ambonese to become favoured in the colonial civil service and army. Consequently, Christian South Maluku had by far the highest literacy of the colony in the 1930 census – 50 per cent compared to a national rate of 7 per cent (Ricklefs 1993: 160). Dutch colonial policy segregated and divided Christian and Muslim Moluccans (with Muslims afforded lesser opportunities in the colonial army and civil service all over Indonesia).

Van Klinken (2007: 90) points out that from colonial times to 1990 Maluku enjoyed extraordinarily high levels of public sector employment. This declined by a third between 1990 and 1998, promoting insecurity among disproportionately Christian beneficiaries of the previous public sector largesse. Budgets from 1998 were sharply reduced in response to the Asian financial crisis, further retrenching public employment. The decentralization policies of the Habibie government in 1999 increased financial incentives for corrupt local elites to grab key positions. So public sector jobs simultaneously became scarcer, more lucrative for those who won them, and more contested through democratic mobilization.

**Politization of religion**

Local politicians were learning to be democratic. They were used to securing office by currying favour with Jakarta elites. What were they to do now to mobilize popular support in the new democratic Indonesia? In circumstances of Christian anxiety that the 1990s had seen some Islamization of the New Order state, a decline in Christians’ considerable relative advantage in public sector employment compared to Muslims’, and immigration eating away their small majority of the population of Maluku (50.2 per cent at the 2000 Census), Ambon Christian politicians saw potential in mobilizing support by appeals to a Christian identity under threat.

On the Muslim side, there was resentment in what became the ignition point of the conflict of predominantly Muslim Batumerah on the fringe of Ambon. In Batumerah only 8 per cent of employment was in the public sector, while in nearby Christian areas as many as 70 per cent of jobs were in the public sector. Local Muslim strength and national support was on the rise, so community leaders also saw prospects for mobilizing democratic support along religious lines. In the mid-1990s, Maluku’s Governor Lateuconsinsa, was aggressively pro-Muslim in appointments, such that all district regents in the province were Muslim by 1996. Both Lateuconsinsa and his Christian rival for the governorship in 1992 and 1997 mobilized criminal gangs to coerce support and threaten opponents. They poisoned the minds of both ordinary people and sermon-givers in churches and mosques that immigrant takeovers of public offices or markets were part of a conspiracy of Islamization or Christianization that threatened their very existence as a religious community. Van Klinken (1999: 16) concluded that each contender was supported by ‘increasingly anxious communication networks . . . Each had prepared contingency plans for an attack from the other. When a trivial incident occurred at the city’s bus terminal, the word flew around each side that “it had started”’.

**Provocation narratives**

In Ketapang (Jakarta) on 22 November 1998 Christian and Muslim Ambonese gangs seem to have been used on different sides of a dispute about control of a gambling monopoly in which 13 were killed. Police then shipped back to Ambon over 100 gang members who had been arrested in the riots. Some of these seemed to be trained and paid, probably by elements in the military, to provoke conflict in Ambon. It is possible that only a small proportion of the triggering events of the Maluku violence were the work of ‘provocateurs’, most of it just contagion that
plugged into longstanding local resentments. I conceive the provocateur script as part of a widespread Indonesian pattern of non-truth and reconciliation. The one thing both sides comfortably agreed on as they sought to reconcile after this conflict was that all this destruction was ultimately the work of outside provocateurs.

There was some self-fulfilling prophecy during January 1999 in the belief across Ambon that boatloads of thugs were arriving to cause trouble. This put both the Muslim and the Christian communities in a security dilemma. The security dilemma thesis is that war can occur when neither side intends to harm the other but both feel they must defend aggressively against their worst suspicions of what the other might do.

Escalation of violence

On 19 January 1999 a fight broke out in Maluku between an Ambonese Christian bus driver and a migrant Bugis Muslim passenger, sparking communal conflict. It was initially conceived more in terms of a migrant-versus-Ambonese conflict rather than one involving religious identities. While youths from the initial combatant communities – predominantly Muslim Batumerah and Christian Mardika – had shared a common rivalry over many years, this time their fighting was more violent and deadly than ever before and was distinguished by repeated attacks on religious symbols. And it spread relatively quickly beyond these traditional rivals across the whole of Ambon island and to at least 14 other islands in Maluku.

Ambon split into exclusively Christian (60 per cent) and Muslim (40 per cent) zones. The central mosque and the central protestant church in Ambon became command centres for a religious war, despatching reinforcements to villages that reported they were at risk of being overrun. Fighting waxed and waned in waves of violence between 1999 and 2004, resuming and intensifying in the second major wave in July 1999, remaining at its peak until January 2000. Christian forces may have had the better of the fighting by January 2000. But at least 2,000 armed Laskar Jihad fighters departed from Java and Sulawesi for Ambon in April–May 2000. These young fighters were mobilised through mass demonstrations organized by religious leaders on the streets of cities, particularly Jakarta, protesting Christian atrocities in Maluku. Then they were armed and provided basic training with assistance from elements of the Indonesian military. Laskar Jihad and other Islamist militias eventually tipped the balance to Muslim fighters. Smaller numbers of other outside jihad groups were also involved. Some Laskar Jihad had automatic weapons. By the end of 2000 approximately one-third of the population of Maluku had been chased from their homes, a large proportion of which were burnt to the ground.

The security forces

The rule of law was an early casualty of the conflict. By July 2000 the police had arrested 855 suspects for various acts of interreligious violence. But trials could not be held because prosecutors, judges and court clerks had fled and prisons had also broken down. When police tried to arrest Laskar Jihad members, they were surrounded by hundreds of protestors who forced their release. By May 2001, some symbolic arrests became possible against some prominent Christian and Muslim leaders to signify that the rule of law was returning.

Maluku was run by active or retired military officers until late in Suharto’s New Order. After the fall of the New Order, political leaders in Maluku continued to see themselves, and to be seen, as clients of particular members of the military class. Opportunistic factions of this military class, van Klinken (2007: 93) argues, were in the background providing resources to different sides of the conflict depending on their loyalties and their business and political agendas. The most devastatingly negative contribution of the military was as sponsors of Laskar Jihad. These imported fighters were trained near Jakarta by current and former members of the military, allowed to travel to Maluku despite orders from President Wahid to the military to prevent them from boarding ships to Ambon. Worst of all, the military sometimes fought alongside Laskar Jihad in large numbers.

Conflict diminution: The road to reconciliation

By late 2000 a new military commander was transferring partisan military units out of Maluku and by early 2001 the new police commander was able to report that 600 police officers had been transferred, 16 dishonourably discharged and 87 sanctioned (ICG 2002). Police and military units began to desist firing upon each other! While the security sector performance in 1999–2000 was more part of the problem than part of the solution, ultimately it became a large part of the solution, though some rogue elements may have been involved in a renewed bout of serious violence that occurred in 2004, but ended quickly.

Early peace-making efforts

The first effort at peacemaking by the Habibie government in March 1999 was to send a delegation of prominent military officers to talk to both sides and reconcile differences. Violence escalated in response: the military was seen by Malukans at that stage as the problem and not the solution. Religious leaders on both sides were secretly reaching out to each other. On 4 September 1999 Christians of the Concerned Women’s Movement held a peace demonstration in front of the Governor’s Office, drawing out the Governor, the police, judiciary and military leadership to listen to a Women’s Voice Declaration. Not long after, a similar demonstration was held by the Muslim Concerned Women’s Movement. The two Concerned Women’s Movements were afraid to demonstrate openly together, but they were secretly meeting to share peace-building intelligence. On 7 December 1999 the Governor followed the women by reading aloud his ‘Declaration of Refraining from Violence and Ending the Conflict’, which was signed by senior leaders of all faiths. Muslim leaders, including the Ulamas Council (MUI) pleaded with all outside fighters to return to their home villages. By mid-2001 approximately half the Laskar Jihad fighters responded to these appeals voluntarily.
A bottom-up movement

A peace movement and process called Baku Bae (reconciliation) was established by Christian and Muslim non-government organizations (NGOs). Three reconciliation meetings of progressively larger groups of Malukan Muslim and Christian leaders were held. It was agreed to expand the interfaith dialogue from these beginnings and two neutral zones were established in Ambon for trade and education patrolled by a peace-keeping force of local residents of both faiths. Though bombs were detonated to destabilize them, these peace zones succeeded and spread.

On 17 January 2001 a prayer meeting of 1,000 school children (500 Muslim/500 Christian) projected the message that ‘their parents should be ashamed. Why cannot they make peace where the children have already?’ (Ambon interview 2007.) Mosques and churches, often with support from donors, then organized a great variety of activities that brought Muslims and Christians together in interfaith dialogue and reconciliation. During many of my 2007 and 2008 interviews, it was said that the shock of the violence had led to a renaissance ofShader (customary) traditions for diminishing violence. The most important of these were pela relationships of mutual help between villages, usually of different faiths.

Interfaith reconciliation

The community of Batumerah that launched the first major attacks of the battle of Ambon in January 1999 enjoyed a ceremony during my 2007 fieldwork where its Christian partner village, Paso, built and erected the Arif pole at the center of its new mosque to replace the one burnt down by Christians. Following such assistance of pela partners with building a mosque or church, devotees of the two faiths enter the building for a shared service. This affirms the Ambonese belief that Islam and Christianity are basically ‘only variations of the same faith’ (Bartels 2003: 135):

What we must do is take the values of pela into the public arena, beyond pela villages. Some migrants have learnt to understand and value pela and participate in pela activities in their areas. So we can revitalize a multicultural pela that was always multi-religious.

(Protestant minister)

One of the projects of the Inter-faith Dialogue was to give pela more shared Muslim-Christian spiritual content. One way they settled upon was to connect pela traditions to stories from both Muslim and Christian holy texts. In several villages I visited, Muslims had helped Christians rebuild churches or Christians had helped Muslims rebuild mosques. In Indonesia such reconciliation through working together on shared projects is important and is called gotong royong.

Post-conflict, there is a tendency to romanticize pela, when, as Brown et al. (2005: 22) point out: ‘Even at its height, pela-gandong did not, and was never meant to, ensure cohesion between broad social groups across the region’. On the other hand, recovery from the worst conflict a society has experienced is a time when romantic reconfiguring of traditions to make them more ambitious traditions of peacebuilding do occur.

Top-level intervention

All this reconciliation groundwork finally bore fruit with an agreement signed at Malino on 12 February 2002. When informants were asked what the turning point in the conflict was, Malino was the near-universal nominee. Jakarta ministers Jusuf Kalla and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), rode into this Malino II reconciliation meeting with the momentum of a peace for Peso recently negotiated at Malino I. Malino I did not deal with the conflict in Maluku, but it did negotiate withdrawal from Peso of some of the Muslim militias that were fighting in Maluku, including Laskar Jihad. While Malino II was a turning point, it was a process that did only a small part of the sustained, detailed work of peacebuilding. It was a very short process, with poor follow-through. While Malino I and Malino II were both important contributions that stamped Kalla and SBY who later (2004–2009) became Vice President and President, respectively, as men capable of restoring peace to Indonesia, we must be careful not to fall prey to a front-stage account of politics. A number of the Christian and Muslim leaders who became Malino delegates had been meeting in secret ‘3 or 4 times a week’ for a couple of months before they started working with Kalla’s office. Yet, the special contribution of Malino was that it was more front-stage, involving more high-profile leaders, than in the past. The entire two days of the meeting was televised, causing everyone in Maluku to be glued to their television sets, thereby also causing a total pause in fighting! As one of the delegation leaders said in an interview, Malino put central government leaders on television being a party to the peace process: ‘Up till then they did not take responsibility as a state’.

Disbanding the militias

The confidence that a turning point to peace had been reached at Malino allowed other positive things to occur, including a moderately successful amnesty for surrender of weapons. The Malino Reconciliation team visited every mosque and church in Maluku socializing the agreement. A critical factor in the return of Laskar Jihad fighters to Java and Sulawesi during 2002 was that their financial backers stopped paying them. International diplomacy led to meetings between Saudi Arabian ulamas with the Laskar Jihad leadership and an authoritative fatwa issued from Saudi Arabia stating that the jihad in Maluku was now over. Ambon ulamas we interviewed who were supporters of the most radical spoilers of Laskar Jihad viewed this fatwa as authoritative. For them the fatwa was the important reason that it was right for all Laskar Jihad fighters to return to their homes.

One leading ulama said Laskar Jihad were actually ‘easy to persuade. They were not stubborn. So long as you appealed to them in religious terms . . We went house to house, talking to them’ (Ambon interview 2007). The slow conversion of
almost all of Laskar Jihad to return to peaceful lives on their home islands was impressive in the way it used a combination of:

1 persuasive overtures from religious leaders they respected in Ambon, Java and Saudi Arabia;
2 elders in the Muslim villages they were protecting thanking them, but saying now it was time for locals to build their own peace;
3 diplomacy that led to an authoritative fatwa to withdraw;
4 withdrawing the financial carrots and political and military support that were inducing them to fight;
5 shutting down the organization that supported them;
6 shutting down the website that attracted and indoctrinated many of them;
7 cutting off much of the plentiful supply of ammunition they had enjoyed in previous years;
8 surprise night-time arrests of sleeping hold-outs and death in fire-fights for others.

Their leader, who was so vitriolic in his advocacy of holy war and ethnic cleansing, and supported the 9/11 attack on New York, is no longer an outspoken advocate of violence against Christians. He was always critical of Osama bin Laden as someone from a different Salafi stream. But he became increasingly vitriolic in regular denunciations of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

**Prospects**

Wilkinson (2004: 43-47) concluded from his regressions on 138 Muslim–Hindu riots in 167 Indian towns that:

[T]own-level electoral incentives account for where Hindu–Muslim violence breaks out and state-level electoral incentives account for where and when state governments use their police forces to prevent riots ... In virtually all the empirical cases I have examined, whether violence is bloody or ends quickly depends not on the local factors that caused violence to break out but primarily on the will and capacity of the government that controls the forces of law and order.

(Wilkinson 2004: 4–5)

Fighting between Ambon Christian and Muslim youth gangs had been common in the 1990s but rarely killed anyone. The Ambon fighting never escalated into wars that embraced all Ambon island and beyond until the disintegration of the New Order left Maluku unprotected by a police and a military who were often more interested in adding fuel to the fire than putting it out. The interesting question then becomes why the security forces choose to allow or fuel disorder. In Wilkinson’s data, the answer was that Indian police were under the political control of elected state governments and in cases where that state government did not depend on minority votes, they could find it politically expedient to allow minorities to be attacked and to attack (rallying disengaged members of their majority ethnic group back to commitment to ethnic voting). Conversely, when state governments did rely on minority votes, they insisted that their police use all means necessary to protect them. Political and military elites in Jakarta in 1999–2000 were concerned about losing Muslim support but not greatly concerned about Christian support. Worse, military leaders up to General Wiranto saw the military as having a political interest in instability, indeed in ‘renegotiating the concept of the nation’ (Bertrand 2004: 10). So Laskar Jihad was allowed to escalate the war, and the military experienced impunity despite taking sides.

The military and the police began to be committed to doing their job in Maluku. Indeed they did it with some finesse, for most of the 2000s, relying heavily on *adat* (indigenous) justice where they could, firmly enforcing the criminal law against violence in other cases, even prosecuting some significant numbers of ringleaders of the violence of a decade ago as evidence became available. Laskar Jihad was persuaded to return through a sophisticated multi-dimensional public–private mix of religious authority and education, carrots and sticks that helped widen internal divisions and disenchantment with their leadership (Hasan 2006).

There is no inevitability that 50/50 demographic splits lead to conflict even when compounded with structural injustice. Women rarely go to war against men. What we have seen since 2000 is a redefining of an interreligious identity of Moluccan brother-sisterhood as syncretically Christian–Muslim. It is a case that reveals a drawback of consociational political resolutions to conflicts that would guarantee both groups a minimum level of political representation or veto. The trouble with consociational politics is that it freezes identities, missing the constructivist insight that identities can be deconstructed and reconstructed, as has happened in a determinedly wilful feat of Moluccan civil society. It was not a matter of retrieving a traditional identity that gathered dust during the conflict; a new post-conflict synthesis of identity is still under construction from new and old spiritualities, rituals and peace pacts. So prospects for peace in Maluku are good for three reasons. First, national and regional anomie has declined as new rules of the game have stabilized in a progressively more democratic Indonesia. Second, interfaith dialogue and reconciliation has reached a point where aspirants for Malukan political leadership would be certain to lose power if they appealed openly to ethnic violence. Third, security sector anomie has subsided as both military and police have submitted to elected politicians who demand that they guarantee security.

**Lessons**

Maluku is one of a number of Indonesian cases that are challenging my starting theory that reconciliation without truth is not possible. These cases show that meaningful and practical levels of reconciliation can be grounded in a formidably dishonest analysis of the drivers of the conflict, at least initially. Few of the
countless crimes against persons and property committed under cover of the conflict have led to an apology for that specific crime. It is more comfortable to blame it all on outside provocateurs.

We are in the era of Security Sector Reform in UN and international engagement with armed conflict. Wilkinson (2004: 5) may be right that: ‘Abundant comparative evidence shows that large-scale ethnic rioting does not take place where a state's army or police force is ordered to stop it using all means necessary.’ Does this mean that our friends in the police and military are justified in concluding that if only reform and resources were focused on the security sector, effectiveness in preventing conflict might be maximized? A second strand of this argument is that there are always ethnic and religious conflicts; there is always racism, prejudice and hatred under the surface in every society. Ethnic fractionalization is not even a strong predictor of conflict in quantitative studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003). You cannot stop war by eliminating ethnic/religious divides, but you can prevent ethnic/religious riots from ever escalating into wars by making your security sector work.

One problem with this prescription is that there are many ways a security sector can fail to do its job. Sometimes in the post-1998 Indonesian conflicts, the security forces failed to stop violence because they wanted to support the winner and really did not know which side was going to win. Sometimes they moved aside to allow atrocities because their commander had taken a bribe to look away. Sometimes they did so because the attacking forces were huge and they feared for their safety. Sometimes soldiers joined one side because of their own faith at what they saw as a moment of millennial showdown between good and evil. Sometimes they failed to do their job because they were annoyed at being hungry and not getting paid. Sometimes conflict between different factions within the security sector paralysed it. Sometimes they failed to protect civilians on one side because the political elite gave them clear signals that they wanted this to end by the other side prevailing. Sometimes they failed to do their job because they wanted chaos to destabilize a government they viewed as hostile to the military. Sometimes they managed these tensions by delegating security to a militia, and then the militia got out of hand. Elements of every one of these things happened in the Moluccas.

Because empirically there are many reasons why security forces fail under pressure, it is best we limit the frequency with which they have to face down mobs throwing bombs. Western security forces look good in terms of their capacity to maintain domestic order only because they have never tried to stop a phalanx of hundreds of angry people carrying machetes and hurling the odd bomb. They look good because they are rarely put under serious pressure domestically, but when they are put under serious pressure by armed civilians in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, we see them differently.

The argument is, why rely on a fallible last line of defence when earlier lines of social defence are available? So if there are grievances fuelling an identity politics that drives violence, work at preventive diplomacy to address those grievances before the event and reconciliation that heals them after the last conflict. Redundant defence will not work if it has just any old strings to its bow. Very different kinds of strings are needed to cover the weak spots of one intervention with the strengths of another. It is good to tackle root causes where we can (and some such as security sector anomie were tackled in this case — nationally through security sector reform, provincially through replacement of units entangled in the conflict). When some of the root causes remain, it is also good to tackle proximate causes (such as a Saudi Arabian fatwa for Laskar Jihad to fight). When some of the root and proximate causes remain, it is good for the security sector to be effective in smothering sparks of religious violence before they inflame larger gangs of fighters. Maluku was a case where not all the root causes and not all the proximate factors were eliminated. But enough of them were addressed that village elders no longer felt they were in a security dilemma. Reconciliation between Christian and Muslim women’s leaders helped here as well. So when spoilers spread false rumours that the religious other was about to attack, women of the religious other were able to pass on assurances to women from the spoilers’ village that no attack was planned.

So societies should invest in resolving root causes of conflict like anomie and discrimination against an ethnic group, as well as proximate causes, and in addition they need effective community policing that smothers sparks that could ignite conflicts. As a last resort they need the capability to halt riots and out-gun rampaging militias. The theory is that societies that are strong at all these capabilities are unlikely to experience ethnic/religious war. Because all of these capabilities have been strengthened in Maluku, and because new institutions of reconciliation and interfaith dialogue have been created to counter the rumour-mongering of spoilers, prospects for preventing a new religious war seem good.

Nevertheless, while so many root causes persist in Maluku, risk remains. In September 2011 Ambon had its biggest test since 2004 when the body of a young Muslim man was found in a Christian area with wounds that looked very much like stab wounds. The police (of whom Muslims remain suspicious because of their past fighting alongside Christians) insisted it was a motorcycle accident, but resisted family demands for an autopsy. This was plain bad policing. Islamist websites then ran hot urging Muslim youth to arm and rally for a rumble after the funeral. Christian youth mobilized in response: seven were killed and over 150 homes burned in the conflict (ICG 2011: 1, 4).

Not all about the policing response was negative, however. Many armed young Muslims from Java who responded to the calls for a new jihad in Ambon were intercepted, turned back or arrested while trying to travel to Ambon. This was precisely what the security sector failed to do in 1999. Second, the organization of forces of peacemaking and reconciliation in Ambon was immediate and formidable rather than delayed and timid as it was in 1999. A group called ‘peace provocateurs’, drawing on veterans of the interfaith dialogues of the 2000s, worked with local government officials to restore calm much more quickly than in 1999 and 2004. At least, so it seems at the time of writing. Not all lessons had been learned, but it seems enough so far to contain violence to low levels in comparison to the devastation and carnage we saw in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004.
Note

In accordance with my ANU Human Research Ethics approval for Peacebuilding Compared, interview informants are quoted here anonymously.

References


