Charles Tittle’s *Control Balance* and criminological theory

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**Abstract**

Charles Tittle’s (1995) *Control Balance* suggests that deviance is likely either when people are much more controlled than controlling or when they are much more controlling than controlled. The theory is more subtle than first appearances suggest; it finds control ratios to influence motivation, provocation, opportunity and constraint. Tittle’s work opens up the potential for a more productive integration of explanatory and normative theory in criminology. A republican account of the redistribution of control is advanced at this explanatory-normative theoretical interface.

**Key Words**

- control balance  
- deviance  
- predation  
- republican

In *Control Balance: Toward a General Theory of Deviance*, Charles Tittle (1995) has given us one of the more important theoretical contributions to the sociology of deviance. Tittle advances in a bold way Jack Gibbs’ (1989) idea that control should become the central organizing concept of the discipline of sociology. The objectives of this article are to show why the theory of control balance is a major advance, yet to show how it could and should be simplified into a theory that has at once more explanatory power and greater parsimony.

The theory is fleshed out in a detail which will be ignored for the purposes of this paper. Given that my purpose is to argue that the core propositions of the theory amount to a breakthrough, yet those core
propositions can be rendered more powerful and parsimonious, I do not need to worry about explanatory appendages of the theory that may be valuable, but that involve no particular theoretical progress.

The importance of Tittle’s contribution

The variable to be explained in Tittle’s theory is ‘deviance’ defined as ‘any behavior that the majority of a given group regards as unacceptable or that typically evokes a collective response of a negative type’ (Tittle, 1995: 124). The crucial independent variable is the ‘control ratio’. The control ratio is the degree of control that one can exercise relative to that which one experiences. If by virtue of the roles and statuses one occupies and the personal strengths one has, one has the potential to exert more control over others and their environment than others (and the environment) do in fact exert over oneself, then one has a control surplus. Obversely, a person who by virtue of lowly status has little potential to control but who actually experiences enormous control has a control deficit.

The interesting theoretical move Tittle makes is to suggest that either kind of control imbalance—surplus or deficit—conduces to deviance. To see why this is an important move, consider one of the most influential sentences in the history of criminology, first uttered by Edwin Sutherland in his 1939 Presidential address to the American Sociological Society: ‘If it can be shown that white collar crimes are frequent, a general theory that crime is due to poverty and its related pathologies is shown to be invalid’ (Sutherland, 1983: 7). In light of Control Balance, a riposte to Sutherland is: If it can be shown that both control surpluses and control deficits explain deviance, it may be that crime in the suites can be explained by control surplus, crime in the streets by control deficit, so that control imbalance structured into a society becomes a common cause of both types of crime. Another of what Kathleen Daly (1995) describes as the central paradoxes of crime and justice that Tittle’s theory enables us to tackle is why women and girls in all societies we know commit much less crime than men and boys, while it is the latter who enjoy the greater wealth and power. If both control surplus and control deficit are involved in the explanation of crime, then as we will see below, we might come to grips with this paradox as well. And a good many more which are compellingly documented in Tittle’s monograph.

Another attractive feature of Tittle’s theory is that it manages synthesis of explanation by rational choice, virtuous choice and sociology of the emotions mechanisms. Unlike almost all traditional criminological theories, Tittle’s theory includes an account of why people are motivated to commit crime. For present purposes, the crucial part of that motivational story is that the pursuit of autonomy is more or less a learned human universal. This is true to the point where when people enjoy a control surplus, they are still motivated to extend it. When they suffer a control deficit, they are
motivated to eliminate it. Deviance results when motivation is triggered by
provocation and enabled by the presence of opportunity and absence of
constraint. Building opportunity and constraint into the theory brings into
play the explanatory power of rational choice. Provocation is built into the
theory in a way that brings the sociology of the emotions in. A person
highly motivated to deviate by virtue of a control deficit, who is exposed to
an opportunity with low risk that constraint would be mobilized may be
virtuous enough not to deviate until there is a provocation—a racial insult
or some other discourtesy, challenge or display of vulnerability that elicits
resentment or shame over a control deficit (or temptation to exploit in the
case of a control surplus). Provocations are ‘contextual features that cause
people to become more keenly cognizant of their control ratios and the
possibilities of altering them through deviant behavior’ (Tittle, 1995: 163).
Virtue (or ‘moral commitment’ as Tittle prefers in his more normatively
neutral approach) is snuck into the theory here not as a causal mainspring
(like motivation, provocation, opportunity and constraint) but as a limiting
contingency on the operation of those mainsprings of the theory (Tittle,
1995: 208–9). At least it is there.

Tittle’s core contention that control imbalance motivates and explains
rates and types of deviance seems a powerful and testable explanation for
a lot of things we know from the sociology of deviance. Equally, his claim
that control imbalance affects patterns of provocation, opportunity and
constraint, which in turn affect deviance, adds to the power of the theory,
if not to its testability. Tittle suggests in various places (e.g. pp. 170, 177,
182, 276) that deviance is a result of a desire to rectify a control imbalance.
This is odd because while those with a control deficit may do this, those
with control surpluses pursue ever bigger surpluses. It is both simpler and
more plausible to assert that most people want more control, however
much they have, than that they seek to ‘rectify the [control] imbalance’
(p. 177). Elsewhere, Tittle is more careful on this matter, if more convol-
uted, where he speaks of ‘motivation to correct a control imbalance or to
extend a control surplus’ (p. 182).

Why control deficits should stimulate deviance will be intuitively clear to
most readers. The claim taps into a long tradition of writing in criminology
about how powerlessness engenders resentment, envy, hopelessness, need,
loss of stake in conformity and humiliation that can be acted out through
either violent or property crime (Braithwaite, 1979). But why do control
surpluses stimulate deviance? Tittle has a kind of ‘power corrupts’ expla-
nation here. One effect of having a control surplus is that other people
recognize this and subordinate themselves to you; most people with a
control surplus take advantage of this proffered subordination. Because it is
harder to control someone with a control surplus (by definition), deviance
carries lower risk for persons with control surpluses. Therefore, they can
and do take advantage of the subordination preferred to them in deviant
ways when this is gratifying. This picks up one of the earliest insights of
feminist theory; in the words of Mary Wollstonecraft (1995: 9): ‘...
hereditary property—hereditary honours. The man has been changed into an artificial monster by the station in which he was born, and the consequent homage that benumbed his faculties like the torpedo’s touch.’ According to Tittle, the iterated subordination experienced by persons with control surpluses renders them ungrateful for the things subordinates are subordinate about. They come to presume subordination to the point where any resistance to it becomes an insult and a provocation to deviance. An illustrative repeated observation from the literature on domestic violence is the dominating husband who is infuriated by the failure of his wife to have dinner ready for him at the time he expects (Hopkins and McGregor, 1991). Hence, in different ways, both subordination and resistance become provocations to deviance for those with control surpluses.

Moreover, Tittle contends that there is a reciprocal relationship between the deviance engendered by control surpluses and that engendered by control deficits. Domination and ingratitude at the hands of actors with control surpluses is humiliating for those with control deficits. This humiliation engenders defiant deviance among the powerless. Defiance in turn is reciprocated (with deviance of domination) to further extend the control of the actor with the surplus. Obversely, ‘Efforts to extend control surpluses are likely to lead to efforts to overcome control deficits’ (deviance of the dominated) (Tittle, 1995: 182).

Effects of redistributing control

Tittle’s control ratio idea seems a more fruitful way of reconceptualizing my own work on why reducing inequality based on class, race, sex, age and political power (slavery, totalitarianism) might simultaneously reduce crimes of exploitation and crimes of the exploited, crimes of the powerful and crimes of the powerless (Braithwaite, 1979, 1991). A materialist and then a sociology of the emotions argument will be reformulated into Tittle’s framework here. The first is an opportunity theory argument that: (1) crime is motivated in part by needs, often transient, episodic needs (Wright and Decker, 1994: 36–48); (2) needs are more likely to be satisfied as control ratios increase; (3) policies to foster control balance will do more to increase the need satisfaction of those with control deficits than to decrease the need satisfaction of those with control surpluses. The latter is true because of a standard welfare economics point that marginal gains from satisfying needs decline as need satisfaction increases. The value of one’s millionth dollar is less than one’s first. A billion dollars of GDP spent on housing for the homeless will increase need satisfaction more than the reduction of need satisfaction from reducing the value of mansions for the rich by a billion dollars. When people feel that few of their needs are met, they are more likely to perceive that they have little to lose through a criminal conviction, little stake in conformity. In contrast, a person with
basic needs satisfied will suffer more from a prison sentence that deprives him of a comfortable home, a loving family life and a stimulating job.

Because people with large control surpluses are likely to be in a position where most of their needs are met, they are most unlikely to steal in order to increase need satisfaction. Their theft is more likely to be motivated by greed. The reformulated materialist argument becomes therefore that control imbalance increases:

Crimes of poverty (control deficit) motivated by need for goods for use

Crimes of wealth (control surplus) motivated by greed for goods for exchange (that are surplus to those required for use)

People with control surpluses tend to steal to gratify greed; in Marxist terms, not to acquire goods for use, but acquisition of goods for exchange that are surplus to what is required for use. Control surpluses result in the accumulation of economic surpluses to control. Surplus can be disposed of in a variety of ways such as inheritance, charitable contributions and conspicuous consumption to signify status. The important application of surpluses from a criminological point of view, however, is through exchanges which constitute new illegitimate opportunities. The best way to rob a bank is to own it. But that in turn requires a large quantity of capital. Elsewhere I have documented a variety of ways that the possession of goods for exchange beyond those required for use enables the constitution of a wide variety of extremely lucrative criminal opportunities that are not available to those of us still struggling to acquire the goods and services we would like to use (Braithwaite, 1991). The point is an old one, explicated in Cicero’s prosecution of Verres, the corrupt governor of Sicily in 70 BC: ‘The people who have reason to fear prosecution, Verres assures his friends, are those who have only stolen just enough for their own use: whereas what he, on the contrary, has stolen is enough to satisfy many people!’ (Cicero, 1971: 38). Cicero’s republican analysis of unchecked accumulation and corruption is revived in the 18th-century feminism of Mary Wollstonecraft (1995: 234): ‘The preposterous distinctions of rank, which render civilization a curse, by dividing the world between voluptuous tyrants and cunning envious dependants, corrupt, almost equally, every class of people . . .’

In terms of Cohen and Machalek’s (1988) evolutionary ecological approach to expropriative crime, the returns to an expropriative strategy vary inversely with the number of others who are engaging in the same strategy. Extreme control surpluses foster extraordinarily lucrative minority strategies. People and organizations that control large surpluses can pursue criminal strategies that are novel and that excel because they cannot be contemplated by those without extreme surpluses.

It follows from Cohen and Machalek’s (1988) analysis that those with extreme control surpluses will rarely resort to the illegitimate means which are the deviant staples of those with control deficits, because they can
secure much higher returns by pursuing strategies to which those with control deficits have no access. There will be little direct competition between the control deficit criminal and the control surplus criminal. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that separate explanations are required simply because these worlds of deviance take such different forms. On the contrary, Tittle’s theory shows how there can be a common explanation for the two patterns of deviance in the form of the extent of control balance or imbalance.

Just as greed fetishizes money for its value for exchange rather than use, so control itself can be fetishized. Control can be exchanged, invested to generate more control. Hence, the crimes of J. Edgar Hoover (Geis and Goff, 1990) might be understood in terms of an insatiable desire to accumulate more power for exchange. In this way, the purchase of the materialist analysis can be extended beyond property crime to many other forms of deviance. The most terrible crimes of our history, of Hitler against the Jews, Cortez and the Conquistadors, the genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, are explained by the pursuit of power by actors whose lust to dominate was insatiable, who would never have been satisfied by a balance of control.

The second argument to be reconceptualized from Braithwaite (1991) is directly adopted by Tittle. This is a sociology of the emotions account about control ratios and humiliation. Tittle reads the criminal episodes analysed by Jack Katz (1988) rather as I do, and somewhat differently from the way Katz himself reads them, since Katz eschews general explanation. ‘The latent argument’ in Katz, according to Tittle (Tittle, 1995: 278), is that ‘deviant behavior is attractive because it puts the person in control’. Indeed, the argument is not very latent when Katz characterizes the ‘badass’, for example, as one who takes pride in defiance at being bad:

The badass, with searing purposiveness, tries to scare humiliation off; as one ex-punk explained to me, after years of adolescent anxiety about the ugliness of his complexion and the stupidness of his every word, he found a wonderful calm in making ‘them’ anxious about his perceptions and understandings.

(Katz 1988: 312–3)

Beyond Katz, Tittle quotes ethnographies of burglars, for example: ‘As I rifled through those people’s most private possessions, I felt a peculiar power over them, even though we’d never met’ (Tittle, 1995: 193). Katz does see violence as ‘livid with the awareness of humiliation’ (Katz, 1988: 23). Rage transcends the offender’s humiliation by taking him to dominance over a proximate person. Just as humiliation of the offender is implicated in the onset of his rage, so the need to humiliate the victim enables her humiliation. Similar conclusions have been reached by psychiatric scholars (Kohut, 1972; Lewis, 1971; Lansky, 1984, 1987) and other scholars working in the sociology of the emotions tradition (Scheff, 1987; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991).
Katz rejects structural explanations for the cycles of humiliation, rage and assertion of domination that he documented. In contrast, Braithwaite (1991: 49) asserted:

[S]ome societies are structurally more humiliating than others. For a black, living in South Africa [under Apartheid at the time] is structurally more humiliating than living in Tanzania. Living in a prison is structurally more humiliating than living in a nursing home and the latter is more humiliating than dwelling in a luxury apartment. Slavery is structurally more humiliating than freedom. School systems such as I experienced as a child, where children are linearly ordered in their classroom according to their rank, ‘dunces’ sitting at the front, are structurally more humiliating for those who fail. . . . More generally, egalitarian societies are structurally humiliating. When parents cannot supply the most basic needs of their children, while at the same time they are assailed by the ostentatious consumption of the affluent, this is structurally humiliating for the poor.

(Braithwaite, 1991: 49)

Now I might want to reformulate all this using Tittle’s more general and elegant account: societies with large control imbalances will be structurally more humiliating than those with modest control imbalances. Much crime, particularly violent crime, is motivated by the humiliation of the offender and the offender’s perceived right to humiliate the victim, by the offender being dominated and by the offender’s domination of a victim. Like the materialist argument, the sociology of the emotions argument applies with as much force to crimes of control surplus as to those of control deficit. Hitler, as I have already said, enjoyed a control surplus. His fascism was structurally humiliating. In Mein Kampf he explained how the German people had been humiliated at Versailles, tricked and betrayed by Jews for generations. His was an appeal to a humiliated people, an appeal to transcend it through the violent assertion of world domination, and along the way to assert a right to humiliate the Jews. The historical stupidity of the Allies at Versailles was to saddle the Germans with a control imbalance which was an emotional as well as a material burden they were bound to defy (Scheff, 1994). It was the emotional dynamics of that control imbalance that handed the world the holocaust. An enormous appeal of Tittle’s theory is the sweep of its relevance—from the most fragmentary domestic altercation to explaining global conflicts.

Control ratios and types of deviance

The aspect of Tittle’s theory I would want to abandon is his account of how different types of deviance are associated with different levels of control imbalance. Consider his account of the effect of different levels of control surplus. When individuals exercise slightly more control than that to which they are subject, exploitation is said to be the most common form of deviance, examples of which are price-fixing, shake-down schemes by
gang leaders who sell protection to merchants, bribery and extortion. In the zone of medium control surplus, the modal type of deviance shifts from exploitation to plunder—

selfish acts—forms of plunder—that include things like environmental pollution inflicted by imperialist countries whose leaders are in search of scarce resources in underdeveloped countries, programs of massive destruction of forests or rivers for the personal gain of corporate owners or executives, unrealistic taxes or work programs imposed by autocratic rulers, enslavement of natives by invading forces for the benefit of military commanders, pillage of communities by hoods doing the bidding of crime bosses, pogroms . . . .

(Tittle, 1995: 191)

When control surpluses are very large, decadence becomes the characteristic form of deviance, of which Nero, Howard Hughes and perhaps Michael Jackson are proffered as exemplars. The distinctions between exploitation, plunder and decadence are not clearly defined. Nor do they seem distinctions worth making. Tittle gives no empirical evidence to suggest that there might be some correspondence between the three zones of control surplus and these three types of deviance. So why render the theory more complex in this way? Why not adopt the more parsimonious, and one might add more plausible, view that the larger the control surplus, the more likely exploitation, plunder and decadence all become?

On the control deficit side, there are some suggestive empirical grounds for taking Tittle’s partition into zones of deficit more seriously. Here predation is said to be associated with marginal control deficits. The classic instances of predation involve directly taking things from others, directly inflicting violence on them or directly forcing them to do things they do not want to do (e.g. rape). In the moderate zone of control deficit, defiance is said to be the modal form of deviance. Defiance means deviant acts of protest against the control to which they are subjected such as mocking authority or sullen conformity. Withdrawn or escapist deviance, such as ‘alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide, family desertion, mental illness, or countercultural involvement’ (Tittle, 1995: 190), is also a possibility in this intermediate zone of control deficit, though it is not clear how or whether most of this is classified as defiance. In the extreme zone of control deficit, submissive deviance is said to be typical. Perhaps controversially, Tittle suggests that most people find slavish submission or grovelling compliance deviant. People in this zone are so dominated, according to Tittle, that they are too afraid of countercontrol to engage in either predation or defiance.

Again, the distinctions among predation and defiance are not especially clear, though they are sharply distinguished from submissive deviance. But then one wonders that many withdrawn forms of deviance such as mental illness or drug abuse might not be submissive. While the categorization across the zones of control deficit is not very compelling, Tittle is on to an
underlying insight. This is that more predatory forms of deviance require a certain degree of autonomy; they require that one not be so dominated as to be afraid of standing up to others. When control deficits are extreme, people may be so terrified of countercontrol that they are beyond predation and even beyond sullen forms of defiance. This core insight is not only plausible; in contrast with the control surplus distinctions there is some empirical evidence which suggests that plausibility. Tittle points out that submission or defiance was more common than predation among black Americans during the period of slavery (Tittle, 1995: 250). With emancipation, predation became more possible because the countercontrol they feared reduced as their domination became less total. Indeed, Tittle could have gone further here. There are empirical grounds for believing that the civil rights progress of the 1960s in the US did more to increase than to reduce black violence (McDonald, 1972). The concept of resistance to domination increasing at the time when that domination is reduced has been a recurrent one in political theory since de Tocqueville (1856: 214), reaching its most developed form in Davies’s (1962) theory, which associates revolution with a prolonged period of economic and social development followed by a short, sharp reversal.

Another form of support for Tittle’s key insight here comes from experimental psychological research organized under Brehm’s (1966) theory of psychological reactance as revised by Wortman and Brehm (1975). The key idea of the theory is that a threat to a freedom motivates the individual to restore that freedom. The psychological reactance literature supports a nonmonotonic relationship between the magnitude of a threat of control and a reaction by the controlled person to re-exert control or to give up (Brehm and Brehm, 1981: 58–97). Threat up to a certain point progressively increases psychological reactance; beyond that point, the subject of control gives up on the idea that she enjoys any control, ceasing resistance to the control. Empirical work derived from the ‘learned helplessness’ research program (Seligman, 1975) led to a modification of Brehm’s (1966) original reactance theory to accommodate the finding that extended experience with uncontrollable outcomes leads to passivity.

The learned helplessness and psychological reactance literatures do highlight a problem with Tittle’s theory. When there is a control deficit, deviance for Tittle is a way that people restore some sort of control. Yet submission, the form of deviance associated with the most extreme deficits, is hardly a means of restoring control; on the contrary, it amounts to yielding to a downward spiral into helplessness. As with the effect of control surpluses, there is therefore a need on the deficit side to reformulate the theory of control balance. The reformulation proposed is that as control deficits increase, predatory deviance increases up to a point where people become so dominated that the fear of countercontrol eventually throws this trend into reverse. Domination increases predation until people become so dominated that they are afraid to reassert their own control through predation (or even less predatory forms of defiance). Resistance is
reinterpreted as pointless in the face of utter domination. At extremes of control deficit, people submit defiantly or they withdraw, giving up on the mainstream of life, retreating into drugs, depression or even suicide. In summary, as control deficits become larger, predatory deviance increases until a point is reached where predation declines in favour of retreatist forms of deviance. To this control deficit reformulation, we can add the simplified surplus reformulation: as control surpluses increase, exploitation, plunder and decadence all increase.

Indeed, we can simplify the two reformulations by pondering whether there is really a clear distinction between predation on the deficit side of control balance and exploitation on the surplus side. James Q. Wilson notwithstanding (1975), there is no problem with conceiving of shake-downs, bribery, extortion and price fixing as predation. Most of the world’s antitrust laws actually incorporate a notion of ‘predatory pricing’ (e.g. Section 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act). So we might consider abandoning the notion that Tittle’s theory of control balance is a theory of deviance in general, conceiving it instead as a theory of predation.

The following simpler theory has attractions. Predatory deviance is least likely in societies where high proportions of citizens are in control balance and low proportions in control deficit or surplus. Predatory deviance increases monotonically with increasing control surpluses; predatory deviance increases with rising control deficits up to the point where people give up on resistance (see Figure 1). Beyond this turning point, predatory deviance declines, submission increases, as does the deviance of disengagement—drug abuse, alcoholism, depressive disorders and suicide. The simplified theory is not meant to suggest that there is no difference between the predatory deviance on the surplus side compared with the deficit side of balance. While predatory deviance is enabled both by having nothing to lose (high deficit) and by having little likelihood of losing it (high surplus), the power dynamics of being in surplus enable forms of deviance which are impossible for those with little control, as we saw in the discussion of Cohen and Machalek (1988). In their choices of predation, the powerless

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1** Hypothesized simplification of the relationship between control imbalance and predatory deviance
must make the best of a bad job, while those with control surpluses can take advantage of a good job. Where there is competition between the two over the same predatory strategies, it is fragile. The small drug dealer can be crushed by a powerful organized criminal unless she finds a way of complementing him or picking up his crumbs.

There is no way of saying anything clear about the specific forms of deviance that will attract those with extreme control surpluses. According to the evolutionary ecological understanding of crime, as in nature, a strategy of predation is more likely to persist if it is different from that used by other predators. Predation flourishes on the basis of innovation to discover niches untouched by competitors. For this reason, criminologists do not even know about the most lucrative forms of crime among the powerful; they are lucrative precisely because so few have the knowledge and resources to exploit them. Similarly, as control is exerted to further narrow the predations available to the powerless, they innovate by trying new scams on people less powerful than themselves (either permanently or momentarily).

This simplified formulation salvages the really important aspects of the explanatory power of Tittle’s theory. It explains why the retired elderly should engage in little predatory deviance—their control deficit is so high that they generally have given up on resistance to control. Similarly, the very young, those under 10, generally have yet to imagine that they might have the power for predatory deviance in response to the enormous control deficit they suffer. Yet it explains why by the time young people pass adolescence, they have rounded the turning point and are near the maximum risk of predatory deviance. It explains why women in circumstances of extreme family and workplace domination can be beyond feeling the power for predation, why the ratio of submissive and withdrawn deviance to predatory deviance is so high for them. It explains why 18th and 19th-century African Americans might have been dominated beyond predation, while late 20th century African Americans can imagine predation as within their grasp. At the same time, the simplified version of the theory avoids some predictions that are unlikely to be sustained. For example, the fact that control ratios are higher for men than for women should imply under Tittle’s original theory that both predation and defiance are more common for women than for men.

Control ratios, provocation and opportunity

Part of Tittle’s theory is that control imbalance explains deviance, not only because it increases motivation and emotional commitment to reclaim or extend control in ways such as those demonstrated by Katz (1988). The explanatory power of control imbalance also comes from the fact that people with control imbalances, according to Tittle, are exposed to greater
provocation and opportunity for deviance. Hence, people who are domi-
nated because of their race are also more likely to be provoked by racial 
insults and subtle forms of disrespect and as young people, they are 
exposed to the illegitimate opportunities constituted by stigmatized sub-
cultures or criminal gangs that are organized in slums. Note the role of 
stigmatization in the constitution of criminal subcultures (Braithwaite, 
1989: 65–8, 127–33); put another way, criminal subculture formation 
maps the social structuring of provocation. Powerful men are provoked to 
predation and exploitation by the submission proffered by potential targets 
of their domination, by the way they experience power as unchecked, and 
by the opportunities (e.g. surplus capital for investment in scams) their 
control imbalance generates. On gender, the theory gives an interesting 
account of why men care more about loss or extension of control than 
women and how this engenders provocation (Tittle, 1995: 239):

Traditionally, and to some extent continuing into the present, the male role 
was defined by active subjugation of the forces of nature and protection of 
his domain .... These role distinctions made sense in primitive environ-
ments because they meshed with the superior physical strength of males and 
the relative confinement and dependency of females handicapped by child-
bearing and nursing .... Because of these role distinctions calling for 
dominance, males are more concerned about their relative control ratios. 
Consequently, they suffer much anxiety about whether they are living up to 
expectations, and uncertainty stimulates tests. Recurring challenges within 
males culture (Luckenbill, 1977, 1984) produce more potentially demeaning 
situational provocations than are faced by females.

(Sanders, 1981; Short and Strodtbeck, 1974)

Similarly, it seems plausible that by the time people are old, they are 
resigned to not caring so much about the things they cannot control. 
Conversely, from adolescence to age 25, young people care enormously 
about establishing an independent identity, breaking free from the stric-
tures of youth, such as family and school control. Because young people spend 
more of their time in public space, while the old spend more of theirs in 
private space, it is the young who encounter more provocation, more 
debasement by police and other superordinates and more of the oppor-
tunities for predation located at the ‘hot spots’ of public space (Sherman et 
al., 1989).

The extent to which people in different structural locations care about 
their domination is important because of the considerable experimental 
evidence that psychological reactance is greater when people care most 
about the freedoms under threat (Brehm and Brehm, 1981: 58–63). Not 
only do crime-prone demographic groups such as adolescents, young adults 
and men care more about loss of control than others, those who select 
themselves into power-exerting vocations, such as politics, policing and the 
military, are likely to care more about debasement, humiliation and 
domination than those who have not been so socially selected. It is a
recurrent tragedy of the human condition that those who are socially selected into the power-exerting vocations are so predisposed to predation and exploitation. This is one reason why throughout human history we have had so much rape in war, police violence, so much political corruption and war-mongering.

So the theory gives redundantly strong grounds for predicting some of the strongest correlates of predatory deviance we have—with age, gender, race and business and political elite status, plus a number of others that are discussed in the book itself.

**Implications for normative political theory**

Tittle does not set out a normative position on which forms of deviance are morally bad and morally good. Consequently, he is reticent on the implications of his work for normative political theory. This is a pity, because those implications are rich, especially for someone attracted to the kind of civic republicanism that I find congenial. According to the civic republican position, as articulated by Pettit and Braithwaite (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990; Pettit, 1997), a master political value is republican freedom, or freedom as non-domination, liberty that is assured by legal, social and economic guarantees that those with greater power will have their ability to dominate us checked. Predation, exploitation and plunder, as conceived in Tittle’s theory, are by definition threats to freedom as non-domination. This is not true of submission and generally not true of defiance or decadence. Hence, a further advantage of the simplification proposed here—transforming the theory into one of predatory deviance where predation and exploitation are collapsed into one concept—is that such a simplified theory can facilitate the neglected task in the social sciences of forging connections between explanatory theories (ordered sets of propositions about the way the world is) and normative theories (ordered sets of propositions about the way the world ought to be).

From the standpoint of republican political theory, what are the implications of the control balance explanatory theory? I will argue that they are:

1. greater equality of control;
2. republican virtue in the exercise of control;
3. given (1) and (2), greater acceptance of control;
4. nurture of social bonds, social support, community.

**Greater equality of control**

This is the only one of the four implications which Tittle himself explicitly draws. If the extent of control imbalance in a society predicts predatory deviance, then redistributing control from those with surpluses to those with deficits will simultaneously reduce the predations of the powerful and the predations of the powerless. An important qualification here is that
redistribution will shift some people with large control deficits from submission and retreatist pathologies such as suicide and drug addiction to predation. From a republican perspective, this qualification is not a deeply troubling one, since submission, like predation, is a political state that is unattractive. Similarly, at least according to an important difference between Braithwaite and Pettit’s (1990: 97–9) republican theory and liberalism, even when drug abuse or suicide is absolutely consensual, it does amount to a reduction of dominion or republican freedom, for those who inflict it on themselves. Reduction of drug abuse and those forms of mental illness which reduce the dominion of its sufferers, or those affected by that suffering, are therefore important moral concerns for civic republicans.

When Tittle does discuss equality of control, he does so in a rather republican way, invoking the kind of separation of powers, checks and balances, that characterized the institutionalism of the framers of the US Constitution (Madison et al., 1987). Balanced societies are ‘probably very democratic ones with social institutions arrayed to sustain mutually controlling checks and balances’ (Tittle, 1995: 197), where ‘the rulers are relatively restrained by the citizens and the citizens are relatively free’ (p. 198). The prediction of this negative association between freedom and predation runs contrary to the intuitions of many who, for example, perceive freedom to have increased crime in post-communist societies and to be responsible for the extraordinarily high crime rates in the US. Yet a negative association between freedom and predation is supported by some more systematic evidence (Braithwaite, 1989: 158–9). Now we might test it further by correlating international political freedom indices with corruption indices (Internet Corruption Ranking, 1995), though this does not yet seem to have been done.

Moreover, from a republican perspective, it is a mistake to think of the US or the post-communist societies as especially free, compared to other democracies. While the US has strong statist checks and balances to restrain abuse of power (the post-communist societies do not), the communitarianism that allows civil society to control excessive exploitation is limited and economic inequality leaves large proportions of the population extremely vulnerable to predation and exploitation. Freedom as non-domination cannot be a practical accomplishment for someone who lives in abject poverty, for someone who has not been given the education accorded to those who are regarded as active citizens of the society under consideration. As in standard civic republican thinking (Sunstein, 1988), it follows that freedom and greater equality of control must be pursued through redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor.

**Republican virtue in the exercise of control**

Of course, control cannot and should not be eliminated. Otherwise, individuals, families and societies could not get the things done that are
needed for them to flourish. The republican normative dispensation is
simply that control should be distributed in a more balanced way. But the
other important element of the republican normative tradition is that it
should be exercised in a more virtuous way. The key aspect of the virtuous
exercise of control raised by Tittle’s analysis is that it should be exercised
without debasing, defiling or humiliating others, so that it does not become
a provocation to predation. Republican control requires respect for per-
sons, humility by the controllers. It rejects lording it over (to apply a feudal
usage against which republicanism reacts), mastering (the reaction against
slavery as the antithesis of citizenship), decreeing (the republican reaction
against monarchy) or dictating (the republican reaction against totalitarian-
ism) to the controlled.

Commitment to an ideal of rule of law is one of the cultural precon-
ditions for republican virtue in the exercise of control. The rule of law ideal
means that no one feels they are above the law when they exercise control,
not even the head of state. All must feel the humility of living in a society
where the rule of law stands above the rule of persons. Here there is a real
difference between a president of the United States who knows that he can
be humbled by the courts and a president of Russia who still knows that he
can tell the courts where to jump off. The power of the rule of law ideal
comes not so much from the formal status of the law as from its cultural
acceptance, its ingrained capacity to inure humility into the exercise of
control.

The favoured republican way of exercising control virtuously is dialogue
which leads to the voluntary assent of the controlled to their control
(Sunstein, 1988). Again, there are preliminary empirical reasons for sus-
pecting that dialogic control works better than precipitate recourse to
command in preventing predatory deviance (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992;
Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1994). More-
ever, there is a child-rearing literature which suggests that if we wish to
raise non-violent, virtuous children who respect others, firm and fair
discipline justified by moral reasoning is more successful than either
absence of control or domineering control that is devoid of dialogue or
justification (Baumrind, 1971, 1978; Braithwaite, 1989: 72). When people,
adults or children, comply because they are coerced to comply, there is
considerable evidence that they become less convinced that compliance is
virtuous or intrinsically valuable, and so they cease compliance when the
extrinsic threat is removed (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 49–51). More-
ever, there is some suggestive evidence that when non-dialogic coercion is
directed against adults with control deficits (e.g. the unemployed), humili-
ation and defiance can result, worsening predation (Sherman, 1992). Schef-
(1994) has shown how the humiliating way the Allies exerted control over
Germany at Versailles put many Germans into a shame-rage spiral that
rendered them vulnerable to the politics of predation. Obversely, after the
Second World War the wisdom of MacArthur in the respect he showed to
the war criminal Emperor Hirohito, the virtuous exercise of power that
was the Marshall Plan, this was the politics of humility and reintegration. The finest moment of the American century.

**Greater acceptance of control**

Tittle’s work suggests that persons and types of persons (e.g. young men) who are less willing to accept control are more likely to respond to it with predatory reassortions of control. The psychological reactance literature shows that control is more likely to engender defiant reactions for freedoms over which we are more reluctant to accept control (Brehm and Brehm, 1981). It follows that if we can persuade people to be more accepting of control, there will be less predation. This is a worrying inference because if people are in slavery, republicans concerned about domination must want them to resist that domination rather than accept it, even if the effect is that their conduct becomes more predatory.

At the same time, we know that control is necessary for most of the good things in life. As we saw in the last section, children raised without control become exploitative and dominating adults. If banks do not control a lot of capital, there will not be the investment to generate employment. Government capable of strong control is necessary for the rule of law, to secure human rights against domination, to raise the taxes to redistribute wealth and to put in place strong checks and balances (Braithwaite, forthcoming).

The republican normative framework here is quite clear. We should support those controls that in their ultimate effects increase freedom as non-domination, resist controls that reduce republican freedom. In a society where the first two republican implications of control balance theory have been implemented—where equality of control is as great as is consistent with maximizing freedom as non-domination, where control is exercised with the virtue consistent with maximizing liberty—then we should want citizens to accept that control, enjoy its benefits and put up with the autonomy loss necessary to those benefits. Of course, in terms of a whole society such a utopian situation would never come to pass. However, there will be contexts, even within societies which fall far short of the first two ideals, say family contexts, where parents virtuously sustain maximum equality of control within the family consistent with securing freedom as non-domination for its members and those it deals with. In these contexts, republicans want to engage in dialogue with children to persuade them that it is best to be accepting of the family’s control, just as in contexts where they are dominated and abused we want to assist them to resist. In contemporary capitalism, much more so than under Fordist capitalism, there are workplaces where control is distributed without gratuitous inequality and with humility and respect. We all reap the benefits of increased productivity and reduced predation when workers live with this control. When educational institutions show equity and respect to students, we all get the benefits of a better educated populace through
persuading students to submit to the educational regime. Males often have a special problem in submitting to controls in school and elsewhere, even where those controls are beneficial and decent.

**Stronger social bonds, social support, communities**

The criminological literature is rich in explaining and empirically demonstrating how social support reduces crime (Cullen, 1994). Not only do social bonds with loved ones prevent the onset of crime, the forging of bonds to new partners can be a major factor in exit from criminal careers (Shover, 1996: 124–6). More broadly, strong social bonds between individuals or strong communities at the macro level reduce predation and exploitation (Braithwaite, 1989). Where the social bond between an employer and employee is strong, the respect this breeds makes exploitation more difficult to sustain. Where social bonds in families are strong, predatory conduct is more vulnerable to shame because we care about the disapproval of those to whom we are strongly bonded (Braithwaite, 1989). Families are precisely the institution in modern society where we are most likely to learn the virtues of non-domination and respect for others because that is where social bonds tend to be strongest. In short, republican attraction to strong social bonds within strong communities arises from the fact that this creates the structural conditions where the first three republican normative implications of the control balance theory apply. Extreme inequalities of control are harder to sustain between actors who enjoy strong social bonds, as is disrespectful, humiliating exercise of control. Obversely, control is more likely to be accepted under joint conditions of bonding, equality and respect. Just as liberty-equality-fraternity is a Gestalt rolled together in a republican conception of liberty, so is bonding-equality-respect (including respect for difference—diversity within unity) rolled together in a republican conception of community. When social bonds are strong in a society, shaming of domination, pride in non-domination and respectfulness are more likely to prevail. So is shaming of the predation that arises from the control imbalances that remain.

**Conclusion**

Charles Tittle’s theory in *Control Balance: Toward a General Theory of Deviance* has been simplified here to postulate the following. Predatory deviance is lowest in societies where control ratios are more balanced, where low proportions of the population are in control deficit or control surplus. The control ratio is the degree of control one can exercise relative to that one experiences. Because power does corrupt in a variety of ways, predatory deviance increases monotonically with increasing control surpluses. Predatory deviance increases with widening control deficits up to a point where people give up on resistance. Past this point, predatory deviance falls and retreatist deviance such as drug abuse and suicide
increase. Control imbalance increases deviant motivations, provocations and opportunities. Such a theory affords a good account of the patterning of deviance by gender, race and age, for example.

Four normative implications of the theory are advanced.

1. Societies with greater equality of control will be better off because of reduced predatory deviance and reduced withdrawal from social and political life.

2. For any level of inequality of control, control that is exercised respectfully, without humiliation or debasement, will generate less predatory deviance.

3. When control is distributed with equity and exercised with virtuous respect, acceptance of that control is desirable because, especially for men, this acceptance will defuse predatory deviance.

4. When social bonds, social support and communities are strong, equality of control is likely to increase, as is the respect with which control is exercised and the willingness of citizens to accept equitable, virtuous and public-regarding controls.

While the simplification proposed here allows for a more elegant synthesis of explanatory and normative theory, systematic empirical research is needed to assess whether it or Tittle’s original formulation has more explanatory power. As with even the best criminological theories, we can expect the variance explained under either formulation to be modest. So long as such partial theories have some credible explanatory power, they will be useful as metaphors to apply alongside other partial theories in contextual analysis of specific problems of predatory deviance that arise within specific historical conjunctures (Braithwaite, 1993).

Notes

My thanks to Jack Katz, Christine Parker, Charles Tittle and an anonymous reviewer for helpful reactions to an earlier draft of this paper.

1. My hypothesis would be that when people are in perfect control balance, they will pursue the imbalance that will come from greater control.

2. Here I am indebted to the research of my PhD student, Jennifer Balint who is studying these genocides.

3. Note that Figure 1 differs from the (admittedly simpler) inverted-U in Tittle’s (1995: 183) Figure 7.2 because submission is defined as deviance in the Tittle model, but not as predatory deviance in my model.

References


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